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Preface

Socrates was executed for atheism in Athens, and other ancient philosophers
such as Theophrastus and even Aristotle were confronted by the same possibility. Several centuries later many libraries seem to have been destroyed
by fire in order to eradicate all texts suggestive of secular philosophy, and
still later medieval Christian scribes and scholars resorted to textual censorship with comparable results. Such extremes have of course been abandoned
since the Renaissance, but modem classical scholarship has effectively sustained this dubious effort by ignoring or deemphasizing the materialist perspective of ancient secularists such as Democritus, Strato, Cameades and
even Aristotle despite ample textual evidence to the contrary.
At the tum of the twentieth century, the eminent classicist John Burnet
went so far as to explain that the primary achievement of early Greek philosophers consisted of "the faith that reality is divine" in the shared "effort to
satisfy what we call the religious instinct." 1 In effect he proposed that ancient
Greek philosophy served as an early version of religion dedicated to the
concept of existence as a product of one or more gods. The no less eminent
scholar, W.K.C. Guthrie, apparently shared this assumption as suggested by
his reluctance to acknowledge secular analysis. His five-volume set, A History of Greek Philosophy, provides an outstanding historical analysis of ancient
classical philosophy, but his convictions as a lay minister at his college
chapel may have biased his analysis more than he realized. This tendency
seems likely, for example, when he suggested the possibility of shared ambivalence toward religious belief by both of the pre-Socratic philosophers,
Parmenides and Melissus:
Against those who speak of mysticism and proofs of the existence of God, it is
necessary to point out that, even if Parmenides and Melissus retained, almost
Vll
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automatically, this legacy from earlier thought, their remains show that it was
of little importance to them. 2

In simpler terms, religion was presumably retained by both philosophers
at least as common assumptions otherwise of little importance later in their
lives. Guthrie could obscure the religious disbelief of Melissus, as indicated
in a passage quoted by Diogenes Laertius in Lives ofEminent Philosophers:
Moreover, he [Melissus] said that we ought not to make any statements about
the gods, for it was impossible to have knowledge ofthem." 3

This was a succinct admission of agnosticism--if not atheism--and in fact
it anticipated the viewpoint of modem logical positivists including Bertrand
Russell, Guthrie's colleague at Cambridge.
In contrast, Theodor Gomperz, the eminent Austrian classicist who lived
at the same time as Burnet seems to have suggested the likelihood of Melissus' impiety when he accused him of an inexcusable transgression, but without going so far as to identify it:
Grave fallacies must be laid to his charge, but there is not the least ground to
impute to him any deliberate imposture or any deception save the deception of
himself. 4

Grave fallacies indeed! One can only suppose that Melissus' refusal to
concede the necessary existence of gods was considered so extreme that it
had to be ignored except as an unspeakable transgression. Unfortunately,
however, this avoidance that Gomperz shared with Burnet and Guthrie
served to obscure the pivotal significance ofMelissus' primary assumptionthe recognition that the combination of spatial and temporal infinitude, the
latter as already suggested by Parmenides, seems to eliminate the likelihood
of transcendental godhead. Of necessity a functional god along with the
promise of an afterlife could only be possible as co-extensive portions of
material existence in its entirety. Melissus accordingly declared an assumption implicit in ancient Greek philosophy from its very beginning, and in
doing so he bridged the gap from Parmenides' holistic perspective asserted
by classical goddesses at least for literary effect to the outspoken atheism of
Democritus, Protagoras, and an assortment of Athenian Sophists, followed
by Aristotle and still later by Strato, Cameades and even Cicero. Unfortunately, modem ignorance of this predominant secular assumption throughout
ancient Greek philosophy obscures an important historic linkage between
what might seem two separate periods in the history of ancient Greek philosophy-pre-Socratic secular philosophy and Aristotelian cosmology that turns
out to have been equally secular once submitted to close examination.
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In fact careful analysis of early Greek philosophical texts discloses that
pre-Socratic philosophers were almost unanimous in their disdain for both
Homeric polytheism and the cult worship of later years. Today their arguments continue to be ignored or willfully misinterpreted precisely because
they explain the physical universe on a materialist basis at odds with Platonism and modem Christianity. Even prominent modem secular philosophers
have more or less shared this perspective as illustrated by Bertrand Russell's
qualified praise of Aristotle's theoretical contribution in his standard history
ofwestem philosophy. More recently, Tim Whitmarsh maintains in Battling
the Gods: Atheism in the Ancient World, a text for the most part supportive of
ancient freethought, that ancient material philosophers lacked a genuine tradition of their own despite their interesting lives and opinions. But not true.
Except for the Platonists and Neoplatonists, ancient Greek philosophers more
or less shared Melissus' rejection of the orthodox god concept, and in fact
their version of materialism was surprisingly in accord with the most advanced findings of modem science. This is why it seems useful to reconstruct
their shared perspective by integrating on a holistic basis their few texts and
fragments that still exist despite the library fires , medieval censorship, and
modem scholarship devoted to its misinterpretation.

I.
My reconstruction of ancient disbelief begins as a summary of the roughly
fifteen major pre-Socratic natural philosophers who sought to explain a physical universe devoid of supernatural intervention. The second chapter thereupon features the Age of Pericles, when Platonism took root as a reaction
against Athenian Sophists who promoted uncompromising doubt regarding
all matters, including religion. The text also takes into account Protagoras '
secular achievement as a skeptic, and then summarizes Plato 's effort to renew the god concept based on a theory of ideal forms earlier suggested by
Anaxagoras. The next two chapters document how Aristotle's effort to formulate a cosmology in the probable sequence of his texts from Physics and
Metaphysics to De Caelo, Generation and Corruption, and finally De Anima
effectively unified and consolidated pre-Socratic secular assumptions based
on the likelihood that the universe consists of mass in infinite cyclical motion. Pious references to monotheistic godhood are conceded now and again
throughout Aristotle's argument, but most are identified as obvious interpolations by medieval scribes. 5
The fifth chapter discusses Theophrastus and Strato as Aristotle's two
principal successors at the Lyceum. Theophrastus' primer on metaphysics-all that remains of his ample scholarship on cosmology--is discussed as a
summary of Aristotle's assumptions that set the stage for Strato's more stri-
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dent atheistic approach. Also taken into account are Strato's invention of
experimental science and his unsuccessful use of a primitive vacuum jar to
reconcile Democritus' atomism with Aristotle's concept of spatial continuity.
Apparently this is the first scientific experiment on record, and despite its
unavoidable failure it seems to have inspired Bacon's later dependence on
experimentation that is now generally considered to have initiated modem
science. As suggested in greater detail (and for the first time), Bacon himself
very likely suggested his debt to Strato in his Preface to Novum Organum
without specifically identifying him by name.
In the sixth chapter, the shared version of natural philosophy proposed by
Epicurus and Lucretius is shown to provide what amounts to an alternative
version of materialism that featured Democritus' assumptions rather than
those of Aristotle. In my seventh chapter, Academic Skepticism is explored
pertaining to both Arcesilaus' emphasis on common sense and Cameades'
more rigorous emphasis on probability as well as his strident misuse of
Aristotelian logic to reduce orthodox religious assumptions to absurdity. All
evidence of these atheistic arguments was later destroyed except for several
passages quoted by Sextus Empiricus, who undoubtedly refrained from admitting their authorship by Cameades in order to guarantee publication and/
or to avoid prosecution.
The eighth chapter examines Cicero's sophisticated comparison among
these various approaches and their comparative validity. In his final remarks
that have been either overlooked or misinterpreted, he expresses his willingness to modify Cameades' version of skepticism in light of Aristotelian
assumptions as formulated by his former tutor Posidonius. In effect his perspective was both skeptical and Aristotelian, a combination that anticipated
modem secular philosophy. Finally, the Epilogue provides an abbreviated
history of western civilization's loss and recovery of secularism since the
Roman Empire.
Altogether as many as two dozen ancient philosophers are interpreted in
light of their shared commitment to a secular explanation of the universe.
The skeptics are shown to include Protagoras, Aenisidemus, Arcesilaus, and
Cicero, while outspoken atheists include Anaximander, Democritus, Strato,
Cameades, and Lucretius. A mixed viewpoint can be attributed to Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Anaxagoras, and natural philosophers with obvious
atheistic tendencies include Theophrastus, Epicurus, and especially Aristotle
during his thirteen years at the Lyceum in Athens. Aristotle's cosmology is
conceded to be obscure in at least a few contexts, but, as I try to demonstrate,
its cumulative analysis compels a strictly secular explanation once understood based on his theoretical advance from Physics and Metaphysics to his
later texts in their obvious combination, De Caelo, On Generation and Corruption, and De Anima.
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II.
I myself am not a professional classicist versed in Greek and Latin, but
instead a retired English professor who spent several years teaching lecture
courses about the literary history of western civilization. My syllabus included Gilgamesh followed by a quick unit upon Greek genius that featured
Homer, Greek tragedy, and Plato's "Allegory of the Cave" before my analysis advanced to the Bible, Shakespeare, and various modern authors. Totally
omitted from my lectures was Greece's remarkable assortment of secular
thinkers. This was partly because their textual record is necessarily scattered,
but also because I did not recognize its central importance relevant to the
history of western civilization.
On the other hand, my graduate seminars in literary criticism featured
literary deception as "substitutive enhancement" much as explained in my
book, Negative Poetics dealing with the pursuit of pleasant alternatives-the
testament of love as opposed to indifference, the vision of evil as opposed to
severe misbehavior, etc. Later I applied this veridical methodology to both
literary and non-literary texts, whether by Kant, Shakespeare, or the original
authorship of American constitutional law. The archaeology I am proposing
here brings this analysis into play once again, this time as an antidote to the
reluctance of modern classical scholarship to accept pre-Socratic secular assumptions that culminated with Aristotle's impressive version of materialism. In effect my task has been to disclose Greek philosophy's remarkable
theoretical achievement as the primary source of modern secularism.
As for the title of this book, it speaks for itself. Just as the field of
archaeology features the recovery of prehistoric artifacts that bear religious
implications, my effort is to perform essentially the same service relevant to
ancient disbelief. Just as shards of pottery and occasional temple ruins exemplify the findings of archaeology, the task of this book features the analysis
of scattered philosophical fragments additional to the only available complete texts by three ancient secularists--Aristotle, Lucretius, and Cicero. In
combination, these provide sufficient evidence toward a systematic understanding of a thriving secular tradition a couple thousand years ago.
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The practice of religion may be traced back as many as 300,000 years, and
identifiable religious groups existed during the Neolithic Age perhaps 30,000
years ago. On the other hand, there is no evidence of outspoken religious
disbelief until the sixth century BC, roughly twenty-five hundred years ago.
This repudiation first occurred in ancient Greece when so-called natural philosophers began to engage in speculative inquiry more or less a century
before the Age of Pericles. 1 By most accounts the original individual to
engage in philosophical speculation, Thales-supposedly the most eminent
of the seven wise men-would seem to have conceded the existence of gods,
but he also suggested the possibility that the entire universe consists of water.
His disciple Anaximander took the next step by instead proposing the likelihood of an unknown substance that eliminated the necessity of gods, and
later philosophers mostly concerned themselves with a variety of materialist
cosmologies until the inception of Platonism followed by Aristotle's more
inclusive synthesis. Much later, Greek secularism declined during the Roman
Empire and finally terminated during the so-called Dark and Middle Ages.
At least a thousand years passed before the Renaissance attained what has
been described as a rebirth of Greco-Roman civilization, and not surprisingly
a major aspect of this achievement was the rediscovery of secular philosophy
in light of ancient Greek findings.
Comparable periods of doubt can also be detected at about the same time
in the ancient civilizations of China, India, and Iran, when such figures as
Confucius and Lao'tze likewise questioned orthodox religion. However, their
disbelief does not seem to have inspired any significant speculation by their
followers. Why was Greek civilization unique as the source of this remarkable secular revolution? In the final analysis an economic explanation seems
the most plausible. Earlier civilizations enjoyed high levels of agricultural
Xlll
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prosperity on the fertile river plains of Egypt, Mesopotamia, China, and
India, and their economies seem to have depended on collective obedience
ensured by shared religious convictions. The supernatural authority of gods
played an essential role in helping to guarantee obedience and sustain received expectations. To this extent the promotion of belief was more important than the pursuit of knowledge that might possibly be in conflict with
belief.
I. AN ECONOMIC EXPLANATION
Eventually, however, mercantile trade throughout the eastern Mediterranean
region became more profitable relative to agrarian productivity, and cognitive skills became more important than cooperative submission. Phoenician
trade thrived by the twelfth century BC, and its obvious success inspired
Greek competition that led to the founding of Greek city-states similarly
dependent on trade. On the coast of Turkey the port city of Miletus played a
dominant role until Persian armies sacked it in 494 BC, whereupon regional
leadership shifted to Greece, and Athens came to the fore. Here Greek traders
expanded the use of coinage invented in Lydia in the early seventh century.
The nearby silver mines of Laurion provided ample precious metal for this
purpose, and primitive banks were founded to help subsidize transactions
linked with trade. Coastal agricultural regions from Italy to the Black Sea
also benefitted from this commercial network. In exchange for food--primarily consisting of grain-Grecian port cities engaged in primitive manufacture
that included the sale of tools, weapons, pottery, clothing,jewelry, and leather, as well as slaves obtained from lands conquered by others. Almost all
urban dwellers in these cities-even a few of the slaves--somehow shared in
this affluence.
A rapidly growing leisure class soon emerged that adopted a wide variety
of cultural innovations, particularly in Athens during the fifth century BC. 2
As explained by Carroll Quigley in The Evolution of Civilizations, "We
might say that the Age of Expansion in the eastern Mediterranean was from
about 850 B.C. to about 450, while in the western basin it was about 700 to
250 BC 3 As perhaps the most consequential outcome of this prosperity, a
highly articulate minority became interested in philosophy as a theory of
existence more credible than Homeric mythology. Of course priests and
traveling bards continued to promote religious belief among the populace,
but an expanding number of philosophers and their disciples joined in the
pursuit of a credible explanation of the physical universe in and of itself. As
later explained by Aristotle, "It was when almost all the necessities of life
and the things that make for comfort and recreation were present, that such a
knowledge began to be sought." 4 Eventually this speculative inquiry led to
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both science and the field of philosophy. As Hegel explained many centuries
later, "idea stepped into existence" for the first time, and "universal mind"
became rooted in the capacity for sustained analysis rather than unexamined
credulousness. Just as religion had played a useful role in the accumulation
of agrarian wealth, secular philosophy was the most remarkable product of
mercantile wealth. Hegel also declared that this pivotal achievement served
to demarcate the transition when "unhistorical history" came to an end in
Europe--in other words when meaningful antithesis emerged between "the
divine ... and the human subject as an individual." Though Hegel himself
would have vigorously rejected such a possibility, this transformation enacted an advance from collective religious orthodoxy to genuine intellectual
freedom rooted in the substantiation of individual judgment. 5
According to the Marxist philosopher Karl Kautsky in Foundations of
Christianity, this conceptual breakthrough was strictly the result of the accumulation of sufficient wealth to produce an independent leisure class, and
according to Karl Marx himself early in his career, this financial achievement
very likely had a "civilizing influence" as best confirmed at the time by the
rapid increase in the pursuit of secular inquiry. The classical Greek economist H. Michell also suggested in more general terms that the most important
byproduct of this influence was an "era of intellectual alertness" in the pursuit of truth at the expense of conformity rooted in unexamined credulousness. In effect inquiry supplanted belief, and there was less resistance to the
pursuit of a better and more credible explanation of cosmic design than the
erratic- at times preposterous--reign of Homeric gods. 6
II. LOSS OF TEXTUAL EVIDENCE
Unfortunately, most of the textual evidence of this intellectual freedom has
disappeared in a process of attrition beginning with the Roman Empire. This
was when the enforcement of shared belief once again played a major role in
social control, and it intensified with the advent of Christianity in the fourth
century AD. Secular analysis at odds with religious orthodoxy was preserved
on a limited number of scrolls that were too often consigned to wholesale
destruction in later centuries. There were several ways this happened, but the
most effective choice--whether intended or not--seems to have been through
the destruction, usually by fire, of ancient libraries that housed these scrolls.
The first perpetrators seem to have been pagan sects and Roman conquerors,
but within a few centuries a succession of righteous Christian emperors took
on the task on a more systematic basis. Of course many library fires may
have been accidental, but too many occurred not to have been intentional,
and it is all but impossible today to know, since there is no record of scrolls
that might have been salvaged and transported to other libraries. The very
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information that a library was destroyed seems to suggest the likelihood that
its entire contents were thereby eliminated. That at least a few scrolls might
have been saved was of course a possibility, but this is never mentioned.
While the Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum, containing about 1,800
papyrus scrolls, was buried by the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 AD, the eradication of too many other ancient libraries resulted from obvious human involvement. The Phoenician libraries at Tyre and Carthage as well as their
temples and palace archives were destroyed by Roman and Macedonian
armies, and the library at Pergamon (with an estimated 200,000 rolls) was
destroyed by Mark Antony. Similarly, the Library of Domitian was destroyed
during the reign ofCommodus, and both the Forum of Trajan (with from 10
to 20 thousand rolls) and Library of Hadrian in Athens were severely damaged during the Herulian invasion in 267 AD. In addition, Rome's citywide
conflagration during Nero's reign included the perhaps accidental destruction
of many smaller libraries as well as having damaged the Library of Palatine
Apollo and the library for the palace of Tiberius.
The destruction of scrolls at odds with religious orthodoxy even seems to
have been encouraged during the earliest stage in the history of Christianity.
As the Apostle Paul recounted with obvious approval in Acts 19: 18-20, a
large heap of scrolls was submitted to a bonfire at Ephesus in order to
celebrate a particular group's conversion to Christian faith. These scrolls
supposedly encouraged "curious arts" [perierga] somehow linked with magic, possibly suggesting that the specific impiety worthy of destruction was
not to be identified in the very act of destroying texts that might have advocated it. The English translation of the Bible's estimate that the texts were
worth five thousand pieces of silver- accidentally multiplied by ten in both
the German and English translations of the passage--suggests the likelihood
that at least a few of the scrolls that were destroyed might have been relevant
to natural philosophy. 7
Once in power, the Christian Emperor Constantius initiated the widescale burning of pagan libraries and books in general across the Roman
Empire. A decade later, in 364 AD, the Christian Emperor Jovian ordered the
burning of the library at Antioch as well as the systematic destruction of
books across the eastern region. In 370 the Christian Emperor Valens did the
same, as did Theodosius II in 448 and Justinian in 556. The destruction of
Rome's largest library at Trajan's Forum (10,000 rolls) seems to have been
ordered by Pope Gregory I in the sixth century and/or by Pope Gregory VII
in the eleventh century. According to John of Salisbury, Pope Gregory I
explained his effort was to encourage piety, "for fear the secular literature
might distract the faithful from the contemplation of Heaven." However,
both Popes may have taken this course to destroy whatever of the collection
remained after earlier damage during the reign of Commodus, as possibly the
result of lightning. On the other hand, all twenty-nine of the public libraries
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that existed in Rome as late as 350 AD seem to have disappeared by the
seventh century, but they might simply have been dismantled as was likely
·
with the smaller libraries at many of the city's public baths. 8
The biggest and most impressive library of all, at Alexandria, was severely damaged three times. In 48 BC a substantial portion of its contents was
accidentally destroyed by Julius Caesar when he burned his fleet to prevent
its flight from conflict. In 273 AD, the library once again caught fire during
the Emperor Aurelian's invasion to capture the city, and its later and more
severe destruction was ordered by the Christian Emperor Theodosius in 391,
undoubtedly on religious grounds. The library was finally entirely destroyed
in 642 as ordered by the Caliph Omar, this time in the cause of Muslim
purity. Altogether, perhaps a half-million rolls were lost at this one site over
a period of seven hundred years. A large portion of ancient Greek philosophy
was undoubtedly eradicated in these many fires.
The much later destruction of the Library of Constantinople in 1453 by
Muslim fanatics completed the task, whether intended or not, of demolishing
whatever remained of the textual record of secular philosophy in ancient
Greece. Of course the ruins of many of the buildings that housed these
ancient libraries survive today, but their destruction was secondary to the loss
of the scrolls themselves and their written contents. As a result, many dozens
of ancient authors can be identified only by name or because of the remaining existence of small portions of their texts described as fragments.
As to be expected, scrolls of secular philosophy by particular individuals
were particularly vulnerable to wholesale eradication throughout this period.
For example, the entire output of Democritus and Strata relevant to natural
philosophy was lost, as was that of Theophrastus except for a small assortment of scientific writings and one short essay on metaphysics. Also destroyed was the complete output ofClitomachus, who was Cameades' scribe
and supposedly the most prolific author in ancient times. Only three essays
remain by Epicurus, who was generally ranked next unto Clitomachus in
ancient times for his level of productivity. In contrast, Plato's dialogues as
well as Homer's two monumental epics steeped in mythology have endured
twenty-five centuries almost in their entirety.
III. FIVE SECULARISTS WHO SURVIVED
Ancient texts relevant to secular philosophy that continue to exist today are
strikingly few as compared to the output of ancient authors in other areas of
inquiry, most notably dealing with such fields history, mythology, political
considerations, etc. Nevertheless, incidental references to secular theory by
Plato, Cicero, Plutarch, and others are useful in the attempt to resurrect
ancient philosophy, as was the effort of so-called ancient doxographers who
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collected earlier philosophical passages they considered worth preservingfragments that are seldom more than a couple sentences long. From the first
through the third centuries AD, one or more individuals identified as "Aetius" (if such a person existed) exercised this laudable pursuit, as did such
figures as Philodemus, Pseudo-Plutarch, Clement of Alexandria, Antisthenes, Aristoxenus, Porphyry, Stabaeus, and perhaps a dozen others as well
as Aristotle himself. It was not until the late nineteenth century, however,
that the German classicist Hermann Diels finally gathered all the existing
fragments to compile a single standard text later translated into English by
Kathleen Freeman as Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers. 9 Diels referred to as many as 103 ancient Greek philosophers, but he could only quote
fragments by thirty-eight of them, and most fragments were not more than a
couple of sentences long. Significantly, the entire collection fills just 162
pages in Freeman's translation.
Also useful are incidental commentaries by scholastic philosophers in
later centuries such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ammonius, Philoponus,
Themistius, and especially Simplicius. In fact, it was Simplicius' effort to
resurrect Aristotelian theory that was said to have provoked the Roman emperor Justinian into outlawing the pursuit of Athenian philosophy in 529 AD.
From this historic juncture onward, godless inquiry was actually against the
law, and many thousands of heretics were later tortured and burned at the
stake for transgressing this prohibition. St. Thomas Aquinas sought to revive
Aristotle during the thirteenth century, but his successful effort was to harness Aristotle's analytic freedom in support of religious orthodoxy. In
contrast, a formidable task that confronts modem scholarship dealing with
ancient secular philosophy is to piece together as well as possible the essential theoretical sequence that took place in the collective advance from Thales
to Plato, Aristotle, and their Hellenistic successors. In retrospect many of
their insights are remarkably sophisticated, and their theoretical synthesis in
its entirety suggests a remarkable level of secular enlightenment at the inception of western civilization.
Not more than five ancient textual sources that escaped destruction either
promoted secular assumptions or took them into account on a sympathetic
basis. Most conspicuous was Cicero's sequence of two dialogues, Academica
and De Natura Deorum, probably written during the last two years of his life.
Probably because of his popular but unsuccessful historic effort to preserve
the Roman Republic, most of Cicero's writings were preserved, even including these two scrolls except for deletions pertaining to Cameades. On the
other hand, the other four ancient textual sources that escaped destruction by
accident could easily have been expunged from history. Their recovery was
entirely accidental, and without their wealth of supportive information the
secular achievement of ancient philosophy could easily have been lost to
modem research.
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Most remarkable, of course, was Aristotle's mature output of writings,
which was described as oral doctrine-acroamata-that was specifically intended for his disciples alone. These texts were intentionally excluded from
publication during his lifetime, but they comprise almost his entire output
that exists today. This unique trove of restricted theoretical analysis was
discovered as a bundle of lecture notes in the basement of the descendants of
one of his disciples roughly two centuries after his death. According to
Plutarch, the Roman general Sylla brought the entire lot to Rome in 86 BC,
and Andronicus the Rhodian was able to put Aristotle's various texts in print.
At about the same time copies were supposedly brought to Alexandria,
Egypt, to provide the nucleus for the famous Alexandrian library. Until then
Aristotle's reputation had been as a gifted advocate of Plato's ideas, but most
of his earlier output as a member of Plato's Academy seems to have been all
but forgotten without much of a sense of loss. His future reputation accordingly rested upon his confidential output at his own institute--the Lyceum-that was much later salvaged and published. As I try to demonstrate, deletions and interpolations were brought to play over many centuries afterwards
to obscure the secular implications of Aristotle's philosophy. Once these
alterations are taken into account, his secular viewpoint becomes obvious as
a unique and remarkable synthesis of pre-Socratic concepts.
The second of the stray "finds" was Lives of the Eminent Philosophers by
the historian of philosophy Diogenes Laertius (often simply described as
Diogenes), who lived between the first and fourth centuries. A single copy of
Lives was recovered in the ninth century AD, and all later editions were
based on this single copy. Diogenes Laertius summarized the lives and ideas
of as many as 82 early Greek philosophers. Altogether, he included 1,186
references to 365 books authored by roughly 250 philosophers. Especially
important was his inclusion of an appendix including three complete essays
by Epicurus, the only record that has survived of his authorship. Moreover,
he mentioned five earlier historians of philosophy who are now altogether
forgotten--Sotion, Dinon, Manetho, Hecataeus, and Hippobotus- all of
whom probably referred to other philosophers equally forgotten . Much of
this information is unavailable elsewhere and must be considered unsubstantiated, most notably pertaining to biographical matters such as the supposedly colorful deaths of Heraclitus, Zeno, and Empedocles.
The third stray "find" was the single volume of Lucretius' epic De Natura
Deorum, which was discovered by the papal secretary, Poggio Bracciolini, in
a remote German monastery in 1417. As many as fifty additional copies of
this epic history of the physical universe were later discovered during the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but only after Poggio's achievement afforded theological respectability by an officer of the Vatican. Today the most
authoritative manuscripts, the O and Q codices in Leiden, are dated from the
ninth century. Several decades ago earlier papyrus manuscripts of the first

xx

Introduction

century were found in Herculaneum that had been buried as early as the 79
A.D. volcanic eruption of Mount Vesuvius. However, their condition is so
fragile that they still defy reconstruction at this time. In any case, the recovery of a complete text in the early fifteenth century pertaining to natural
philosophy was of unique value preliminary to Bruno's speculation toward
the end of the sixteenth century. Soon afterwards, Gassendi also seems to
have been inspired by Lucretius when he modernized the theory of atomism
on a more scientific basis.
The fourth and last inclusion in this category, more a fortunate acquisition
than a stray "find," was a history of skeptical ancient philosophy by the
second century skeptical philosopher Sextus Empiricus. This thorough assessment was only brought to light among European scholars when it was
included among an assortment of books transported from Constantinople's
libraries to Venice to prevent their destruction by Muslim fanatics during the
successful invasion of 1453. Perhaps a generation older than Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus emphasized the ancient history of skepticism, and
here alone several of Strato's atheistic arguments may be examined, if without any reference to his identity as their author.
Without full access to all of these five early sources whose survival seems
in retrospect to have been entirely accidental, the piecemeal record of ancient
secularism could more likely have been ignored, and its unique secular perspective might not have been renewed by the Italian Renaissance-at least
not to the same extent.

Chapter One

The Pre-Socratic Philosophers

At least fifteen ancient Greek thinkers played significant roles in the abandonment of polytheistic religion featured by such classical authors as Homer
and Hesiod. During the early sixth century BC, these so-called pre-Socratic
materialists-more simply described as natural philosophers- became active
in a variety of separate Grecian coastal cities scattered across the eastern
Mediterranean region. Beginning in Miletus on the coast of Turkey, their
shared inquiry spread to Croton and Elea near the foot of Italy, then Abdera
on the northern Aegean coast, and finally to Athens. The early attempt to
isolate a single underlying substance in the universe led to an emphasis on
cosmic infinitude as well as the pursuit of relevant mathematical analysis.
Holistic and cyclical theories were also proposed as well as the concept of
atomism. Radical skepticism later emerged in Athens, setting the stage for
the grand cosmologies of Plato and Aristotle that would later be expanded
upon by various disciples and followers over the next few centuries. Except
for the works of Plato and Aristotle, little textual evidence exists today to
document the first stages of this remarkable intellectual breakthrough beyond
a few hundred random passages. Nevertheless, the movement as a whole
arrived at a loose synthesis of cosmologies that ultimately provided the basis
for modem secular assumptions. Only by piecing together the assortment of
fragments that remain linked with their probable authorship can this collective achievement be fully recognized as the origin of western civilization's
unprecedented materialist perspective that continues to flourish in modem
times.
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I. THALES (CA. 624 - 546 BC)

Greek philosophy seems to have begun during the sixth century BC at Miletus, a Greek city-state on the coast of Turkey. Generally considered the first
philosopher, Thales was by all accounts the founder of the so-called Milesian
school. He was possibly of Phoenician descent but spent most of his adult
years as a wealthy citizen in Miletus. He was also honored as the most
eminent of the ancient world ' s seven wise men, and among his accomplishments cited by Diogenes Laertius, he supposedly introduced to the Greek
world the conceptual advances in geometry and astronomy that he had acquired while in Egypt. He wrote treatises on the solstice and equinox, established the length of both the year and a 30-day month, and accurately predicted an eclipse of the sun in 585 BC. He also calculated the sizes of the sun
and moon, and succeeded in measuring the height of Egyptian pyramids by
their shadows. Moreover, he demonstrated how a right-angled triangle could
be inscribed in a circle. Relevant to governance, he served as an advisor to
his friend Thrasybulus, the benevolent tyrant of Miletus, and he was said to
have anticipated the consequences of a drought soon enough to capitalize on
the increased price of olives the next year by buying up all the available oil
mills. On the other hand, it is said he once fell into a ditch as he watched the
stars, whereupon an old woman asked him how he could expect to know
about the heavens ifhe couldn' t even see beneath his feet!
Six centuries preceding Christ, Thales supposedly formulated his own
version of the Golden Rule--to refrain from doing what we blame in others.
When asked what is most difficult in life, he replied, "To know oneself."
Asked what is easiest, he replied, "To give advice to another." Moreover, he
warned, "Avoid ill-gotten gains," an edict worthy of consideration even today. He was also said to have asserted that in the final analysis there is no
difference between life and death, possibly suggesting the immortality of the
soul, and when asked what is the divine, he replied with a pantheist assertion
that anticipated the cosmologies of both Parmenides and Aristotle, "that
which neither begins nor ends, suggestive of eternity without divine authority." In a slightly different light he explained the world is animate and full of
divinities. It is anybody ' s guess, of course, bow many of these ideas were
proposed by Thales or were later attributed to him because of his status as the
"wisest man of his age." 1
According to Aristotle, Thales also held that that the soul and thought are
identical, suggesting Aristotle's later equation between the human mind and
mental behavior. Relevant to the physical universe, Thales actually suggested
that a magnet has motive force comparable to the soul in the sense that it
draws iron to it, thereby producing physical motion. 2 He also suggested
Anaxagoras and Plato' s concept of a spiritual universe, for example by having advanced the pantheistic assumption that "all things are full of gods." As
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explained by Plutarch in Moralia, "Thales had set forth the excellent hypothesis that soul exists in all the most dominant and most important parts of the
universe." In light of his earlier remark that divinity consists of eternity,
Thales also anticipated the notion of soul central to Anaxagoras' philosophy
that later inspired Platonism. 3
Thales was mostly famous for his theory that the first principle of the
universe (arche) consists of water, the thinnest of all liquids according to
Aristotle. 4 Today the concept seems somewhat credible in light of recent
astronomical findings that water is a product of ice molecules from vast
cosmic clouds that existed before the creation of the sun. According to Aristotle, Thales argued both that the earth floats on water and that water suffuses
the existence of all matter, not merely the liquid realm supposedly occupied
by aquatic gods such as Poseidon and Amphitrite. Just as ice and steam
possess fluidity, so does life itself and indeed everything that plays a role in
the world about us as later explained by Aristotle:
Thales, the founder of this school of philosophy [materialism], says the [basic]
principle is water (for which reason he declared that the earth rests on water),
perhaps getting the notion from noticing that the nutriment of all things is
moist, and that heat itself is generated from the moist and kept alive by it (and
that which they come to be is a principle of all things). He got this notion from
this fact, and from the fact that the seeds of all things have a moist nature, and
that water is the origin of the nature of moist things. 5

Thales exaggerated the role of water as the single basic element that
happened to be capable of motion that can be observed, but more important
was his explanation of the universe in monistic terms free of anthropomorphic mythology typical of the Homeric gods as well as Orphic belief. This
was a significant advance. Whatever the primary element (or substrate)
might consist of, Thales' proposal suggested for the first time the possibility
of a strictly physical universe governed by a single basic principle. Of course
water is essential to human survival and biology in general, but more important yet, he suggested, it provides the substance of everything else. It effectively bridges the animate and inanimate realms of the universe. Of course
Thales ' theory can be criticized as having been a gross simplification, but it
initiated the pursuit of a holistic theory more credible than Homer's extravagant fabrications about the gods. This was effectively the first step toward a
consistent theory of materialism as an explanation of the universe independent ofreligion.
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II. ANAXIMANDER (cA. 610- 546 BC)
Anaximander, Thales' disciple and successor in Miletus, took a more inclusive approach by proposing the possibility of an unknown universal substrate
(apeiron) that comprises the primary "stuff' of existence but with specific
characteristics as yet undetermined. He did not deny that this basic element
might consist of water, but there were other possibilities as well. He suggested, for example, that the human soul seems air-like, a concept that anticipated the cosmology of Anaximenes. As later explained by Cicero, Anaximander simply proposed arche to consist of "an infinity of substance." By
implication, it has no spatial or temporal edge and its existence is necessarily
identical throughout. 6 Anaximander did not try to identify this basic universal "stuff' as a visible element, for example by accepting Thales' suggestion
of water or some kind of a fluid, air as later proposed by Anaximenes, or
earth as still later proposed by Xenophanes. Instead, he suggested that this
substance very likely consists of something entirely different and yet to be
determined, for example the concept of an atomic field of atoms proposed by
Leucippus and Democritus more than a century later.
Anaximander also explained how everything that occurs in the universe
emerges from infinitude through a process of opposition beginning with the
simple but all-purpose binary distinction between heat and cold. This concept
of sustained dualism anticipated the dialectics later featured by Plato and
Aristotle. As briefly explained by Aristotle in a single sentence, Anaximander had maintained, " ... that [all] contrarieties are contained in the one and
emerge from it by segregation." 7 Hence any particular thing or event necessarily partakes of the universe as a whole through its divergence from another equally pronounced aspect that serves as its opposite. On this basis all
things and events throughout the universe participate in a complex interaction with alternatives equally derived from the whole. Differences in temperature sustain this process as a whole, thereby setting the stage for all other
phenomena to occur in any number of ways through binary opposition.
Little textual evidence of Anaximander's assumptions has survived, and
his explanation is limited to a single passage that can easily be misinterpreted. Here he featured the universal existence of material substance that
undergoes incessant creation and destruction in a cyclical manner:
The Non-Limited is the original material of existing things; further, the
source from which existing things derive their existence is also that to which
they return at their destruction, according to necessity; for they give justice and
make reparation to one another for their injustice, according to the arrangement of Time. 8
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Thus, "things make reparation, and therein do justice to one another according to the order oftime." 9 By implication ceaseless motion takes place in
a steady advance from one extreme to its opposite- from growth to decay,
from life to death--without the intervention of a creator identified with a god
or gods.
As later suggested by Aristotle in Physics, Anaximander might conversely have been willing to identify God with the complete universe in the sense
that its physical existence is no less infinite:
Further, they [all pre-Socratic philosophers] identify it [the universe] with the
Divine, for it is deathless and imperishable as Anaximander says, with the
majority of the physicists. JO

Thales had perhaps already implied this, but here Aristotle attributed the
acceptance of pantheism to Anaximander, as well as asserting that this possibility was shared by most of the pre-Socratic materialists as well as himself.
On the other hand, Anaximander also seems to have anticipated the theory of evolution by suggesting that all life began in the sea as a product of
moisture that evaporates because of heat from the sun. Thereafter, he suggested, it continued to advance and culminated with the creation of mankind.
He made no effort to provide a specific explanation of this evolutionary
transition, but his proposal obviously anticipated the findings of Darwin
many centuries later. More specifically, he proposed a cyclical model of the
universe that may have inspired the later cyclical theories proposed by Empedocles and Aristotle. According to Anaximander, the initial opposition between hot and cold throughout the universe lapsed into a complex cycle
between wet earth, hot fire, cold air, wet water, dry earth, and finally somehow a broken ring of water and a ring of fire that divides into three subsequent rings. Both Anaximander' s evolutionary model and the cyclical cosmology it suggested were described at length in a lost Milesian philosophical
text that Theophrastus summarized two centuries later and in tum, his text
was summarized by Simplicius six centuries later. 11
Anaximander also invented the gnomon used for a sundial, and he supposedly constructed a clock to tell the time. Moreover, he devised the first
map as a depiction of geographical space, and he was said to have constructed the first artificial globe, thereby suggesting the possibility of the
earth ' s spherical shape later described by Pythagoras. Both Parmenides and
Empedocles described a monotheistic god in the shape of a globe, and later
Plato and Aristotle adopted Anaximander' s concept of the globe as a model
equivalent to the earth ' s shape.
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III. ANAXIMENES (cA. 585 - 528 BC)
As an associate of Anaximander and very likely his disciple, Anaximenes
specified air as the most likely substrate for the universe because its density
is far lower than that of Thales' water. Whereas water' s flotation is almost
limited to the surface of the earth, air provides a universal medium for the
sky as well. Moreover, air almost always involves a high level of motion as
compared to water and earth on a graduated scale. Anaximenes also qualified
Anaximander's concept of indeterminate space by insisting that it is undetectable except as the result of motion, moisture, or extreme temperature. He
apparently explained that air provides the underlying nature of the universe,
converting to fire when it becomes finer, then wind, cloud, water, earth, and
even stones. The third century theologian, Hippolytus, suggested that Anaximander treated air as the source of all existence including the gods and that
its medium supports perpetual motion, perhaps even to the universe as a
whole. 12
Anaximenes' theory is defensible to a certain extent even today. Modem
biology confirms that water provides an essential component of the human
body, and recent research suggests the likelihood that water existed in a
cosmic cloud preceding the creation of the sun. On the other hand, according
to a third-century Christian theologian, Hippolytus, Anaximenes went on to
suggest that perpetual motion can occur in such a medium, arguably lending
support to Anaximander's theory of infinitude and anticipating Aristotle ' s
later theory of mass in incessant motion. 13
Anaximenes ' choice to give air a central role instead of water seemed to
make perfect sense at the time. If the universe primarily consists of sky, air
can be interpreted as a medium for the universe more relevant to space in
general. Three levels of density can be taken into account- air, water, and
finally earth and things in general later described as matter. As a possible
fourth element, fire-a visible manifestation of heat- could then be added to
the hierarchy as first suggested by Anaximander and later emphasized by
Heraclitus, on the assumption that heat rises through air as air does through
water. Moreover, Thales' concept of water could be described as a tangible
manifestation of air, for the seeming interaction between the two could be
explained by what we term condensation and rarefaction. Later both Heraclitus and Empedocles went on to combine air with earth, fire and water on a
cyclical basis, and still later, its role was enlarged by Diogenes of Laertius in
a new level of interpretation that enlarged air's essential role as being relevant to life itself. 14
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IV. XENOPHANES (CA. 570 - 475 BC)
Thought to be a contemporary of Anaximenes, Xenophanes was respected
primarily as a religious poet who wrote in epic meter and was said to have
lived into his nineties . He was born in the Ionian city of Colophon, roughly
fifty miles southeast of Miletus, and the influence of Milesian philosophers,
especially Anaximander, influenced his intellectual development. He seems
to have fled the region to escape invaders in 546 BC and spent most of his
life in exile, having traveled as far as the Sicilian towns of Zancle and
Catana. He lived for a while in Elea, where he tutored Parmenides, thereby
linking the so-called Eleatic school on the coast of Italy with Thales' Milesian school on the coast of Turkey.
As inspired by Xenophanes and led by Parmenides, the Eleatic school
featured a strictly holistic perspective rather than an emphasis on the identity
and interactive function of the universe's primary elements. However, Xenophanes was far more concerned about religion than his Milesian precursors.
He referred to polytheism at least thirteen times in the fragments available
today, as well as having made at least as many as six monotheistic references
to a single God. On one hand, Xenophanes' orthodox description of a dominant God surrounded by others of his kind who are less powerful seems
obviously polytheistic :
There is one god, among gods and men the greatest, not at all like mortals in
body or in mind.

Then again, a monotheistic version of God seems obvious in other fragments.
He sees as a whole, thinks as a whole, and hears as a whole.
But without toil he sets everything in motion, by the thought of his mind.
And he always remains in the same place, not moving at all, nor is it fitting
for him to change his position at different times. 15

Here a monotheistic God is described with specificity, but Xenophanes
also proposed the concept of the universe as a "whole" in "motion." The
emphasis on motion suggests the influence of both Anaximander and Anaximenes of the Milesian school, and the emphasis on a "whole in motion"
suggests a concept later featured by Parmenides of the Eleatic school as well
as Aristotle's mature cosmology.
Xenophanes also emphasized the singular identity of the physical universe much as would later typify Biblical sagacity as well as deist assumptions popular in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries:
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For everything comes from earth and everything goes back to earth at last.
This is the upper limit of the earth that we see at our feet, in contact with the
air; but the part beneath goes down to infinity.
All things that come into being and grow are earth and water. 16

The first of these, "from earth to earth, etc." is obviously identical with
Genesis 3.19, suggesting the possibility of a shared source as early as the
sixth century BC. On the other hand, the first and third of these fragments
anticipate Empedocles' later cyclical model of the universe, while the second
and third apparently accept Anaximander' s emphasis on earth itself as a basic
stuff-in effect an entirely new element comparable to Thales' concept of
water and in a supplementary combination different from the earth-air binarism suggested by Anaximenes.
Xenophanes also drew upon Anaximander's concept of a sphere to describe supernatural omniscience with human organs of perception:
God' s shape is spherical, altogether different from man. He can see and hear,
but does not breathe; he entirely consists of mind and thought, and is eternal. 17

This concept of God seems to have been intended to provide a spatial analogy that depicts God's comprehensive authority. Just as the center of a sphere
is equidistant from all points on its surface, he suggested, God's authority is
equally relevant to all things and events in the universe. The infinitude of
God's authority can be understood on the assumption that everything that
exists is equally determined by the central authority of godhead.
What Xenophanes despised was the Homeric conception of gods as a
mixed assortment of anthropomorphic deities that displayed the most reprehensible level of human behavior:
Homer and Hesiod have ascribed deeds to the gods that are a reproach and
disgraceful: theft, adultery, and deception.

No less absurd in his opinion was the anthropomorphic depiction of gods
based on human appearance and behavior:
Mortals believe the gods are born and have human clothing, voice and form.
Ethiopians say that their gods are flat nosed and dark, Thracians that theirs are
blue eyed and red haired.

If oxen and lions had hands and could draw with their hands .. . horses would
draw the shapes of gods to look like horses, and oxen to look like oxen, and
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each would make the gods ' bodies have the same shape as they themselves
had. 18

On the whole, Xenophanes seems to have believed in an abstract God or gods
somehow identified with the earth and less personified than popular deities at
the time.
He also proposed his own version of a secular binarism-effectively a
substratum that enlarged Thales supposition to include a binary opposition
between earth and water as the two basic elements: "We all have our origin
from earth to water," and "All things that come into being and grow are earth
and water." By treating water as the "source of wind" he also suggested as
many as three primary elements--water, earth, and air. 19 The addition of fire
as the fourth basic element would later be adopted by both Heraclitus and
Empedocles. The inclusion of earth as one of the primary elements took on
even more significance once Melissus effectively substituted the generic concept of mass, anticipating Aristotle's still later concept of binary interaction
between mass and motion essential to his final cosmology.
Finally, Xenophanes seems to have anticipated the skeptical assumptions
of Sophists several decades later by having declared the inevitability of ignorance, including the knowledge of gods. As possibly the final fragment of
his philosophical book, he argued, "Let things be believed for at least seeming to be true." 20 In effect, Xenophanes maintained that individuals deserve
the freedom to entertain their own suppositions because there is no absolute
verification of the truth relevant to any of them. For even those who may
stumble on the truth have no assurance of its veracity. Xenophanes was even
willing to extend this caveat to religious belief:
Yet with respect to the gods and what I declare about all things, no man has
seen and no man will know the truth in its clearness. Nay, for e ' en should he
chance to affirm what is really existent, he himselfknoweth it not; but opinion
holds sway over all things. 21

In sum, all presumably valid knowledge necessarily remains opinion, a skeptical stance as later insisted by Athenian Sophists as well as Cicero's generation and beyond.
V. PHERECYDES OF SYROS (cA. 580-520 BC)
An often overlooked early Greek thinker, Pherecydes of Syros seems to have
been younger than Thales, but he can be credited with having sought in his
own fashion to bridge the gap between Homeric mythology and secular
materialism. Like Thales, he was identified as one of the seven wise men,
and he bore the distinction of having been the teacher of Pythagoras. He was
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also credited with having expressed himself in prose instead of poetry perhaps for the first time among ancient Greek authors. His principal astronomical achievement was his successful determination of the annual turning point
of the sun between winter and summer, and in his lost book Pentemychos he
proposed an ambitious metaphysical system that blended science, allegory,
and mythology. Moreover, he was said to have been the first to suggest the
immortality of the soul and the central importance of earth, and a cyclical
cosmology-perhaps the first of its kind--that involved various gods based
on five elements--aether, fire, air, water, and earth. Somehow all of these
were linked with the permanent role of three divine principles--Zeus, earth,
and time. He was said to have initiated the exploration of immortality
through metempsychosis from one mind to the next, as well as a concept of
endless time that seems to have anticipated the later theories of Parmenides,
Melissus and Aristotle. Much of Pherecydes' thinking was compatible with
pre-Socratic assumptions, but his sustained effort to take mythology into
account apparently diminished his contribution as compared to the more
stringent ideas of Thales and his successors. Unfortunately, as with too many
others, nothing he wrote has survived.

VI. PYTHAGORAS AND THE PYTHAGOREANS (CA. 570 - 495 BC)
According to Diogenes Laertius, Pythagoras was born on the island of Samos, and traveled to such regions as Lesbos, Cronos, and Egypt before
returning to Samos, then went into exile as the result of disagreement with its
tyrant, Polycrates. He might have met Thales during his teens and later
visited both Egypt and Babylonia before settling in Croton, a Greek city on
the coast of southern Italy, where he spent the rest of his life. He became a
cult leader with a large following dedicated to a special admixture of mathematical philosophy and his own version of religion derived from Egyptian
mysticism. He promoted the notion of an afterlife and reincarnation before
final union with a universal soul equivalent to a monotheistic God. His core
doctrine was kept a guarded secret by his followers and has for the most part
been lost. Like later philosophers such as Socrates, Arcesilaus, and Carneades, he was said to have taken pride in having written nothing himself, so
the record of his arguments was entirely the product of later disciples. According to Diogenes Laertius, Pythagoras did in fact author at least three
texts-On Education, On Nature, and On Statesmanship-but was sufficiently embarrassed by his stylistic deficiencies to have prevented their circulation. Modern scholars, however, have rejected this likelihood. 22 Texts identified with his authorship might well have been modified or augmented by
later followers who were probably linked with one of the competitive schools
based on his teachings--the "Acousmatics" (or "Pythagorists"), who featured
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his mystical teachings as opposed to the so-called "Mathematicians," who
featured his scientific assumptions.
Pythagoras is generally credited with having invented the world philosopher. When asked by Leon, the tyrant of Phlius, exactly who he was, Pythagoras supposedly answered with a word that was as a combination of the
words phi/a (love) and sophos (wisdom), by implication not pertaining to
"useful" or "comfortable" truths, but instead the "hard" truths that cannot be
denied. 23 He was also said to have invented the word cosmos to describe the
universe as a whole, and the word harmony as a description of music that
could be applied to every aspect of life. Moreover, he invented the word
monads that was later supplanted by Leucippus and Democritus' word atoms.
Pythagoras' particular historic achievement was his effort to explain the
physical universe on a strictly mathematical basis that was best illustrated by
geometry as the analysis of spatial relationships. Most famous was his theorem that the square of any right triangle's hypotenuse is always equal to the
combined squares of its two rectangular sides divided in half. Instead of
adhering to the Milesian effort to isolate a single physical element comparable to water, air, or earth, he argued that the basic root of physical existence-in effect Anaximander's principle of arche-primarily derives from
complex mathematical quantification.
As explained by his disciple, Alexander, in Successions of Philosophers,
Pythagoras proposed the monad as a basic unit of existence, from which
derives the dyad as a binarism that links monads, followed by all the rest of
the numbers and valid equations that put them into play. He argued that from
simple numbers, he argued, derive in succession the point, the line, the solid
figure, sensible bodies, and the four elements, fire, water, earth and air, all of
which combine to produce the universe as a whole with the earth at its
center. 24
Pythagoreans went so far as to argue that a void equivalent to the number
of zero exists which separates all things and even numbers from each other as
later explained by Aristotle:
The Pythagoreans held that void exists and it enters the world from the infinite
air, the world inhaling also the void which distinguishes the natures of things,
as if it were what separates and distinguishes the terms of a series. This holds
primarily in the numbers; for the void distinguishes their nature .. 25

This preliminary aspect of Pythagoras' cosmic model might well have
inspired the later concept of particles suspended in a void that was debated
by the atomists and Anaxagoras followed by Aristotle and Strato's effort to
obtain a defensible synthesis.
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Like Anaximander and Xenophanes, Pythagoras was fascinated by the
sphere and even considered it the most beautiful solid figure and comparable
to the circle as the most beautiful plane figure . He was the first to describe
the earth as being spherical well before the astronomical findings of the
Alexandrian astronomer Hicetas, who inspired Copernicus' heliocentric theory many centuries later.
The basic and most accessible evidence Pythagoras used to support his
elaborate cosmology was the harmonious relationship among intervals on a
musical scale as illustrated by the length and tightness of strings. He proposed the concept of harmonia to designate an integrated relationship on
such a scale relevant to all phenomena and then drew upon this principle to
define odd and even numbers, prime and composite numbers, and square
numbers in the realm of arithmetic. He also identified this harmony on a
celestial scale as a cosmic music of the spheres. In medicine he proposed his
own version of homeopathy, using opposites to stabilize physical disorders.
One's physical health, he suggested, depends on the effective sustenance of
an appropriate balance that can be quantified on an arithmetic basis: "Health
means the retention of the form, disease its destruction." 26
As later mentioned by Aristotle, Pythagoras' disciples--described as Pythagoreans--used Anaximenes' concept of air in their explanation of music as
a universal principle that might also explain human behavior as it relates to
other and more inclusive aspects of cosmology:
The theory handed down from the Pythagoreans . .. [they] declared that the
soul is identical with the particles in the air, and others with what makes these
particles move. These particles have found their place in the theory because
they can be seen perpetually in motion even when the air is completely
calm .. . for they all seem to assume that movement is the distinctive characteristic of the soul, and that everything else owes its movement to the
soul ... " 27

The Pythagoreans seem to have anticipated Anaxagoras and Plato's cosmology of a universal soul, Leucippus and Democritus' cosmology of incessant
atomic interaction, and even Aristotle's cosmology of mass in perpetual motion as explained in De Cae/o.
Pythagoras rejected the Homeric gods, but he continued to accept the
concepts of prophecy, divination, and the transmigration of souls, and he
argued that the sun, moon, and stars might be considered gods because they
generate heat as suggested by Anaximander's cosmology. He correctly proposed that the sun illuminates the moon and that "gods and man are akin
inasmuch as man partakes of heat." Fate is the cause of things, he maintained, and all things that live partake of heat. Moreover, he suggested,
biological reproduction results from germination, and the entire soul comprises three parts- intelligence, reason, and passion. He also argued that
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consciousness draws nourishment from the blood supply to the brain; and
since reason alone is immortal, he proposed, only the human soul is immortal. This particular assumption confirmed the link between reason and mathematics as well as having anticipated both Platonic metaphysics and Aristotle's assumption of graduated human consciousness. Also implicit in Epicurus' cosmology was a theory of order and logic seemingly at odds with Anaximenes' theory of air that implied limitless boundaries. In contrast, Pythagoras ' alternative emphasis on number and mathematical exactitude featured
forms accessible to cognitive recognition.
There were several accounts of Pythagoras' death, but most likely he and
as many as forty of his disciples seem to have been murdered by the inhabitants of the neighboring town of Croton. It seems these angry townsmen
resented what seemed the arrogance of Pythagoras and his followers that
culminated in the school's effort to impose its own government on the entire
community. In a public confrontation, an angry throng of hostile Crotons
supposedly cut Pythagoras' throat, then slaughtered all but two of his followers.
Later disciples who adhered to Pythagorean doctrine continued to conceal
its wide assortment of assumptions from the scrutiny of others. Those who
broke this rule were subject to punishment and even expulsion as illustrated
by the harsh treatment of Hippasus when he disclosed some of its mathematical secrets. Even Empedocles seems have been expelled several decades later
when he sought to incorporate some aspects of Pythagorean doctrine into his
writings. The accurate perpetuation of Pythagorean assumptions seems to
have been the intention of this enforced secrecy, but their secrecy also seems
to have permitted continuous revisions in response to the theoretical stance
of later pre-Socratic philosophers.
By some accounts, the eminent philosopher-scientist Alcmaeon lived in
Croton in the second half of the sixth century BC and was a student of
Pythagoras and was considered a Pythagorean by Diogenes Laertius and
others. This possibility seems to have been ignored by sources preceding
Diogenes Laertius and to be disputed by a variety of modem classicists.
However, the possibility of his personal relationship, his residence in Croton,
and the dedication of his single book On Nature to Pythagoreans suggest the
likelihood of his connection with the movement. He wrote mostly on medical
issues, for example an analysis of the brain as the seat of consciousness, the
essential role of sensation, and the necessity of balance between excess and
deficiency in the sustenance of the body. He was also credited, however, with
first suggesting the immortality of the soul, very likely having inspired Plato ' s later explanation of the soul in Phaedrus. He extended this principle to
the '1ustice" of the whole universe as a conflict between opposites, most
notably between earth and fire as complementary basic elements. That Xenophanes featured earth just as Heraclitus featured fire suggests the possibility
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of a chronological sequence among the three theories, but at this time there is
no evidence to determine their order.
There was no confirmed textual record of Pythagorean doctrine until the
publication of the treatise On the Universe by Philolaus, a contemporary of
Socrates whose mentor Lysis was one of the two disciples to have survived
the massacre at Croton. Philolaus apparently retained Pythagoras' mathematical perspective, for example, featuring the unique status of the number ten
and the concept of a harmonic mean as illustrated by musical figures. However, he also seems to have addressed Heraclitus' concept of fire, Parmenides' holistic concept of the universe, and Empedocles' cyclical model.
Moreover, he argued, the cube represents geometric harmony that suggests
Pythagoras' concept of a harmonic mean.
According to Diogenes Laertius, Philolaus also proposed the creation of
an expanding circular universe with symmetrical thickness: "The universe is
one, and it began to come into being from the centre, and from the centre
upwards at the same intervals as those below." On the other hand, he described the sun as a celestial lens that transmits both the light and heat of the
rest of the universe on the earth, a concept not entirely without merit if the
sun sustains the heat and light first produced by the Big Bang. 28 Perhaps
inspired by Philolaus, Plato later offered the concept of a single god at the
center of such an eruption, as opposed to Aristotle's concept of perpetual
orbits devoid of central godhead. 29
In a possibly spurious fragment, Philolaus' cosmology also seems to have
provided a broad synthesis of an inclusive cyclical realm as earlier suggested
by Parmenides, one that anticipated both Plato's transcendent aspect of soul
and universal mind and Aristotle's more secular concept of modification in a
strictly physical universe:
But since the moving part circles from everlasting to everlasting, and the part
that is moved is disposed in whatever way the moving part carries it, it follows
necessarily that one is ever in motion and the other ever passive. And the one
is wholly the dwelling of Mind and Soul, and the other of Becoming and
Change; and the one is first in power and superior, and the other is second and
inferior. But that which is made of both these, namely the ever-running (circling) Divine and the ever-changing Mortal, is the universe. 30

The passage seems to have anticipated both the theories of Plato and
Aristotle. However, any effort to distinguish its accuracy relevant to this
choice is necessarily speculative as a summary of Pythagoras' original doctrine.
There is no clear evidence of Philolaus' influence on Plato despite the
likelihood that he acquired a copy of On the Universe and wrote Timaeus in
response to its ideas. He mentioned Philolaus by name only once in his
writings-an incidental reference in Phaedo, an entirely different text. Ac-
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cording to Diogenes Laertius, Philolaus nevertheless advocated an abstract
deterministic cosmology that possibly inspired Platonism to a certain extent,
"that all things are brought about by necessity and harmonious inter-relation." However, this intention also seems to have anticipated Aristotle's assumptions as suggested by Philolaus ' first sentence of his book quoted by
Diogenes Laertius, "Nature in the ordered universe was composed of unlimited and limiting elements, and so was the whole universe and all that is
therein." 31 In effect, Philolaus seems to have enlarged and updated Pythagoras' theory to justify the concept of a self-sufficient universe relevant to later
and more advanced theoretical contributions. By doing so he helped to set the
stage for the more inclusive formulations of both Plato and Aristotle.

VII. HERACLITUS (CA. 540 - 480 BC)
Heraclitus was born about sixty miles north of Miletus in the port city of
Ephesus to an aristocratic family from whom he inherited considerable
wealth. He lived to about the age of sixty, supposedly transferred his endowment to his younger brother, abandoned all social connections, and became
increasingly misanthropic toward the end of his life. His single reference to
Ephesus suggests implacable hostility, "May wealth not fail you, men of
Ephesus, so that you may be convicted of your wickedness!" 32 There is no
indication he was directly connected with the Milesian school or with any
major philosopher at the time, but he seems to have been aware of the earlier
arguments of Xenophanes and Pythagoras. While he never mentioned
Parmenides' arguments, Parmenides seems to have been aware of his.
Heraclitus seems to have authored a single text with three sections loosely
devoted to the topics ofreligion, statecraft, and cosmology, and one hundredforty passages have been preserved as aphorisms rather than portions of
longer texts. Perhaps ironically, he warns in fragment 47, "Let us not conjecture at random about the greatest things," though he himself confronts exactly this risk. His topics exhibit little continuity, justifying Aristotle's complaint that he failed to prolong any argument, but his ability to encapsulate a
theoretical paradox within the fewest possible words was exceptional.
At first many of these aphorisms might seem self-evident, but upon further consideration take on deeper significance. For example, the obvious
insight of fragment 12, "Those who step into the same river have different
waters flowing ever upon them," enlarges Anaximenes ' concept of incessant
motion by suggesting sustained interaction between change and stasis. Plato
later suggested a slight modification, "All things are in motion and nothing is
at rest," and in tum Aristotle proposed the universal principle of all things
caught up in eternal motion. 33 Aristotle extended this to a cyclical explanation of the seasons, astronomical phenomena, and the cycle of life and death,
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all of which seems anticipated by fragment 103 of Heraclitus, "Beginning
and end are general in the circumference of the circle." 34
In Metaphysics Aristotle attributed to Heraclitus two obviously linked
paradoxical aphorisms: (1) "all things are and are not," and (2) "all things are
true and all are false." These seemingly empty maxims suggest the frequent
contradiction that what seems valid relevant to one perspective can be rejected in light of another. 35 Also insightful is Heraclitus' notion that the
transition from one state of affairs to another is a stable aspect of existence:
The sun is new each day.
The way up and down is one and the same. 36

Relevant to change as a discernible process, Heraclitus proposes fire to be
the fourth and most basic substance additional to water, air, and earth:
Fire lives the death of earth and air lives the death of fire; water lives the death
of air, earth that of water. 37

However, fire seems to have taken on a double and therefore even more
important role. Both Anaximander and Pythagoras had already featured the
vital necessity of warmth, but Heraclitus enlarges the principle by identifying
fire itself- presumably the agent of warmth--as the primary source of transition among the other elements. In its double role as both one of these four
stages in perpetual sequence but also as effectively the agent that imposes
this transition, he apparently suggests that fire is the dominant aspect of the
universe, as indicated by three additional fragments:
There is an exchange: all things for Fire and Fire for all things, like goods for
gold and gold for goods.
Fire, having come upon them, will judge and seize upon (condemn) all things.
Need and satiation. 38

More specifically, Heraclitus identified lightning as a particularly dramatic version of fire launched from the sky with great power:
The thunder-bolt (i.e. Fire) steers the universe. 39

Elsewhere Heraclitus substituted "soul" for "fire," suggesting the possibility that the two are different versions of the same principle in sequence
with earth, air, and water, and with each phase destroyed with the inception
of the next:
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To souls it is death to become water; to water, it is death to become earth.
From earth comes water, and from water, soul. 40

Heraclitus even substituted soul for air, featured by both Anaximenes and
Empedocles, setting the stage for Anaxagoras' later concept of Nous as a
principle of universal mind later essential to Platonic metaphysics.
Just as earth, air, and water in combination antedates Aristotle's later
concept of matter, Heraclitus' theory of fire can also be understood to have
anticipated the concept of energy as a basic process equivalent to the other
three as substances collectively identified as mass. Also suggestive of at least
the inevitable effect of fire, Heraclitus proposed elsewhere that the world is
in such total flux that the truth can never be fully disclosed:
The hidden harmony is stronger (or 'better') than the visible.
Nature likes to hide. 41

For the sake of argument, modem naturalists might be willing to accept a
slightly different sequence that identifies fire with the Big Bang, followed by
earth identified with planetary matter, and water and air as basic elements
that support life. In as many as three fragments-31, 36, and finally 76Heraclitus took into account Anaximander's theory of cycles to suggest a
relatively complicated life-and-death sequence that also anticipated the fourstage cycle that Empedocles adopted in his later circular cosmology. Then
death itself becomes the principal agent of transition, and the reference to
soul (or consciousness) identified with air in this fourfold cycle of transitions
renews the original concept of Anaximenes without reference to fire.
Heraclitus also reexamined the destructive aspect of conflict on both a
negative and positive basis:
War is both king of all and father of all, and it has revealed some as gods,
others as men; some it has made slaves, others free.
One should know that war is general (universal) and jurisdiction is strife, and
everything comes about by way of strife and necessity. 42

Struggle and its result in destruction are inevitable aspects of the universe
according to Heraclitus' cosmology. Yet he also suggested harmony plays a
universal role, and by implication the universe somehow manifests the interaction between conflict and harmony at the most basic level. Heraclitus
proposed a countervailing holistic theory of the universe that depends on
more inclusive harmony linked with soul, identified as Logos ("the word" or
any logical argument that can be verbalized on a more inclusive basis) as
explained in several of his fragments:
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The Law (of the universe) is as here explained; but men are always incapable
of understanding it, both before they hear it, and when they have heard it for
the first time. For though all things come into being in accordance with this
Law, men seem as if they had never met with it, when they meet with words
(theories) and actions (processes) .. .
That which is in opposition is in concert, and from things that differ comes the
most beautiful harmony.
Joints: whole and not whole, connected-separate, consonant-dissonant.
You could not in your going find the ends of the soul, though you travelled the
whole way: so deep is its Law (Logos).
When you have listened, not to me but to the Law (Logos), it is wise to agree
that all things are one.
For all human laws are nourished by one, which is divine. For it governs as far
as it will, and is sufficient for all, and more than enough. 43

Heraclitus anticipated the later concept of a unified universe of Parmenides and Aristotle by explaining the universe based on the principle of
Logos--the "purpose which steers all things through all things." 44 Though
fire both sustains and participates in cyclical interaction with earth, air, and
water as components of the physical universe, an even more basic factor
plays the most dominant role, a holistic organization akin to human intelligence imbedded in the universe. As opposed to a process identified with fire ,
Heraclitus thus seems to have proposed Logos as a more inclusive principle
of stasis that both dominates and stabilizes the universe. The dialectic opposition between the two-fire and Logos-presented at an entirely new level
Anaximander's initial theory ofbinarisms that predominate in the universe as
a whole.
By having advanced the notion of Logos, Heraclitus may be said to have
invented his own version of metaphysics as a dialectic explanation of the
complete universe. Plato seems to have been inspired by his theory of Logos,
and Aristotle, followed by Sextus Empiricus and others, seem to have been
influenced by Heraclitus' dialectic if without fully supporting it. 45 Even the
New Testament's Gospel of John starts with wording possibly inspired by
Heraclitus, "In the beginning was the Word [i.e. Logos] , and the Word was
with God, and the Word was God." John's specific use of the Greek word
Logos in this passage seems entirely in accord with Heraclitus ' use of the
word five centuries earlier.
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In a couple of passages, Heraclitus seems to have explained Logos on a
strictly religious basis, for example by accepting the notion of a "divine law"
as a single principle relevant to the universe:
lf we speak with intelligence, we must base our strength on that which is
common to all, as the city of the Law (Nomos), and even more strongly. For all
human laws are nourished by one, which is divine. For it governs as far as it
will, and is sufficient for all, and more than enough. 46

Divine law can be identified with an orthodox concept of God's authority,
and by implication such a God becomes a benevolent figure who exudes
charity necessarily misunderstood by mankind:
God is day-night, winter-summer, war-peace ... but he changes like (fire)
which when it mingles with the smoke of incense is named according to each
man's pleasure.
To God all things are beautiful, good and just; but men have assumed some
things to be unjust, others just. 47

It seems possible that these fragments were later interpolations, but Heraclitus can be said to have rejected orthodox religious observances at least to the
extent that they consist of "rites accepted by mankind in the Mysteries are an
unholy performance" 48 Neither Orphic practices nor Homeric mythology
seem to have had any particular appeal to him. Like his predecessors Xenophanes and Epicurus, he did not entirely abandon religion but sought to
explain the physical universe based on ultimate authority, perhaps but not
necessarily, identified with a deity. His ambivalence is shown in two fragments in which he linked "that which is wise is one" first with Zeus identified by name and later with the more abstract reference to a "purpose which
steers all things through all things." He declared in the first fragment that
singular wisdom is both willing and unwilling to be called by the name of
Zeus," and in the second he took a more abstract stance by declaring "That
which is wise is one: to understand the purpose which steers all things
through all things." 49 In the second passage, final authority consisted of the
capacity for imparting both motion and direction to everything in the universe. This primal source can be considered a God or gods, or Plato's spiritual authority, or even Aristotle's altogether secular concept of mass in perpetual motion. To this extent at least, Heraclitus' arguments anticipated both
science and metaphysics supportive of religion.
Few if any scholars accept the bizarre account of Heraclitus' death as told
by Diogenes Laertius, especially since its singular violence might seem to
have been fabricated in the effort to ridicule his theories. Supposedly Heraclitus sought to cure a skin affliction by pasting a mixture of animal feces over
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his entire body. He then lay in the sun to let the mixture dry out, but it
hardened to such an extent that he was unable to protect himself when a pack
of hungry dogs devoured him alive! It should be acknowledged that Diogenes Laertius was alone in having recounted this as well as a few other such
bizarre death stories--respectively of Strato and Empedocles. However, in all
three instances no one else has left an alternative version.
VIII. PARMENIDES (cA. 515- 450 BC)
Parmenides effectively marks the midpoint of pre-Socratic philosophy, having been born as many as five decades after Xenophanes and five decades
before Democritus. Like Heraclitus he was the product of a wealthy family
and was raised in Croton near the Sicilian communal site of Pythagoras and
his disciples. He also seems to have been familiar with the ideas of Heraclitus, who was perhaps a generation older, and in his youth he had a Pythagorean teacher, Ameinias, as well as Xenophanes, who was still alive when
Parmenides eventually became the founder and principal philosopher of the
so-called Eleatic school located near Rome at Elea. He played a central role
in the advance of Greek philosophy and perhaps lived long enough to meet
the youthful Socrates, as Plato indicates in his dialogue Parmenides.
Whereas earlier Milesian philosophers had emphasized matter or the
"stuff' of the universe, under his influence the Eleatic school emphasized the
temporal and spatial limitlessness of the universe-effectively an absence of
any kind of an edge or boundary relevant to timeless infinitude as maintained
by Parmenides himself or on both a temporal and spatial basis as maintained
by Melissus. In a single large fragment preserved by Sextus Empiricus recorded by Simplicius, Parmenides accepted a holistic concept of the universe
as earlier suggested by Anaximander and Xenophanes, but he also sought to
revise and enlarge Heraclitus' concept of Logos by depicting the universe as
a limitless but indivisible and self-sufficient whole that was devoid of motion. Stasis dominated rather than alteration on the assumption that all
changes cancel each other out. Otherwise, he both accepted and superseded
the physical reductionism in the Milesian tradition and the mathematical
emphasis of Pythagoras.
In the approximately two dozen fragments available today, Parmenides
began his analysis with a mythical vision of a Homeric goddess who delivered him by chariot into a supernatural realm where his many questions
could be answered by rejecting all "things that seem" and rejecting those
without proof. Needless to say, his use of a fictive goddess to declare the
necessity of truth could well have been an intentional contradiction:
Thou shall inquire into everything: both the motionless heart of well-rounded
Truth, and also the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true reliability.
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But nevertheless thou shalt learn these things (opinions) also--how one should
go through all the things-that-seem, without exception, and test them . 50

His supernatural guide then gives guidance to Parmenides on how to tell
truth from falsehood:
You must accept my word when you have heard it-the ways of inquiry which
alone are to be thought: the one that IT IS, and it is not possible for IT NOT
TO BE, is the way of credibility, for it follows Truth; the other, that IT IS
NOT, and that IT is bound NOT TO BE: this . . . is a path that cannot be
explored; for you could neither recognize that which is NOT, nor express it. 51

Parmenides also highlighted the importance of temporal continuity with
his insistence that "Being has no coming-into-being and no destruction, for it
is whole of limb," and effectively endless. At the risk of contradicting himself, he argued, that nothing can come "into being, beside Being itself, out of
Not-Being." 52 The implication seems obvious that existence never began nor
will it ever end. Also that the universe was never created nor is there any
prospect of its termination. Therefore, existence can only be explained in and
of itself, and truth ultimately accords with existence. The countless assortment of untruths that deviate from this principle of existence-for example
the vivid possibility of an enormous turtle with earth perched on its shellsimply do not exist except in their lively depiction.
Pannenides capped his description of the universe in a passage with the
anthropomorphic concept of a ruling goddess might well have been intended
as a parody of Heraclitus' earlier depiction. Just as a relatively minor goddess
supposedly first confronted with the truth, a higher goddess-presumably the
highest- actually informs him of this truth in light of Heraclitus' depiction
of fire:
For the narrower rings were filled with unmixed Fire, and those next to them
with Night, but between (these) rushes the portion of Flame. ' And in the centre
of these is the goddess who guides everything; for throughout she rules over
cruel Birth and Mating, sending the female to mate with the male, and conversel y again the male with the female. 53

Parmenides quickly simplified the most basic task of this goddess as the
principle of love: "First of all the gods she devised Love." 54 Here love once
again plays a pivotal role, perhaps as inspired by the early Greek poet Hesiod.
Perhaps inspired by Xenophanes, Parmenides declared that the earth is
spherical and located in the center of the universe, and first emphasized that
sensation can only be inexact, confirming the necessity of reason, for example in determining the most basic truths of nature such as, " ... how earth and
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sun and moon, and the aether common to all, and the Milley Way in the
heavens, and outermost Olympus, and the hot power of the stars, hastened to
come into being." 55 But like Heraclitus, Parmenides also proposed that the
soul and mind are effectively identical, and he advocated the necessity of
reason "instead of imagination's deceit" in deciding whether "the generation
of man" ultimately derives from the sun as an effect of heat that "surpasses
the sun itself." As later explained by Diogenes Laertius, he suggested the
paradox as justified by his own example that only human reason can equal or
exceed the physical manifestation of the universe. 56
As Aristotle noted, Parmenides' ultimate contribution was his simple implication--apparently inspired by Xenophanes--that the One is God, a monist
concept that anticipated both Plato's theory of spiritual infinitude and even
Aristotle's theory of an endless physical universe. 57 However, Parmenides
also seems to have divided the universe into the "flaming fire in the heavens"
(or light) as depicted by Heraclitus and what might be construed as its polar
opposite, either earth or "dark Night, a dense and heavy body" as depicted by
Xenophanes. Both are equal, Protagoras proposed, "because to neither of
them belongs any share of the other." He also explained in materialist terms
that suggest Anaximander's dichotomy, "Everything is full equally of Light
and invisible Night, as both are equal, because to neither of them belongs any
share (of the other)."58
Despite its apparent contradictions, Parmenides work seems to have inspired later scientific and philosophical inquiry at an abstract level of analysis. On the other hand, his cosmology also anticipated the concept of a
spiritual universe later emphasized by Anaxagoras and Plato, and it is not
surprising that it was later featured in Plato's dialogue, "Parmenides," in
which he submitted to elaborate explanation the axiom, "If there is no one,
there is nothing at all." As explained by Parmenides, Heraclitus' concept of
Logos with an identity as "one"-had become the ultimate issue.
IX. ZENO OF ELEA (CA. 490 - 430 BC)
Zeno seems to have been born in Elea in 489 BC, roughly twenty-five years
after Parmenides. He was possibly an adopted son of Parmenides as well as
his disciple and, according to Plato in his dialogue Parmenides, they journeyed together to Athens to meet Socrates. By 446 BC Zeno's first book,
Disputations, was apparently published against his will with the subtitle
Against the Philosophers and/or Treatise on Nature. It was a highly argumentative book, and his principal target seems to have been the Pythagoreans, the first of the pre-Socratic cosmologists to have called themselves
philosophers. Though Zeno, like Parmenides, might have been exposed to
Pythagorean doctrine at an early age, later Pythagoreans seem to have re-
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jected the holistic emphasis of Parmenides, and Zeno came to his defense by
challenging the inescapable limitations of their mathematical Pythagorean
assumptions.
According to Aristotle, Zeno was the first to employ dialectic analysis
just as Empedocles was said to be the first to discover rhetoric. Zeno's
specific approach can be described as having been dialectic in the sense that
he used logic on a negative basis in order to deny one thesis in order to
demonstrate its opposite. By disproving X, he proved the opposite of X. In
effect he sought to reduce supposedly credible theories to absurdity (e.g. the
Pythagorean assumption that discrete numbers are imbedded in the universe)
in order to demonstrate their inadequacy. He was credited with the first use
of logical analysis one that Aristotle went on to substantially enlarge and
formalize for a more comprehensive theory of deductive logic. Zeno ' s most
famous use of this strategy was his rejection of the Epicurean notion that all
"things are a many" in a numerical sense, since they may be described as an
infinitude of discrete entities identified as limits. To demonstrate his thesis,
Zeno suggested that anybody who advances to a distant goal must first advance half the distance, but earlier by a fourth, earlier yet by an eighth, and
so on. Therefore, an infinite number of intermediate stages--each of them
effectively a point on a line--must first be completed in the effort to attain the
final goal, and as a result nothing in motion can reach its destination. Other
such paradoxes described by Aristotle included determining the exact location of a place and even the sound of millet seeds when they hit the floor. As
explained by Aristotle, Zeno suggested infinite divisibility might seem to
preclude actualization, but of course it does not, demonstrating that mathematical calculation alone cannot fully describe a continuous and essentially
holistic universe. Zeno did not believe any of the paradoxes he proposed, but
used them as hypothetical examples to discredit what he thought was facile
mathematical analysis.
For his successors, Zeno's primary theoretical contribution was to have
featured this paradox and others like it, which were probably proposed in the
single book he wrote early in his career as mentioned in Plato ' s dialogue
"Parmenides." Later Aristotle took into account this particular example of
Zeno's argumentation several times, but without otherwise mentioning his
theoretical assumptions. Even today Zeno's paradox is generally understood
as an absurdity, but this was intended by Zeno himself who used it to demonstrate the inadequacy of mathematical exactitude to explain physical process
on a holistic basis.
Ironically, the deviation of reality from its numerical calculation was
perhaps best illustrated by Zeno's experience with death as his own personal
transition- how and in what sequence nobody can be sure. As told by Diogenes Laertius, whose story can neither be confirmed nor rejected by consulting alternative sources, one of three possibilities transpired when he lost his
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life. As a prisoner standing before the throne ofDemylus, Elea's tyrant at the
time, Zeno was said to have offered to whisper the names of his fellow
collaborators in the ear of Demylus, who supposedly accepted his offer. But
then Zeno bit his ear and would not release his grip until he himself was
stabbed to death by loyal soldiers. Another possibility suggested by Diogenes
Laertius, however, was that Zeno bit Demylus ' nose, not his ear, and was
killed for having done so, or, as a third possibility, he might have instead
bitten off his own tongue and spit it in Demylus' face, whereupon an angry
crowd murdered Demylus. 59 There is no historic evidence which, if any of
these accounts was true, but in all three instances a transition occurred
whereby life was followed by death for one or both of the two individuals,
Zeno and Demylus. Needless to say, as with Diogenes Laertius' account of
the deaths of both Heraclitus and Empedocles, there seems ample room for
skepticism among modern scholars.
X. MELISSUS OF SAMOS (WON SEA BATTLE IN 441 BC)
Like Pythagoras, Melissus was born in Samos and in his maturity he supposedly became a respected statesman. As the admiral of Samos ' fleet during the
Peloponnesian War, he was celebrated for having broken an Athenian blockade against the island in 441-40 BC. His status as a philosopher, on the other
hand, seems to have been almost incidental, despite the importance of his
assumptions. There is no clear evidence that he had any direct link with
Parmenides or with any of the other philosophers at the time, and little is
known about his theoretical achievement beyond his prose treatise On Being,
even though it enlarged the Eleatic concept of existence as a unified whole.
His brief reference to earth, air, fire , and water as elements suggests he was
aware of Empedocles' assumptions. 60 However, he ignored the theories of
both Empedocles and Anaxagoras.
His primary contribution seems to have been in extending Parmenides'
concept of infinitude to apply to space as well as time. No boundaries exist,
he asserted, that limit temporal or spatial infinitude. By implication, no exterior realm such as heaven, paradise, or Hades is possible as a separate realm
from the physical universe. Whereas Parmenides conceded the possibility of
spatial limitations of the universe by describing the universe as a sphere with
all points equidistant from its center, as earlier suggested by Anaximander
and Xenophanes, Melissus rejected the concepts of both spatial and temporal
boundaries in a disconcertingly short sentence, "But as it [existence] is always, so also its size must always be infinite." 61 Both time and space are
alike in that they are necessarily endless without a center or any kind of edge
or perimeter.
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Melissus also expanded Parmenides' holistic notion, "what exists is one"
by emphasizing the importance of extension devoid of borders:
If it were infinite, it would be One; for if it were two, (these) could not be
(spatially) infinite, but each would have boundaries in relation to each other. 62

This doubled concept of the infinitude of both time and space clarifies
Melissus' agnostic supposition quoted by Diogenes Laertius that it is impossible to have knowledge of the gods. 63 Any thing or event- even one or
more gods--might seem isolated by some kind of an edge or boundary, for
example birth, death, or bodily mass, but its very occurrence situates it in the
universe that as a whole possesses both temporal and spatial infinitude.
Melissus also offered a number of paradoxes that linked the concept of
boundaries with the distinction between existence and non-existence. Several
of these paradoxes can be quoted as examples that support Parmenides'
primary assumptions:
. . . before it came into being, Nothing existed. If however Nothing existed, in
no way could anything come into being out of nothing. Nor is there any
Emptiness; for the Empty is Nothing; and so that which is Nothing cannot be.
And there can be no Dense and Rare.

If Things were Many, they would have to be of the same kind as I say the One
IS.

If Being ls, it must be One; and ifit is One, it is bound not to have body. But if
it had Bulk, it would have parts, and would no longer be.
If Being is divided, it moves; and ifit moved, it could not be. 64

Melissus accepted the possibility of mixture among elements, though he
seems to have rejected Democritus' notion of atoms as impenetrable matter
surrounded by void as a state of absence that "cannot be." 65 Melissus argued
in a different context, "If Things were Many, they would have to be of the
same kind as I say the One is." 66 Thus the principle of unbounded limits that
applies to the universe as a whole also applies to all atoms within the universe. In effect a void cannot exist in interior space any more than in the
universe as a whole. 67 With this wording Melissus seems to have suggested
difficulties with Leucippus' notion of atomism that anticipated Strato's later
effort to obtain a synthesis between the two.
Aristotle was highly critical of Melissus' arguments in several contexts,
suggesting at the very beginning of Physics," . .. the argument ofMelissus is
gross and offers no difficulty at all: accept one ridiculous proposition and the
rest follows--a simple enough proceeding." Later in the text Aristotle took
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Melissus' thesis more seriously by offering the dubious refutation, "But there
is no necessity for there being a void if there is movement. It is not in the
least needed as a condition of movement in general, for a reason which
escaped Melissus: viz. that the full can suffer qualitative change." Significantly, Aristotle revisited these considerations in De Caelo and seems to
have considerably modified his stance by conceding that Melissus' arguments, like those of Parmenides, were defensible on a metaphysical basis
though he could not be "held to speak as a student ofnature." 68 Arguably this
obvious threefold stair-step sequence of responses by Aristotle supports the
likelihood that Physics was a relatively early work as compared to De Caelo,
in which he seems to have consolidated his cosmology by more effectively
obtaining a synthesis between metaphysics and the science of physics as
justified by Melissus' pivotal insight regarding infinitude.
XL EMPEDOCLES (cA. 492 - 432 BC)
Empedocles was born in Sicily, and was about a generation younger than
Parmenides and a generation older than Anaxagoras. He was a mystic, physician, poet, dramatist, political activist, and what might be described as an
eclectic philosophical genius. He was supposedly expelled from the Pythagorean society during his youth for having incorporated passages from their
secret discourses into his early poetry, and, according to Diogenes Laertius,
he later studied as a fellow student of Zeno under Parmenides. He admired
Parmenides and supposedly imitated his poetry in declaring his own philosophical ideas. During his life his fame rested as much on his poetic eloquence as his contribution to philosophy, and much of his philosophy was
appreciated at the time as a prose version of poetry. He was said to have
written as many as forty-three tragedies as well as a 600-line book pertaining
to medicine. Also, he may have been the first philosopher to take an interest
in botany, and Aristotle later described him as the inventor ofrhetoric.
In opposition to autocratic power Empedocles seems to have played a
populist role in local politics and at one point was offered the kingship of the
city, which he refused. Also, he supposedly wore extravagant clothing, became wealthy in his old age, and took pride in his status as a prophet. He
seems to have been describing himself when he wrote:
There was living among them a man of surpassing knowledge, who had acquired the extremest wealth of the intellect, one expert in every kind of skilled
activity. For whenever he reached out with his whole intellect, he easily discerned each one of existing things, in ten and even twenty lifetimes of mankind. 69
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Empedocles supposedly even went so far as to encourage many compatriots to believe that he was a god.
Almost a fifth of Empedocles' philosophical writings are estimated to
have survived, including a variety of fragments quoted by as many as fifteen
later authors-eleven fragments by Aristotle, eight by Simplicius, six by
Plutarch, etc. This is more than for any of the other pre-Socratic philosophers, despite the likelihood that he wrote not more than one or two books on
cosmology, On Nature and Purifications. These are usually mentioned as
unrelated texts, but it has been suggested that they might have been separate
titles for the same text. There is a striking contrast among his fragments
between a religious and secular perspective, and it cannot be discounted that
he might have sought to mingle the two viewpoints in a single book.
Empedocles' religious convictions are on frequent display in his fragments, for example, in his passage, "Happy is he who enjoys the wealth of
divine thoughts, but wretched the man whose mind emphasizes obscure opinion about the gods!" In the same context he also suggested a surrealistic
depiction of a particular God, possibly Apollo, who combined Parmenides
and Anaxagoras' principle of universal mind with Xenophanes concept of
spherical manifestation:
It is not possible to bring God near within reach of our eyes, nor to grasp him
with our hands, by which route the broadest road of Persuasion runs into the
human mind. 70
But he (God) is equal in all directions to himself and altogether eternal, a
rounded Sphere enjoying a circular solitude. 71

Empedocles' identification of God with mind anticipated the more elaborate suppositions of both Anaxagoras and Plato, but there is no clear evidence whether his incidental suggestion preceded or followed Anaxagoras'
more elaborate explanation.
Like Parmenides, on the other hand, Empedocles insisted on the eternal
existence of the universe without any necessary reference to one or more
gods:
But that which is lawful for all extends continuously through the broad-ruling
Air and through the boundless Light. 72

A universal law was also an issue of utmost importance to both Plato's
later concept of godhead as eternal mind and, still later, Aristotle's concept
of an eternal physical universe which is modified solely by motion. Also
possibly influenced by Parmenides, Empedocles suggested the temporal infinitude of the universe:
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... it is impossible for anything to come into being; and for Being to perish
completely is incapable of fulfillment and unthinkable; for it will always be
there, wherever anyone may place it on any occasion. 73

By implication, such endlessness necessarily precludes the role of a God
or gods in having created it. Empedocles insisted on this likelihood at least
twice again as applied to human destiny:
There is no creation of substance in any one of mortal existences, nor any end
in inexecrable death, but only mixing and exchange of what has been mixed;
and the name ' substance' is applied to them by mankind. 74

Empedocles rejected the concept that non-existence both precedes birth
and follows death for the individual human being: " ... before mortals were
combined (out of the Elements) and after they were dissolved, they are nothing at all." 75 The obvious compromise among these variant assumptions, as
later suggested by Aristotle, would be that individuals do in fact die but not
the species as a whole.
At times Empedocles seems entirely confident of a received monotheistic
viewpoint. Elsewhere, however, his attitude seems pantheistic, for example
when he declares his acceptance of Anaxagoras's assumption, "For all
things ... have intelligence and a portion of Thought." 76 Often his rhetorical
skills obscure the contradictions implicit in his arguments, and well enough
for him to have avoided the prosecution that seemed more likely for outspoken atheists such as Democritus and Protagoras.
Empedocles addressed his book(s) to his disciple Pausanias with a conventional invocation to his own Muse with knowledge as "divine law [that]
allows us creatures of a day to hear." He asked Pausanias to grasp his true
assumptions in his "inner heart," but also to protect them "within [his] silent
bosom," apparently to prevent their disclosure. It remains to be seen whether
these feelings supported popular religion or his materialist assumptions, such
as appeared in one of his published texts that attracted more readers than
those of most of his contemporary philosophers. Elsewhere Empedocles
called upon Pausanias to "hear" Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus, and Nestis," but he
also took the risk articulating current secular assumptions. Not that Empedocles totally rejected religion. Rather, he seems to have sought to bridge the
gap between received belief and secular possibilities. Like Anaximander and
Pythagoras, he took satisfaction in a unified physical universe that could be
analyzed on a consistent basis, but like Anaxagoras and later, Plato he sought
a strictly spiritual explanation for this transcendent outcome.
Like Parmenides, Empedocles sought to link endlessness with cyclical
behavior whereby various stages "perish into one another." While Heraclitus
had already suggested such a cyclical explanation, Empedocles enlarged the
concept based on an elaborate four-stage transition among earth, air, fire, and
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water. 77 Unlike Heraclitus, he explained the cause of this sequence as the
outcome of love rather than fire. Empedocles instead proposed a functional
dichotomy between love and hate that seems to suggest a more basic interaction between attraction and repulsion and is reminiscent of Anaximander's
earlier concept of cyclical interplay between hot and cold as the primary
cause of sustained motion in the physical universe. Further, by featuring
Heraclitus' concept of incessant conflict between love and hate, Empedocles
proposed what must have seemed an all-inclusive grand synthesis of preSocratic materialism--a cyclical interaction among the four supposedly basic
elements--water as suggested by Thales, air as suggested by Anaximenes,
earth as suggested by Xenophanes, and fire as featured by Heraclitus. Moreover, Empedocles agreed with both Anaximander and Parmenides that this
grand cosmic cycle has persisted throughout eternity kept in motion by a
binary interplay between love and hate attraction and repulsion) in a grand
cyclical transition more inclusive than Anaximander's dualism between hot
and cold and Heraclitus' dualism between fire (or war) and Logos. Empedocles depicted this cosmic momentum as a timeless cyclical struggle among
the most basic elements: "In turn they get the upper hand in the revolving
cycle, and perish into one another and increase in the tum appointed by
Fate." 78 His cyclical hypothesis seems to have been popular among contemporaries, and others suggested several relatively simple alternatives, for example Hippo of Rhegium's binary cycle between fire and water; 0enopides
of Chios' cycle between fire and air; and 0nomacritus' cycle among fire,
water, and earth without air. 79
Perhaps of philosophical significance was Empedocles' suicide. As with
the deaths of Heraclitus and Zeno recounted by Diogenes Laertius, Empedocles was said to have killed himself in a singular fashion, in his case by
having jumped into Mount Etna' s volcano in order to confirm his status as a
god. However, this final choice is entirely conjectural, and he might instead
have later died at Peloponnese or Thurioi. The primary evidence of suicide
was supposed to have been the discovery of his sandals carefully arranged at
the volcano' s rim. so
XII. ANAXAGORAS (cA. 500 - 428 BC)
Born in Ionia, Anaxagoras traveled to Athens and was the first major philosopher to reside there. He was said to have arrived at the age of twenty and to
have spent three decades in the city during the early reign of Pericles. He was
supposedly Pericles' teacher as well as the city's unofficial "resident" philosopher until his trial for impiety for having maintained that the sun and moon
are celestial bodies rather than gods. After his acquittal, the result of an
eloquent defense by Pericles, he retired to the city of Lampsacus on the
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Hellespont, where he later died. By some accounts his death occurred at
about the time of Plato's birth. At one time he was supposedly on friendly
terms with the dominant Sophist, Protagoras, as well as the tragedian Euripedes, both of whom were suspected ofreligious disbelief by fellow citizens.
There is no evidence, however, that he had any direct relationship with
Socrates aside from his influence regarding the concept of higher consciousness as suggested by Socrates at his trial. Anaxagoras and Democritus never
met, and they both admitted that they avoided each other. Democritus was
much younger and undoubtedly less well-known at the time, but their aversion might well have resulted from theoretical differences.
As suggested by the title of his single published text, Physica (translated
as On Natural Science), Anaxagoras pursued both science and philosophy,
and he seems to have played a singular role in having exposed Athenians to
both of these fields of inquiry for the first time. His philosophical debt was
eclectic, but his version of materialism seems to have been primarily inspired
by the theoretical assumptions of Anaximenes, who had died a few decades
earlier. As documented by Diogenes Laertius, Anaxagoras' cosmology was
supported to a large extent by empirical observation, for example his suppositions that the sun is an enormous mound of red-hot metal more massive
than the Peloponnesus mountain range and that its radiation is powerful
enough to illuminate the moon as well. He also proposed that the Milky Way
exists as the light of stars not illuminated by the sun, that wind occurs when
air is rarified by the sun's heat, that the collision among clouds causes
thunder and lightning, that earthquakes result from air descending into the
earth, and that mammalian procreation is caused by the combination of heat,
moisture, and an unknown "earthy substance."
At the very beginning of Physica, Anaxagoras advanced a defensible
cosmology inspired by Anaximenes, which later influenced both Plato and
Aristotle. He asserted that the universe consists of air and aether, which
partake of infinitude in both the number and minute size of countless particles similar to each other:
All things were together, infinite in number and in smallness. For the Small
also was infinite. And since all were together, nothing was distinguishable
because of its smallness. For Air and Aether dominated all things, both of
them being infinite. For these are the most important (Elements) in the total
mixture, both in number and in size. 81

Just as Parmenides and Melissus had ascribed infinitude to both time and
space, Anaxagoras extended the principle to the microscopic in size. Anaxagoras' concept of a minute substance might seem to have been suggested by
the atomism advocated by Leucippus followed by Democritus, but he also
argued, contrary to their assumptions, that mixtures might occur among these
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elements, and that particles are not separated by any kind of a void at the
smallest level. Instead, he proposed that the universe consists of an infinite
medium of aether as earlier suggested by Anaximenes. He also argued the
possibility that growth and nutrition occur at the atomic level and the likelihood that all things differ to the extent that that they involve different mixtures of identical ingredients as suggested by the modem theory of atomic
structure with its electrons, neutrons, etc.
He identified all basic elements as seeds: "the seeds of all Things, which
contain all kinds of shapes and colours and pleasant savours." 82 He went on
to describe the visible universe as a realm occupied by a large assortment of
"composite products" comprising an infinitude of perceptible shapes and
colors, since "all things contain a portion of everything," a principle that still
remains defensible. He enlarged Heraclitus' thesis that the unity of opposites
is universal based on the assumption that all of the most basic elements
"circulate and are separated off by force and speed." On the other hand, he
seems to have accepted Heraclitus' two concepts regarding a concentric deity
and the central role of Logos as cosmic law dominant in the universe. He
even anticipated Aristotle's assumption that motion alone produces force, but
he seems to have linked this with a presumably subatomic velocity many
times faster than the visible universe, thereby anticipating the modem acceptance of the speed of light as many times faster than the speed of stars and
planets. 83
Anaxagoras also adopted Anaximander and Empedocles's emphasis on
rotary motion by suggesting that the universe as a whole is incessantly rotating with enough rapidity for it to cohere. His assumptions here become
debatable based on modem analysis. However, he also proposed a spatial
continuity whereby air and aether are separated from the surrounding multiplicity, as perhaps suggested by Anaximenes, and he went on to argue, "all
things are together" and "forever equal" as already suggested by his principle
that "all things contain a portion of everything." 84 He further proposed that
each physical substance is distinct from others because one component predominates in its mixture with other elements, and he explained that the
interaction among these particles can ultimately be traced to attraction and
repulsion. He even declared his acceptance of Parmenides principle that
nothing can be added to the totality of all things and likewise that nothing can
pass away, and, as later summarized by Aristotle, he asserted, "Almost all
things that are homogeneous are generated and destroyed only through aggregation and segregation, and are not in any other sense generated or destroyed but remain etemally." 85 In modem terms, the atoms and molecules of
any particular body can be transferred one way or another among various
compounds in a potentially endless sequence.
Many of Anaxagoras' assumptions are useful as a complex synthesis of
earlier theories, but he took a further step by linking them based on his own
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theory of Nous, the transcendent manifestation of mind more unified than the
binary opposition of love and hate. If earth, air, fire, and water occur in
sustained motion by an interaction between the strictly mental principles of
love and hate as proposed by Empedocles, this interaction can be subsumed
to Nous as human consciousness on a more holistic basis. Thought itself
became the most basic element, rather than any of the various alternatives
suggested by his predecessors. As explained by Anaxagoras, Nous is effectively "the finest of all things," a manifestation of thought that necessarily
exists both in and beyond the physical nature. In effect, Nous is the only
element that both participates in nature and exceeds it: "And nothing is
absolutely separated off or divided the one from the other except Mind
[Nous ]." 86
Heraclitus had already proposed the notion of Logos as a mental function
imbedded in the universe, and Empedocles had featured the dichotomy between the mental dispositions of love and hate. In tum, Anaxagoras proposed
the more inclusive existence of Nous as transcendent mind- possibly a universal agent of law suggesting supernatural authority. As possibly suggested
by Melissus' concept of a unified physical existence with no boundaries,
Anaxagoras suggested the manifestation of transcendent existence identified
as Mind, which is paradoxically "mixed with no Thing, but is alone by
itself," yet with ultimate authority over the universe as a whole. 87 As much
later explained by Cicero, Anaxagoras was "the first pre-Socratic philosopher to hold that the orderly disposition of the universe is designed and
perfected by the rational power caused by mind, called Nous." 88 Nous was
identified as a shared principle that comprises both the entire universe and a
mental capacity independent of the universe that it has effectively created.
As proposed by Aristotle, this cosmic authority also bore a substantial
ethical aspect, for Anaxagoras argued that a single deity exists comparable to
the "good" identified with appropriate mental behavior. 89 Now an entirely
new concept of religion became possible in strictly monotheistic terms that
was obviously more credible than the Homeric mythology of Zeus and his
fellow gods and goddesses. This spiritual version of pre-Socratic cosmology
effectively provided the foundation for a more advanced version of religion
as a monotheistic alternative to the Homeric gods. No longer did deity consist of anthropomorphic mythical figures, but instead it entailed an embodied
universal consciousness both in and of itself and as an intrinsic manifestation
of the universe. This was the principle that Socrates had in mind when he
asserted the religious implications of Anaxagoras' notion, "that it is mind
that produces order and is the cause of everything. " 90 This also helps to
explain why Socrates felt he did "know" on a spiritual plane aside from his
frequent insistence in public debate that he knew he didn't know. Many
centuries later at the Council of Nicaea, the concept of Nous seems to have
inspired the Christian notion of a Holy Ghost as a particular aspect of God
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imbedded in the universe as a whole. Obviously, however, Nous as transcendent consciousness differs from the modem Darwinian explanation of human
intelligence as the outcome of biological evolution in which the human mind
is a product of the universe, not its essence, as Aristotle also seems to have
asserted in his pivotal text De Anima. 91
In several pages preserved by Simplicius, Anaxagoras had no difficulty in
accepting the paradox that transcendent mind is both perfect and the ultimate
source of conscious mistakes and the world's countless imperfections. Unlike the sustained trial-and-error mistakes typical of normal mental behavior,
the perfection of higher consciousness is supposedly singular and unassailable. Anaxagoras even went on to suggest that a transcendent version of
mind achieves total purity as opposed to everything else that is otherwise
independent of full control:
Other things all contain a part of everything, but Mind is infinite and selfruling, and is mixed with no Thing, but is alone by itself. . .. For it is the finest
of all Things, and the purest, and has complete understanding of everything,
and has the greatest power. 92

An entirely new version of supernatural authority identified with godhead
then seemed possible based on this definition of universal mind (Nous).
Anaxagoras also suggested that transcendent creationism was a product of
Mind by having made things "revolve from the outset," apparently the agent
of both creation and circular revolution as already suggested by Empedocles
and Parmenides and later featured by Aristotle:
For it [Mind, or Nous] is the finest of all Things, and the purest, and has
complete understanding of everything, and has the greatest power. All things
which have life, both the greater and the less, are ruled by Mind. Mind took
command of the universal revolution, so as to make (things) revolve at the
outset. And at first things began to revolve from some small point, but now the
revolution extends over a greater area, and will spread even further. And the
things which were mixed together, and separated off, and divided, were all
understood by Mind .... And nothing is absolutely separated off or divided the
one from the other except Mind. Mind is all alike, both the greater and the
less. 93

He then suggests that the entire universe came into existence much as
explained by earlier pre-Socratic philosophers:
It was this revolution which caused the separation off. The dense and moist
and cold and dark (Elements) collected here, where now is Earth, and the rare
and hot and dry went outwards to the furthest part of the Aether. .. . Earth
solidifies ... water is separated off. From water comes earth, and from earth
stones are solidified . .. 94
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This genetic explanation by Anaxagoras simplified and smoothed over
Empedocles paradigm on what seems a more credible basis.
Despite all seeming disparities, Anaxagoras explained, transcendent mind
is the primary agent that harmonizes contradictory aspects of the universe as
well as all motion among celestial bodies in the sky. He concurred with
Leucippus and Democritus' thesis that nature consists of an infinitude of
seemingly mindless and therefore chaotic microscopic interactions. However, he also insisted that this perceived disorder produces overall harmony, the
product of higher mental behavior. Just as Empedocles subsumed the cyclical
momentum of natural elements depicted by earlier philosophers to the binary
opposition between love and hate, Anaxagoras subordinated this entire hierarchy to an even higher singular authority--Naus itself--an inclusive principle
of transcendent consciousness that could later be identified as monotheistic
godhead. His concept of mind's universal authority through the rapid expansion of the universe seems to have inspired Platonism's most basic assumptions as well as Christian theology's much later concept of God's transcendent authority. Thus, both Plato's idealism and Aristotle's naturalism can be
traced to the influence of Anaxagoras. Plato's metaphysical assumptions
seem to have been primarily inspired by Anaxagoras' concept of Nous, while
Aristotle's later cosmology served as a synthesis of Anaxagoras' scientific
perspective with that of both Leucippus and Democritus.

XIII. DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA (CA. 425 BC)
Raised in Apollonia on the island of Crete, Diogenes of Apollonia was
younger than both Anaxagoras and Leucippus and perhaps slightly older than
Democritus. Plato ignored him in his Dialogues along with Leucippus and
Democritus, and among the ancient natural philosophers Diogenes shared
with Socrates the distinction of having been ridiculed in public performances
of comedies during his lifetime. Yet his philosophy played an important, if
limited, role in bridging the gap between the early Milesian school-particularly Anaximenes-and Aristotle's mature cosmology in De Caelo and De
Anima. All of the earlier pre-Socratic philosophies anticipated Aristotle's
theoretical synthesis, some more than others, but it was Diogenes who effectively summarized pre-Socratic assumptions, setting the stage for Aristotle's
later and more sophisticated version of metaphysics.
Diogenes accepted the position of Thales and Anaximander that nature as
a whole derives from a single basic substrate, thereby justifying a monistic
theory of the physical universe. With this in mind, according to Aristotle,
Diogenes sought to resurrect Anaximander's original concept of heat as a
continuous activity of the universe:
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Diogenes is right when he argues that unless all things were derived from one,
reciprocal action and passion could not occur. The hot thing, e.g. would not be
cooled and the cold thing in turn be warmed, for heat and cold do not change
reciprocally into one thing, but what changes (it is clear) is the substratum.
Hence, whenever there is action and passion between things, that which underlies them must be a single something. No doubt, it is not true to say that all
things are of this character; but it is true of all things between which there is a
reciprocal action and passion. 95

In response to the interplay between heat and its absence Diogenes, who
was familiar with human anatomy, pointed out the essential role of that lungs
play in delivering air to the rest of the body. He revived the assumption of
Anaximenes that air plays a basic role linked with heat as the source of
incessant motion necessary for the sustenance of life.
As later explained by the Christian church father, Clement of Alexandria,
Diogenes was willing to enlarge Anaximenes' choice of air in perpetual
motion as a particular benefit of the sun and even the principle of motion in
and of itself:
Diogenes postulates air as the element. Everything is in motion and there are
innumerable worlds. He constructs the cosmos thus : the whole is in motion
and becomes thin in one place and dense in another, and where the dense
comes together it has formed a close mass, and so on with the rest of the same
way: the lightest parts took the uppermost station and produced the sun. 96

In effect mass is a product of density, and the least dense version of mass
is to be found in the sun, the source of heat and the agent of energy distributed by air. Diogenes accepted Anaximenes' choice of air as the essential
source of life and therefore the primary and most basic element of the universe derivative of heat. 97 He insisted, "Men and all other animals live by
means of air, which they breathe in, and this for them is both Soul (Life) and
Intelligence." Today, of course, oxygen's crucial role is in biological existence is recognized, but Diogenes extended the principle to explain the
governance of the whole universe, by implication linking breath with the
strictly physical manifestations of fire, conflagration, and even the power of
the sun:
And it seems to me that that which has intelligence is that which is called Air
by mankind; and further, that by this, all creatures are guided, and that it rules
everything; for this in itself seems to me to be God [sic] and to reach everywhere and to arrange everything and to be in everything. . . . Also in all
animals, the Soul is the same thing, (namely) Air, warmer than outside in
which we are but much colder than that nearer the sun. 98
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Perhaps something exists equivalent to a monotheistic God, but it entirely
consists of air. In effect, Diogenes considered breath to be a more basic
universal principle than Anaxagoras' concept of universal soul, suggesting
that the metabolic function of neural performance is more basic than its
cognitive manifestation. Anaxagoras had already proposed the existence of a
single God, as had both Empedocles and even Xenophanes. However, Diogenes' explanation of godhood seems pantheistic and is in accord with Anaximenes' concept of air as the most basic medium of the universe, effectively
linking mind and matter.
Diogenes conceded the basic necessity of a monistic universe-all things
"the alteration of the same thing"-as first suggested by the Milesians preceding the binary and quaternary divisions of Heraclitus and Empedocles:
It seems to me, to sum up the whole matter, that all existing things are created
by the alteration of the same thing, and are the same thing. This is very
obvious. For if the things now existing in this universe-earth and water and
air and fire and all the other things which are seen to exist in this world: if any
one of these were different in its own (essential) nature, and were not the same
thing which was transformed in many ways and changed, in no way could
things mix with one another ...

Like Anaxagoras he identified the organization of the universe equivalent
to human intelligence. Moreover, he even seems to have agreed with Anaxagoras that the universe is ultimately a product of consciousness with human
behavior one instance of this inclusive capability:
"All . .. things come into being in different forms at different times by changes
of the same (substance) and they return to the same. Such a distribution would
not have been possible without Intelligence." 99

Diogenes' thesis linked Anaximenes' emphasis on the central role of air
with mental capacity equivalent to Anaxagoras' concept of Nous and Plato's
later insistence on a spiritual universe. Nevertheless, Diogenes subsumed
mind to matter, not the other way around as Plato argued. In none of his
existing fragments did he explicitly assert matter's dominant role, but its
likelihood was everywhere implied. Significantly, Plato ignored Diogenes'
theoretical contribution, whereas Aristotle took him into account at least five
times.
XIV. LEUCIPPUS (cA. EARLY 5rn CENTURY BC)
Leucippus could have been born and raised in Miletus or Abdera, Elea or
Melos, and it seems he spent his entire life as a teacher either in Miletus or
Abdera on the northern coast of the Aegean Sea between Thrace and Mace-
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donia. But possibly not. According to Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus later
claimed that Leucippus never existed. Others however disagreed, and it
seems likely that Leucippus did exist, that he was a pupil of Zeno or even
Parmenides in Elea, which would account for his monist assumptions regarding a strictly physical universe. As an advocate of such a synthesis he was
said to have written two scrolls, The Great World Order and On Mind, the
first of which is now entirely lost. However, one sentence has survived from
the second scroll, the compelling statement, "Nothing happens at random;
everything happens because of reason and by necessity." 100 A determinist
cause and effect relationship was therefore of paramount importance and
suggests both the Milesian and Eleatic perspectives.
Yet, such an explanation would have been at odds with the basic argument for which Leucippus is primarily known, that of a seemingly random
interaction among microscopic atoms, by definition the smallest particles in
existence. In fact the paradox between a dominant cosmic logic (featured by
Heraclitus' concept of Logos) and endless random motion among infinitesimal atoms was an essential consideration, for if such chaos predominates at
the most basic level of existence, how can the whole universe function on a
predictable basis? The effort to resolve this seeming contradiction that has
persisted even in modern times became the essential goal of the atomists
Leucippus and Democritus. Pythagoreans or perhaps the Phoenician, Mochus
(or Moschus), might first have suggested the existence and behavior of such
minute particles, but whatever Leucippus's source, if any, he himself primarily featured the possibility of countless atoms too small and chaotic to be
observed by the naked eye, but in fact the universal stuff of the universe. Just
as Parmenides and Melissus had assigned infinitude to time and space, Leucippus suggested its application strictly to microscopic events. Today, photons, electrons, or the so-called Higgs particles have been identified as even
smaller bodies than atoms, but whatever microscopic stuff exists as the basic
constituent of material existence, Leucippus identified it as atoms that compose larger entities, ultimately the whole universe.
Leucippus described the physical universe as a vast realm of mostly empty space filled with the incessant interplay of countless atoms in temporary
combinations. As later explained by Diogenes Laertius, "The all includes the
empty as well as the full," and the existence of matter is the combination of
atoms through their network with each other suspended in space: "The
worlds are formed when atoms fall into the void and are entangled with one
another." 101 Aristotle more or less substantiated this explanation in his lost
text, "On Democritus," later quoted by Simplicius. While he featured Democritus his summary applied to Leucippus' original theory as well:
Democritus [i .e. Leucippus] thinks the nature of the divine entities consists of
small substances infinite in number; he supposes a place for them, different

38

Chapter I

from them and infinite in extent, and to this he applies the names of 'void',
'nothing', and 'the infinite', while to each of the substances he applies the
names ' thing', ' solid', and 'existent' . He thinks the substances are so small as
to escape our senses have all sorts of shapes and figures, and differences of
size. From these, then, . .. are generated and compounded perceptible masses.
The substances are at variance and move in the void because of their dissimilarity . .. and as they move they collide with each other and interlock in such a
way that . .. a single substance is never in reality produced from them; for it
would be very simple-minded to suppose that two or more things could ever
become one . . . . He thinks that they cling to one another and remain together
until some stronger necessity . . . scatters them apart and separates them. He
ascribes the genesis and the separation opposed to it not only to animals but
also to plants, and to worlds, and generally to all perceptible bodies . 102

Aristotle' s principal disciple, Theophrastus, offered a slightly different
but equally useful version of Leucippus' theory in the First Book of his
Opinions:
Leucippus of Elea or Miletos (for both accounts are given of him) had associated with Parmenides in philosophy. He did not, however, follow the same
path in his explanation of things as Parmenides and Xenophanes did, but, to all
appearance, the very opposite. They made the All one, immovable, uncreated,
and finite, and did not even permit us to search for what is not; he [Leucippus]
assumed innumerable and ever- moving elements, namely, the atoms. And he
made their forms infinite in number, since there was no reason why they
should be of one kind rather than another, and because he saw that there was
unceasing becoming and change in things. He held, further, that what is is no
more real than what is not, and that both are alike causes of things that come
into being: for he laid down that the substance of the atoms was compact and
full, and he called them what is, while they moved in the void which he called
what is not, but affirmed to be just as real as what is. 103

Theophrastus primarily attributed variation to the structural differences
between atoms themselves rather than their multiple combinations as later
explained by Aristotle. Neither Aristotle nor Theophrastus sought to explain
the cosmic explanation attributed to Leucippus whereby compound arrangements result from collisions and entanglements in an enormous whirl gathered around the earth, but still Theophrastus' passage provides a lucid explanation of the interaction between atoms and the void surrounding them.
In retrospect, the basic assumption of Leucippus '-the concept of particles suspended in a void- differed from Melissus' assumption that material
continuity pervades the universe as an essentially continuous expanse of
matter without any possibility for empty space. This emphasis upon continuity was later adopted by Aristotle as well, but what seemed a basic contradiction between continuity and the possibility of atomistic disjunction continued
to defy synthesis, setting the stage for Strata' s later unsuccessful effort to
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obtain a compromise based on experimental evidence. Both models seem
defensible in light of modem physics in the sense that the entire universe can
in fact be understood as an infinite force field much as Melissus proposed,
but the microscopic space occupied by atomic particles is nevertheless vast
compared to the size of their respective nuclei.
Leucippus suggested what might seem obvious-that motion as featured
by Anaximenes would be impossible without empty space for things to move
into. Dense atomic mass displaces (or pushes through) a comparatively rarified atomic mass of lesser density and, in the case of air and water, the
rarified mass can be divided by anything of greater density, then almost
immediately converges again. Air, for example, is full of atoms and molecules but contains far more empty space among these atoms and molecules
than does a rock, so a rock can be thrown into the air without any difficulty.
In effect, its tightly bound atoms and molecules displace the relatively sparse
assortment of atmospheric atoms. Similarly, fish can swim in water, an axe
can chop wood, and a diamond can cut glass. As a result, relative atomic
density-i.e. greater mass relative to the space it occupies-is crucial to the
possibility of motion.
Whatever the paradox between space and motion, Leucippus seems to
have suggested that mass primarily exists as a multitude of tiny entangled
atoms that occupy relatively little space. Leucippus was therefore able to
treat atomic particles as the most basic element, and to explain the origin of
celestial bodies-in fact the entire universe-relevant to the necessarily complex formation of these particles in what might seem an endless variety of
substances:
These [atoms] collect together and form a single vortex, in which they jostle
against each other and, circling round in every possible way, separate off, by
like atoms joining them. And the atoms being so numerous that they can no
longer revolve in equilibrium, the light ones pass into empty space outside, as
if they were being winnowed; the remainder keep together and, becoming
entangled, go on their circuit together, and form a primary spherical system.104

With obvious reference to cyclical motion as already suggested by Heraclitus and Empedocles, Leucippus as summarized by Diogenes Laertius explained the entire universe as a more inclusive "entanglement of atoms"
comprising a vast single vortex. At every level, bigger and more massive
substances gather toward the center of spherical systems while lighter ones
are thrust into outlying orbits. 105 Whether he recognized the fullest implications of his analysis, Leucippus also succeeded in helping to extend the
earth's predictability to apply to the whole universe. Obviously the Milky
Way fits this description, as do most other galaxies in the sky-as many as
two trillion of them according to the mo_st recent count. 106
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Leucippus was also correct in suggesting that the earth travels in orbit, but
his notion that the sun itself orbits around the moon was of course mistaken.
He also suggested the principle of gravity, maintaining that the earth was
"formed by portions brought to the center coalescing," and he ventured to
predict the eventual destruction of all celestial bodies, by implication including both the earth and universe: "As the world is born, so, too, it grows,
decays and perishes, in virtue of some necessity," the nature of which he did
not specify. 107 Here again Leucippus seems to have anticipated the assumption of modem astrophysicists that all stars and planets are just as susceptible
to eventual destruction as people and animals.
Like the Milesian philosophers and Democritus, Leucippus excluded religion from consideration as compared to the other major pre-Socratic philosophers. He narrowed his theory to the universe as an objective realm that
exists on a strictly physical basis from the bottom up. There was no opportunity for the presence and authority of one or more transcendent gods to be
taken seriously according to his concept of infinitesimal existence. Leucippus' single presumably harmless fragment that has already been quoted, to
the effect that "everything happens out ofreason and by necessity," takes on
new profundity in light of this cosmology. No matter how chaotic atomic
entanglements might seem, existence is best understood as cosmic manifestation that endlessly replicates itself. In effect reason is imbedded in the universe, not the product of anthropomorphic intervention.
XV. DEMOCRITUS (cA. 460-370 BC)
Most historians link the final stage of pre-Socratic philosophy with Democritus, the so-called "laughing philosopher," who was a contemporary of Socrates as well as Leucippus' young co-author of the theory of atomism. Leucippus had first proposed such a possibility, but it was Democritus who effectively advanced its assumptions and took into account numerous concepts
relevant to its implications. Later, Aristotle actually described him as a "man
who had thought about everything," and, as suggested by Diogenes Laertius'
bibliography, he seems to have authored as many as seventy-two scrolls upon
a variety of fields including ethics, physics, astronomy, mathematics, logic,
agriculture, medicine, epistemology, and even military tactics. Unfortunately, none of his complete works has survived, and the three hundred fragments
included in Freeman's Ancilla are almost entirely limited to ethics and have
no relevance to his theory of cosmology or atomism in particular, his most
important philosophical contributions. The wide range of his theoretical inquiry was comparable to that of Aristotle, but unlike the fortunate recovery
of Aristotle's writings, almost his entire output was lost except for numerous
fragments almost all of which pertain to relatively inoffensive assumptions.
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Democritus was born and raised in Abdera on the northern coast of the
Aegean Sea, where Leucippus seems to have practiced philosophy and not
far from where Aristotle was born perhaps seventy years later. He lived well
into the fifth century and was said to have died at roughly the age of one
hundred, by far the oldest of the major Greek philosophers. His family was
quite wealthy and the Persian king Xerxes was said to have dined at their
house while in transit from Greece to Persia. Perhaps impressed by the
knowledge of Xerxes' staff regarding religion and astronomy, he himself
supposedly traveled in his youth to Persia, Ethiopia, India, and Babylon,
where he became acquainted with the Chaldean Magi. He was also said to
have spent seven years with Egyptian geometers before returning penniless
to Greece where he lived for a while in Athens, but there is no information on
where he lived afterwards. He and Anaxagoras never met, and the chronology of his relationship with others in Athens is unclear. He later remembered
having encountered Socrates, whereas Socrates in tum had no recollection of
his presence or identity, suggesting he was older and more of a celebrity at
the time. On the other hand, Democritus was said to have hired Protagoras as
his secretary, then accepted him as a pupil despite the likelihood that Protagoras was a full generation older than Socrates.
The bulk of Democritus' theoretical arguments that we have today were
preserved by Aristotle in fifty-seven passages relevant to cosmology, including eight in Physics, nine in Metaphysics, seven in De Caelo, three in On
Generation and Corruption, and eight in De Anima. Other ancient authors
who took his arguments into account included Sextus Empiricus (37 passages), and Cicero (17 passages listed). Plutarch's discussion of Democritus
in "Against Colotes" also helps to confirm his reputation as a major philosopher several centuries after his death. Moreover, both Epicurus and the epic
poet Lucretius seem to have based their shared secular perspective almost
entirely on Democritus' assumptions. Unfortunately, most of Epicurus' cosmological analysis has been lost, and Lucretius' epic version seems to have
been based on Epicurus' assumptions as much as those of Democritus.
The primary evidence of Democritus's theory of cosmology consists of a
scroll called The Great World-Order (Diakosmos), which began with Leucippus's explanation of atomism in a preliminary section of the text, followed by his own smaller section identified as Lesser World-Order, which in
a shortened version, enlarged the scope of Leucippus' theory. As neither
portion of Lesser World Order has survived, Democritus' theory can only be
reconstructed as a tentative likelihood based on the summaries of others.
Fortunately, Aristotle wrote a precis summary of his theory that survived into
the sixth century AD, long enough for Simplicius to have read and summarized its analysis in a long paragraph most of which can be quoted here in
multiple translation:
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As earlier indicated, Democritus proposed that all matter throughout the
universe consists of atoms as an infinite number of minute particles that
commingle with relative freedom in an otherwise infinite vacuum. The entirety of the visible universe accordingly consists of numerous combinations
of these atoms that interact in relatively stable combinations. Moreover, a
steady mixture of atoms is basic to all perceptible shapes and figures, and
movement takes place among shapes and sizes resulting from this disparity.
In effect heavy objects with relatively high atomic concentration can displace
lighter substances (e.g. air or water) whose reduced density is necessarily less
resistant. On the other hand, substances can interlock in relatively stable
formations until an even "stronger necessity" is sufficient to scatter them.
Democritus suggested this incessant modification derives from atomic interaction at the most basic level of manifestation relevant to vegetation, animal
behavior, and in fact all perceptible and imperceptible existence. 108
Obviously missing from the text is any reference to transcendent authority that might be identified with one or more gods. Unlike Anaxagoras,
Democritus seems to have limited his analysis to a strictly physical explanation of a field of atoms as opposed to a more holistic analysis that linked
physics with the possibility of universal consciousness.
According to Sextus Empiricus, Democritus was in full accord with Leucippus that the universe consists entirely of atoms suspended in empty space
and that all else is nothing more than the necessarily limited perception of
nature. To this extent their shared assumption enlarged Parmenides' description of existence as an endless unified realm. However, his version also
featured physical determinism, since "all things happen by virtue of necessity." 109 An infinitude of atoms might seem to interact in random fashion, he
conceded, but their cumulative manifestation occurs in a predictable manner
just as seemingly irregular activity may be measured today by means of
statistics. On a comparable basis, Democritus suggested, what might seem to
consist of microscopic chaos must also be perceived as a more inclusive
ordered system. He also proposed that countless other worlds exist across the
universe, and that some of them "not merely resemble but completely and
absolutely match each other in every detail ... including human beings." 110
To a limited extent Democritus accepted Anaxagoras' equation between
soul and thought as particular aspects of a single universal substance relevant
to mental behavior. In doing so he more specifically suggested, " ... its
power of originating movement must be due to its fineness of grain and the
shape of its atoms." 111 By implication this caveat featured neural ingredients-today's concept of brain cells-that connect the transcendent aspect
of consciousness with the physical behavior of the brain. In Book I of De
Anima, Aristotle indicated that Democritus also identified soul as "a sort of
fire or hot substance" [in modem terms metabolism as controlled oxidization] that is "linked with respiration as the characteristic mark of life." In
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effect his relatively simple proposal merged the earlier theories of such figures as Alcmaeon, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Diogenes Apollonius, and even
Heraclitus. He also linked soul with mental behavior in general: "Soul and
thought are, he says, one and the same thing." In effect, he suggested, soul is
identical with human consciousness as a particular manifestation of the physical universe rather than supernatural intelligence as transcendent manifestation. This suggestion by Democritus as recounted by Aristotle might well
have anticipated the later philosophical standoff between Platonism and Aristotle ' s natural philosophy-also between metaphysics and empiricism, ultimately between religion and science. 112
According to Aristotle, Democritus also identified the soul with thought
as human consciousness produced by "indivisible bodies" because of its
atomic structure, effectively a concept of neural anatomy quite different from
Anaxagoras' broad identification of soul with a single substance as "the
principle of all things." 113 Democritus also seems to have anticipated
Locke's epistemology by suggesting that soul is "identical with reason."
Therefore, according to Aristotle, Democritus felt able to treat ideation as a
product of sensation in response to the perceived environment:
Democritus says that either there is no truth or to us at least it is not
evident. And in general it is because these thinkers [inclusive of Democritus]
suppose knowledge to be sensation, and this to be a physical alteration that
they say what appears to our senses must be true. 114

In other words, any change or movement observed in the environment
necessarily produces a conscious response adequate to respond with appropriate behavior as later suggested by Lockean epistemology. Aristotle acknowledged that Empedocles and other pre-Socratic philosophers had also
suggested this possibility, but maintained that it was Democritus who featured its central importance. According to Aristotle, Democritus even went
on to suggest that all sensation-hence perception- is an advanced biological manifestation of touch as the simplest reflex at the most basic level of
response. Aristotle mentioned this thesis in order to reject it, but modern
research indicates its likelihood. For example, worms primarily depend upon
tactile contact and perhaps odor as compared to more advanced response
combinations of insects and animals. When an obstruction blocks the path of
a worm, it possesses sufficient neural capability to recognize the impediment
and move around it. The more refined senses of smell, sound, and sight may
be identified as later additions acquired by more advanced species. 11 5
As an arch-materialist obsessed with behavior of the physical universe,
Democritus apparently had the reputation among most of his contemporaries
as an outspoken atheist, as indicated by Cicero's brief remark at the beginning of The Nature of the Gods :
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... his [Democritus'] denial of immutability, and therefore of eternity, to
everything whatsoever surely involves a repudiation of deity so absolute as to
leave no conception of a divine being remaining! 116

Few passages by Democritus that exist today confirm this radical stance
except for his expressed sympathy with Sophists who played a dominant role
in Athens at the time by promoting the assumption either that there is no
clear-cut truth or that it cannot be discerned. Democritus himself took this
argument to its limit by maintaining in at least one particular fragment excerpted from his lost text, Canons: "Truth is sunk in an abyss, opinion and
custom are all-prevailing, no place is left for truth, all things are successively
wrapped in darkness." As later explained by Cicero in Academica, "He [Democritus] flatly denies that truth exists at all ... and says that the senses are
'full of darkness."' 117 Obviously this radical assertion of disbelief seems to
have been incompatible with Democritus' later reputation for encyclopedic
knowledge, so these particular remarks may be assumed to have typified an
early stance he later abandoned. In effect, his version of skepticism, very
likely inspired by Protagoras, might have justified an empirical thoroughness
later enlarged by Aristotle as opposed to Platonism's relatively simplistic
transcendental "truths" derivative of Anaxagoras' philosophy.
Democritus' only two comments that survive about contemporary religion are limited to his ridicule of its supposed social and psychological benefits quite aside from the likelihood of its validity as a credible explanation of
the universe. In the first of these remarks he identified religion as a primitive
effort to explain potential dangers in the physical universe that might have
been caused by gods:
For when the men of old times beheld the disasters in the heavens, such as
thunderings and lightnings, and thunderbolts and collisions between stars, and
eclipses of sun and moon, they were affrighted, imagining the Gods to be the
causes of these things. 1I 8

In the second passage Democritus proposed that the promotion of religion
had been an opportunistic ruse primarily beneficial to those who invented
and promoted it:
When the life of mankind was without order, those who so far excelled the rest
in strength and intelligence, that all men lived subservient to their commands,
being intent to gain for themselves more admiration and veneration, invented
for themselves a kind of superhuman and divine authority, and in consequence
were by the populace accounted Gods. 11 9
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One suspects that Democritus mentioned this possibility with regards to
early prophets who lived elsewhere in order to avoid the threat of public
prosecution.
Democritus' religious disbelief seems a pivotal factor in helping to clarify
his sustained hostility with Anaxagoras, then Plato during his residence in
Athens. As Democritus explained at one time, Anaxagoras "did not take to
him" upon his arrival in Athens, but he also offered a more benign explanation , "I came to Athens and no one knew me. " Another possibility was the
coincidence that both Anaxagoras and Democritus' tutor Leucippus sought at
the same time to enlarge Eleatic cosmology by proposing competitive versions of microscopic infinitude with opposite attitudes toward the possible
role of religion. Also Anaxagoras might have rejected Democritus simply
because of his close relationship with Leucippus. In any case Plato seems to
have sided with Anaxagoras by totally omitting any reference to both Leucippus and Democritus throughout his dialogues. In the single instance in
which he was said by others to have mentioned Democritus by name, he
declared his wish that all of Democritus' writings be burned. One of his
disciples supposedly replied that Democritus' writings were already in such
wide currency that the task would be difficult at best, which suggests the
likelihood of a highly competitive relationship at the time. As mentioned by
Diogenes Laertius, Plato also refused to enter into any kind of public debate
with Democritus, very possibly because of his reputation as a formidable
adversary:
. .. obviously because he [Plato] kn ew that he would have to match himself
against the prince of philosophers, described by Timon, 'Such is the wise
Democritus, the guardian of discourse, keen-witted disputant, among the best I
have ever read.' 120

Ultimately Plato appears to have prevailed. His version of transcendent
metaphysics obviously took precedence in later histories of philosophy at the
expense of Democritus' radical empiricism, as much as anything because
most of Democritus' writings upon cosmology were destroyed exactly as
Plato had advocated, many of them probably by fire. To the extent that
Democritus' general perspective has survived, it has been the result of his
substantial influence upon three later authors-Epicurus, Lucretius, and especially Aristotle. Otherwise, record of his historic contribution would have
been entirely limited to his relatively harmless ethical teachings featured by
cautious ancient doxographers.
In retrospect, Democritus and Plato played complementary roles in their
pursuit of basic philosophical truths. Plato advocated transcendent authority
with obvious monotheistic possibilities as already inspired by Anaxagoras,
whereas Democritus limited his perspective to empirical findings based on
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physical evidence that supported the rejection of godhood by such precursors
as Anaximander and Melissus. In particular his concept of atomism encouraged a renewed pursuit of scientific investigation at odds with Plato's concept of ideal forms. Whereas Democritus explained human intelligence as
complex mental behavior responsive to the objective world, Plato took up
Anaxagoras' cause by featuring the importance of spiritual transcendence
that presumably supersedes this level of knowledge relevant to the objective
world. It was left to Aristotle, once Plato's favorite disciple, to bring Democritus' emphasis on materialism to a more advanced level through a close
examination of early pre-Socratic assumptions.
In fact these two complementary strategies seem to have occurred in
tandem. Just as Plato enlarged Anaxagoras' concept of Nous at the expense
of Democritus, Aristotle enlarged the materialism of Democritus and many
of his predecessors at the expense of Plato's concept of ideal forms. He
submitted to analysis the formulations of both authors but increasingly sided
with Democritus, especially in what would seem to have been his final three
texts upon cosmology. 121 He continued to pursue the theory of physical
continuity suggested by Anaxagoras, but also took into account the alternative hypothesis of Democritus and Leucippus regarding the analysis of spatial infinitude. This potential source of contradiction was much later explored
by Aristotle's disciples, Theocritus and Strato, if without any success in
obtaining a fully acceptable synthesis. 122 In any case, Democritus' achievement inspired the Epicureans and encouraged Aristotle's dependence on empirical investigation as well as his recognition that the god concept had little
if any relevance to his effort to explain the universe as a whole.

XVI. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
All of the pre-Socratic philosophers sought a holistic theory of the universe
either by featuring a single element or as many as four in a functional combination. Godhead was not entirely omitted from consideration, but it was of
secondary importance and often ignored, as were the various myths linked
with the notion of supernatural deities. Monotheism and the transcendent
authority of gods were suggested now and again--especially by Xenophanes,
Parmenides, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras--but the strictly physical implication of their theories could easily be differentiated from their concessions to
religion. On the other hand, many of the theories anticipated modem scientific concepts, for example when earth was explained as mass, fire as energy,
and Pythagorean mathematics as a complex matrix of numerical relationships
imbedded in nature as exemplified by the modem equations of gravity and
the speed of light. For example, the concept of gravity was anticipated in a
sense by Leucippus' notion that heavy objects fall because of their compact
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atomic arrangement as opposed to light elements that float or rise because
they are effectively squeezed upward through the displacement of nearby
heavier elements. In effect they retain their space by letting themselves be
pushed upwards. Similarly, the concept of atomism advocated by Leucippus
and Democritus anticipated modem particle physics, as did Anaxagoras'
theory of sub-atomic continuity. In light of modem physics both theories
turned out to be defensible. Moreover, Parmenides' concept of the universe
as timeless spiritual existence bore useful implications for modem religion,
as did Anaximander's concept of an unidentified substance within a potentially endless physical substratum.
It can be added that Heraclitus' notion of fire as sheer energy anticipated
Farraday's theory of fire as rapid oxidization, the dependence of metabolism
on oxidization proposed by Lavoisier, and even the splitting of atoms proposed by Einstein. Einstein's famous equation, e (energy) equals m (mass)
times c squared (the speed of light times itself) can be loosely translated to
the effect that fire (i.e. energy) equals earth (i.e. mass) times the square of a
Pythagorean mathematical constant that somehow manifests the velocity of
light. Ancient Greece's pre-Socratic materialists may be admired for having
anticipated these factors as confirmed, for example, by the atomic bomb's
instantaneous transition from mass (as suggested by Melissus), to energy (as
suggested by Heraclitus). Even the recent discovery of the so-called Higgs
particle can be explained by establishing a universal principle (Anaximander' s concept of arche) that the entire universe (Parmenides' concept of its
existence as a whole) consists of an enormous force field (again, Heraclitus'
concept of fire) that produces matter (again Melissus' concept), whose existence consists of tiny particles (Democritus' concept of atomism) that result
from the breakdown of "elegant symmetries" yet to be fully explained
(Anaximander' s principle of arche relevant to Pythagoras ' theory of imbedded mathematics). On the other hand, Plato' s version of Anaxagoras' concept
of mind imbedded in the universe seems to have inspired the orthodox Christian binarism between transcendent spirit and the material universe as described by St. Augustine and still promulgated today by modem Christianity.
Both ideological alternatives of science and religion can be traced to complementary aspects of pre-Socratic philosophy. What other ancient creed or
system of belief bore any comparison to this collective achievement?

Chapter Two

Plato and the Age of Pericles

Radical doubt was fashionable among a generation of Sophists during the socalled Age of Pericles, which lasted roughly from 495-429 BC. The obvious
absurdity of Greek mythology had finally provoked both outspoken skepticism and unrestrained secular speculation by many of the pre-Socratic philosophers. Disbelief came into vogue, and relevant to almost every issue the
question boiled down to, "How can this assumption to be valid?" Or more to
the point: "To what extent does it withstand sustained criticism?" Credible
answers were formulated on a sustained basis to determine why or how any
particular concept was worthy of consideration. Vigorous debate became
commonplace as well as an enlarged emphasis on analytic skill that allowed
more articulate and/or better-informed advocates to prevail at the expense of
others. This pursuit of rhetorical advantage was perhaps best illustrated by an
episode reported in Plato's dialogue Protagoras, when as a young dialectician Socrates fell into argument with Protagoras, the first and most successful proponent of Sophism. Supposedly their purpose was to explain the basic
difference between virtue and knowledge. Much was said, and no decisive
explanation finally prevailed. More important, however, the standoff confirmed that Socrates was a genuine contender quite aside from the seasoned
capabilities of Protagoras.
I. SOPHISTS
It was almost inevitable that Sophism arose as a systematic commitment to
disbelief. Sophists, however, took skepticism to excess, and it soon became
almost a parody of itself. For example Gorgias, by many accounts the most
eminent Sophist after Protagoras and Socrates, went so far as to insist that
nothing exists, that if it did it would be unknowable, and if it were knowable
49
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it could not be communicated. 1 Even more radical was the argument by
Xeniades of Corinth as late as 400 BC, later summarized by Sextus Empiricus:
.. . that all things are false, and that every impression and opinion is false, and
that all that becomes, becomes out of the non-existent, and all that perishes
into the non-existent. 2

Cratylus of the mid to late fifth century B.C. extended the principle to all
acts of communication on the assumption that such behavior necessarily
depends on telling lies. Later, Metrodorus of Chios, a friend and disciple of
Epicurus, took skepticism to its ultimate limit:
I deny that we know whether we know something or know nothing, and
even that we know the mere fact that we do not know (or do know), or know
at all whether something exists or nothing exists.
This radical stance seems to have applied to religion, materialist philosophy, and just about everything else. Then again, Metrodorus could support
the contrary proposition, "Everything exists which anyone perceives." 3 In
combination, these complementary assertions confirmed that nothing is true,
but also that everything submitted to discussion could be taken into account
as a necessarily debatable version of truth.
Not surprisingly, the choice between religion and the pursuit of a secular
alternative became a primary concern. Diagoras was obliged to flee from
Athens in order to avoid prosecution as an atheist, but the poet Simonides
appears to have been forgiven for the implicit agnosticism in his remark
about the existence of the gods, "The longer I think about it, the fainter
becomes my hope of an answer." 4 The philosopher Anaxagoras was prosecuted for atheism in a public trial, apparently because he proposed that the
sun and moon were devoid of godhead, but fortunately he was acquitted as a
result of Pericles' impassioned public defense. Pericles' mistress Aspasia
was also tried, and she too was acquitted as the result of Pericles' eloquence
in her defense. The eminent sculptor Phidias was less fortunate and died in
prison, charged with obvious impiety for having portrayed Pericles and himself on Athena's shield in one of his statues.
Public trials with the possibility of execution obviously discouraged individuals from flaunting their disbelief, but less militant stances of deism,
agnosticism, pantheism, and even theoretical complexity seem to have diminished the threat of prosecution, as illustrated by the later examples of
Aristotle and Epicurus. Democritus and Euripides were suspected of atheism,
and the more outspoken atheists who survived included such social outcasts
as Prodicus of Ceos, Diagoras ofMelos, Euhemerus ofTegea, and Theodorus of Cyrene. .
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Plato's cousin, the playwright Critias [circa 410 B.C.], also seems to have
been notorious for his atheism. A relatively large fragment of his satiric play,
"Sisyphus," displays impiety in its explanation of religion's origin. As summarized by Critias, a "wise and clever man" once invented both fear and
religion by insisting that gods exist who know everything that people think or
do and that it is impossible to escape the gods because of their surpassing
intelligence. Mankind was so frightened by such a possibility that lawlessness ceased, and thus mortals came to believe in deities. 5 Critias accordingly
suggested on this basis that religion could be justified not for its truth but as a
collective expedient to discourage potential lawbreakers. Despite his obvious
disbelief, Critias was an active participant in two of Plato's dialogues, "Charmides" and "Critias," and he later played an aggressive role as a member of
Athens ' notorious Thirty Tyrants. Unlike other philosophers at the time, he
actually died in battle supporting the Tyrants' effort to rule Athens. Quite
aside from his politics, his assumption appears credible even today that religion can be useful in encouraging acceptable behavior.
A popular reaction mounted in Athens against disbelief that was intermittent but also both dramatic and predictable. There were public trials, imprisonments, the flight of notorious disbelievers, and most of all the misguided
execution of Socrates, perhaps the least culpable freethinker who could have
been targeted for this purpose. The collective hostility to skepticism may
have led to renewed temple worship, and even the public theater including
Aristophanes' comedies used doubt to ridicule skeptics. Classic tragedy
served the same purpose through its ritualized enactment of expiation for a
tragic flaw that was inevitably the result of disbelief. A protagonist's single
inexcusable transgression was indifference to prophecies by the gods as well
as their final authority relevant to human affairs. As explained by Aristotle's
classic treatise Poetics, tragedy depicted the inevitable destiny of a monarch
comparable to Pericles whose disdain for holy prophecies guarantees ruination that finally obliges his recognition of his failure. Catharsis thus occurs
among the audience as a complex emotional reaction that merges sympathy
with a sense of righteous justification.
Sophocles in particular seems to have employed tragedy to challenge
Pericles' leadership at the time. Political and religious considerations perhaps
merged in his depiction, though Sophocles' effort may have been based upon
his sustained hostility to Pericles that lasted most of their lives. 6 In his
tragedy, Antigone, Sophocles told of the mythical tyrant, Creon, who ignored
the edict of gods regarding the burial of the dead. Catharsis occurred as
emotional relief shared by the audience upon his discovery of his error in
succumbing to the temptation of disbelief. Even more effective was Sophocles ' later tragedy, Oedipus Rex, which enacted the destruction of an arrogant
leader who ignored a sacred prophecy that he was doomed to kill his father.
Oedipus' visible limp symbolized his deficiency every step he took, but it
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also reinforced the myth's relevance to Pericles at the time, since he himself
seems to have been slightly crippled. Even suggestive of tragic pride were
Pericles' successful public speeches that led to the acquittal of Anaxagoras
and Aspasia. In the opinion of many, his effective rhetorical skills in defense
of their supposed transgressions displayed undue arrogance that could only
have compounded public reaction against Pericles' counterproductive trade
policies that led to the Peloponnesian War. In retrospect, the "real" tragedy
of Athens was Pericles' death, followed by the defeat of Athens that terminated the most remarkable period of ancient Greek civilization. Yet having
lost the Peloponnesian War, Athens would recover well enough to renew at
least its intellectual dominance throughout the region. It was still able, for
example, to host Plato's Academy, Aristotle's Lyceum, Epicurus's Garden,
and the Stoa as a public site for Stoic philosophers. However, the unprecedented Age of Pericles had been brought to a close. Ironically, Athens ' later
achievement as the highpoint of ancient philosophy supplanted its earlier
advantage as the pinnacle of Greek civilization on a more inclusive basis.

IL PROTAGORAS (C. 490-420 BC)
Born in Abdera on the northern coast of the Aegean Sea, Protagoras studied
under Democritus and then distinguished himself as a student of grammar.
Later, in Athens he became a celebrated educator in public discourse, teaching his disciples how to dissect a stance on any proposition under consideration. He was said to have been the very first teacher to charge fees from his
students. In his mature years he distinguished himself as the principal advocate of Sophism in public debate upon a large variety of controversial issues.
He offered no particular philosophical theory beyond his insistence that the
human mind is the measure of all things and that what is described as the soul
is nothing apart from the senses, a proposition later taken up by Aristotle and
still later by modern behaviorists. On a practical level, in forensics Protagoras taught how every question can be defended on both sides. He was willing
to submit all supposed truths and propositions of philosophy to scrutiny.
Contrary to Socrates' famous insistence that all he knew was that he didn ' t
know, Protagoras seems to have been fully confident that he knew enough to
be able to expose the errors of others in sorting out the relative validity of
their arguments.
Protagoras was famous for having asserted that everything we perceive
and try to explain in the world about us is necessarily a projection of our own
consciousness. He made this point in his book On Truth- in one of only two
passages from his entire body of work that survive today: "Of all things the
measure is Man, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are
not, that they are not." 7 Arguably, his final willingness to take into account
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things that "are not" anticipated the modem dependence on experimental
evidence for the purpose of rejecting false hypotheses. Karl Popper, for example, has argued that this negative consideration is an essential aspect of
science, since all hypotheses are necessarily susceptible to challenge should
later findings prove them false. Protagoras also distinguished between phys is
(freedom) and nomos (traditional usage).
What can be described as his final major contribution, his treatise On the
Gods challenged the ancient Greek gods for belonging to the category of
things that are not:
About the gods, I am not able to know whether they exist or do not exist, nor
what they are like in form ; for the factors preventing knowledge are many: the
obscurity of the subject, and the shortness of human life. 8

Protagoras did not deny the existence of the gods categorically, but simply argued that he was unable to make such a judgment because of the lack of
sufficient credible information as far as he was concerned. To this extent he
can be described as having been an agnostic, instead of a hard-core atheist
according to Thomas Huxley ' s distinction in the late nineteenth century.
Upon the publication of On the Gods, Protagoras was said to have been at the
home of the celebrated playwright, Euripides, who was also a good friend of
Anaxagoras. Almost immediately afterwards, however, Protagoras was
forced to flee from Athens chased by a crowd of enraged religionists who
gathered up all of his texts and consigned them to bonfires. During his escape
from Athens he unfortunately died in a storm at sea. His indignant compatriots considered this to have been punishment by the gods, because he had
suggested the possibility of their non-existence, overlooking the comparable
fate of pious individuals on the same boat as later suggested by apologists.
III. SOCRATES (469-339 BC)
Perhaps a dozen years younger than Protagoras, Socrates was born in Athens
and began his career as a sculptor. He later served three years as a soldier and
was said to have conducted himself with unusual bravery. As recorded by
Diogenes Laertius, still later he became a member of the Senate before becoming a disciple of the philosopher Archelaus, himself supposedly a disciple of Anaxagoras. Socrates ' role as a Sophist opposed to natural philosophy
is stated in his remark "that the study of nature is no concern of ours." At his
trial he denied that he " . . . searched into things under the earth and in
heaven," obviously suggesting his indifference to materialist philosophy, and
when Euripides gave him a copy of Heraclitus ' treatise and asked what he
thought of it, he replied, "The part I understand is excellent, and so too is, I
dare say, the part I do not understand, but it needs a Delian diver to get to the

54

Chapter 2

bottom of it.". With obvious reference to the findings of natural philosophy
he similarly declared in Phaedo that he was "utterly and absolutely incapable
of these inquiries." 9 Instead, he explained that he adhered to his own inner
voice as a "divine sign" that warned him against accepting ideas he could not
fully understand. He conceded his ignorance of materialist inquiry, and instead insisted on his singular commitment to the validity of ideas that could
be understood. He also felt that valid knowledge was limited to what he
could grasp on a strictly ethical basis, and that what escaped his understanding was not only avoidable but perhaps even evil. His almost total lack of
reference to the natural philosophers throughout most of Plato's dialogues
would suggest that he relegated their findings to this particular category.
Fellow Athenians eventually tried and convicted Socrates for corrupting
his disciples and for having introduced new divinities. Socrates sought acquittal based on the argument that he did in fact accept the possibility of
supernatural beings because he considered the universe to consist of a realm
of spiritual existence dominated by universal mind as proposed by Anaxagoras, one of the earlier natural philosophers. Socrates went on to defend his
religious belief with a question of his own, "Can a man believe in spiritual
and divine agencies, and not in spirits or demi-gods?" 10 As quoted by Plato
in Cratylus, he expressed his full approval of Anaxagoras' assumptions "that
mind or soul is the ordering and containing principle of all things," and" ...
that justice is mind, for mind, as they say, has absolute power, and mixes
with nothing, and orders all things, and passes through all things." 11 The
acceptance of these two principles, he suggested, made irrelevant the particular gods found socially acceptable. In fact, he did believe in the gods if on a
different basis from those of his fellow Athenian citizens.
In Plato's dialogue Phaedo, Socrates does seem to have abandoned his
earlier commitment to disbelief inspired by Protagoras-his simple insistence that he knew he didn't know-in favor of his later confidence that "the
best and highest good" was a product of the mind and that supernatural
authority somehow exists. On this basis he could continue to adhere to his
notion that knowledge is virtue, though it seems to have conflicted with his
earlier insistence that he took satisfaction in his ignorance. As transcribed by
Plato in Phaedo, Socrates' explanation of his spiritual "conversion" just before his execution confirms his emphasis on piety rather than a specific belief
in one or more gods:
I heard someone reading from a book of Anaxagoras, that mind was the
disposer and cause of all, and I was delighted at this notion ... mind will
dispose all for the best, and put each particular in the best place. Therefore is
anyone desired to find out the cause of the generation or destruction or
existence of anything, he must find out what state of being or doing or
suffering was best for that thing, and therefore a man had only to consider the

Plato and the Age ofPericles

55

best for himself and others, and then he would also know the worst, since the
same science comprehended both. 12
Socrates' added that he himself had taken an interest in natural science at
an earlier age, but then became "so befogged by these speculations" that he
intentionally "unlearned" what he thought he knew. By implication he did
not entirely reject the skepticism he had shared with Protagoras and others in
the Sophist movement, but turned to Anaxagoras' theory, the single credible
pre-Socratic concept of a fully spiritual universe. 13
It seems that this modest disclosure bore substantial theoretical consequences, for as the principal disciple of Socrates, Plato devised a metaphysics based on the concept of ideal forms. The universe consists of spiritual
essence, he insisted, but it also possesses imbedded archetypes with particular relevance to the human soul. Plato more or less emphasized this synthesis
the rest of his life without specifying whether these archetypes might have
been portions of any binary or quaternary structure such as proposed by
Anaximander, Empedocles and others. Within a generation, however, his
own principal disciple, Aristotle, inverted this thesis by renewing the materialist inquiry of pre-Socratic materialists on a more sophisticated basis. Just as
Plato revived religion at the expense of pre-Socratic materialism, Aristotle
revived pre-Socratic materialism in light of his own version of science at the
expense of Plato's theory of ideal forms. Since then, the antithetical standoff
between Plato and Aristotle ' s respective philosophies has dominated much of
the history of western civilization. In retrospect, Socrates obviously provided
the first step in this sequence.
IV. PLATO (427-347 BC)
By many accounts classical Greece's most eminent philosopher, Plato was
born in Athens with the name Aristocles. He was a descendent on his mother's side of the legendary Athenian statesman Solon, who was generally
credited with having initiated the city's democratic tradition. Little is known
about Plato's youth beyond his service as the leader of a choir before his
study of gymnastics under the wrestler Ariston, who bestowed on him the
nickname Plato ("broad-shouldered") because of his stocky build. Plato also
studied natural philosophy, tried to paint, and wrote poetry until he came
under the influence of Socrates at the age of twenty, whereupon he supposedly destroyed his poetry and abandoned natural philosophy to become one of
Socrates ' most loyal disciples as well as his faithful scribe. Nobody knows
for sure whose ideas prevailed in the final transcriptions of the dialogues,
those of Socrates or Plato, or to what extent Plato might have sought to
bridge their differences. Socrates ' insistence on his own ignorance seems
probably an accurate assessment, while his more complex explanation of
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theoretical assumptions seems more likely an expression of Plato's arguments.
Along with Socrates, Plato accepted Anaxagoras ' theory and would seem
to have experienced his own conversion at roughly the same time. Whatever
change occurred, the two of them--and probably the rest of Socrates' disciples-advanced from a somewhat moderate level of skepticism inspired by
the Sophists to the outright rejection of natural philosophy in favor of spiritual transcendence, which was first suggested by Anaxagoras. Plato and his
supporters went on to revive the concept of an ethical transcendent god at a
more sophisticated level. Plato argued that Mind plays a major role in the
universe as suggested by Anaxagoras when he elevated it to the "finest of all
things" and one that "is alone by itself." 14 Plato' s concept of universal mind
consequently linked godhead with the human soul as advanced manifestations of transcendent achievement. Religion in general and Christianity in
particular have continued to employ many of the assumptions that Plato first
formulated as an ethical reaction against both natural philosophy and the
reliance on skepticism it inspired. This more complex perspective may be
suggested by combining sententiae imbedded in various essays by Plato:
• Timaeus: God desires that all things should be good and nothing bad, so as
far as this was attainable. 15
• The Republic: God is perfectly simple and true both in word and deed. 16
• Laws JV: God ought to be to us the measure of all things and not man. 17
• Laws VII: And God is the natural and worthy object of our most serious
and blessed endeavors. 18
• Timaeus : For God only has the knowledge and also the power which are
able to combine many things into one and again resolve the one into
many. 19
• Theaetetus: If the gods will it so, so be it. 20

An uncompromisingly pious ethic is present in this sequence of injunctions, and even today devout religionists have had no difficulty in accepting
them, quite aside from the particular version of God they choose to worship.
In his famous "Allegory of the Cave" described in Book VII of The
Republic, Plato offers what might be described as a vivid analogy ofreligious
conversion. The aspiring philosopher crawls through a maze of darkened
underground tunnels that symbolize "bastard knowledge" as typified by the
philosophy of Democritus in order to gain genuine enlightenment, and once
he reaches sunlight the full truth supposedly presents itself in its full glory.
By implication this conversion suddenly occurs when nature ' s remarkable
plenitude confirms spiritual inspiration's benefits instead of an incessant materialist analysis beset with earth, stale air, dripping water, etc .. Of course the
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attainment of this perceived higher "truth" as promised by Plato entailed his
own version ofreligious conversion. 21
In his dialogue "Theaetetus," probably written at about the age of forty,
Plato challenges the skeptical perspective of Protagoras, who had died at sea
a few decades earlier. Much had happened over the intervening period, so
Plato is able in retrospect to link Protagoras' skeptical epistemology with the
materialist cosmology of the earlier natural philosophers. Their assumptions
could only take root, Plato suggested, because they had been inspired by tacit
skepticism already present, if not yet recognized. Moreover, he argues, if the
two principles insisted by Protagoras are true, that "each of us is a measure of
what is and of what is not," and that "man is the measure of all things," it
becomes obvious that "the truth of Protagoras, being doubted by all, will be
true neither to himself nor to any one else." 22 To make his point, Plato quotes
Socrates to the effect that this deficiency also necessitates an uncritical acceptance of the contradictory theories proposed by the earlier philosophers.
Both Socrates and Plato rejected pre-Socratic philosophy by focusing on
Anaxagoras' tangential insistence that the mind alone both invests and subsumes all existence in its entirety. However, less understandable is how they
linked this effort with an ethical pursuit of "the good" at the expense of
theoretical adequacy. Often, for example, "the good" turns out not to be
particularly beneficial and its advocates lack the analytic skills to recognize
the difference. Plato's principal concern was virtue and piety at the expense
of cosmology, and toward this end Plato's transcendent archetypes could be
featured instead of the supernatural antics of Homer's pantheon of gods and
goddesses. Pre-Socratic materialism might have undermined Homeric myth
even among the populace, but as interpreted by Plato, Anaxagoras' concept
of nous came to the rescue, and the social accord of the populace as a whole
was effectively restored-or so it seemed. The social customs and prerogatives of religion could be resurrected on a far more sophisticated basis to
provide an effective antidote to what seemed materialist dogma that might
conceivably dominate philosophy into the indefinite future. What was of
primary importance was an acceptable ethics based upon one's belief in the
gods, whatever their transcendent manifestation.
The revival of the God concept was far more acceptable to Plato in
contrast to the earlier natural philosophers whose interest was focused upon
an explanation of the universe as a vast existence with a necessarily complicated arrangement of interactive physical principles. Instead, Plato presented
the belief in a world dominated by a God whose existence is both unified and
resistant to excessive clarification. As Plato stated elsewhere:
Now that which is created must, as we affirm, of necessity be created by a
cause. But the father and maker of all this universe [i.e. God] is past finding
out, and even if we found him, to tell of him to all men would be impossible. 23
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Just as pre-Socratic philosophy had advanced from Homeric mythology
to a strictly physical analysis of the universe that encouraged both skepticism
and social anarchy, Plato introduced spiritual assumptions that had been
implicit in many of the earlier religions. If pre-Socratic philosophy had all
but eradicated the paramount role of the gods, Plato restored their relevance
on a far more persuasive basis, one that could supposedly reunite all portions
of society except for inveterate disbelievers.
As a product of his later years, Plato's dialogue Timaeus was one of his
few attempts to suggest a viable synthesis between religion and certain advances in secular philosophy. Without mentioning any of the pre-Socratic
philosophers by name, he paid his respects to earlier concepts such as Heraclitus' theory of fire, Empedocles' cyclical theory of earth, air, fire, and water,
and Anaxagoras' version of atomism that featured "smaller particles thrust
into the interstices of the larger." 24 He accepted the description of the earth
as a globe, a concept first suggested by Pythagoras. However, his analysis
had little relevance to the more specific aspects of science and philosophy,
and he once again made it plain that his principal concern was the central role
of God and the destiny of the human soul. He even described God's manifestation as an "image," in other words a visualized presence whose recognition
is essential to the eternal preservation of the soul. God is described in the
dialogue's final sentence as: "the sensible God who is the image of the
intellectual, the greatest, best, fairest, most perfect-the one only-begotten
heaven." 25
Plato also went so far as to invoke the help of God based on the standard
of probability: "I call upon God and beg him to be our savior out of a strange
and unwonted enquiry, and bring us to the haven ofprobability." 26 In Theaetus, Plato had already emphasized the crucial but necessarily loose concept of
probability to justify religious belief on the assumption that whatever seems
probable can be considered true at least to that extent:
But in that field I am speaking of-in right and wrong and matters of religion-people are ready to affirm ... that the public decision becomes true at the
moment when it is made and remains true so long as the decision stands. 27

The reference to "public decision" averted doubts about any particular
truth's likelihood if it could be granted validity by a majority of people. Plato
also maintained on the same basis that religious doctrine should be accepted
at its face value on that basis alone:
We must accept the traditions of the men of old time who affirm themselves to
be the offspring of the gods .... How can we doubt the word of the children of
the gods? Although they give no probable or certain proofs, still, as they
declare that they are speaking of what took place in their own family, we must
conform to custom and believe them. 28
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In effect Plato proposed extremely generous constraints in determining
the validity of religious convictions acceptable to the public because of their
moral necessity as well as their probability. If the populace considered a
belief to be probable, this in itself was sufficient justification to concede what
amounted to its functional truth. Obviously, this generous acceptance of
earlier pagan deities was completely at odds with both the skepticism of
Protagoras and the theoretical contributions of earlier materialists! As justified by the admission of"conforming to custom," Plato effectively declared
his orthodox belief after having used Socratic doubt to dispense with the
secular perspective in his earlier dialogues.
Plato also suggested that if there was any possibility miracles might be
true, they can and ought to be considered probable and therefore effectively
true:
[When God] was framing the universe, he put intelligence in soul, and soul in
body, that he might be the creator of a work which was by nature fairest and
best. Wherefore, using the language of probability, we may say that the world
became a living creature truly endowed with soul and intelligence by the
providence of God. 29

Here Plato actually seems to defend the supernatural claims typical of
earlier religions based on the consideration of probability. Moreover, he
extends this necessity to the acceptance of all mortals able to identify themselves as the children of gods:
Plato encourages a departure from objective philosophical analysis by
aging traditionalists who depend on patriarchal authority justified by godhood. Received customs thus take precedence over theory that valorizes truth
independent of social and familial authority. 30
This is completely at odds with both the skepticism and the theoretical
contribution of earlier materialists! Here Plato effectively declared his belief
to be based on custom after having used Socratic doubt to challenge, the
secular perspective in his earlier dialogues.
Plato's views upon religion culminated in Laws X , apparently his final
testament in which he simply described himself as "Athenian." He died while
writing Laws X, and his disciple, Philippus of Opus, was said to have completed and published it after his death. It is possible that Plato himself may
have completed an initial draft, that Philippus substantially revised the text,
or that he himself wrote the text based on remarks by Plato that Plato himself
would have deleted from the final draft. And of course it could have been
brought to completion in any combination of the above. In any case, the text
discloses a level of hostility against atheism and natural philosophy more
intense than anything he had previously said. Earlier writings certainly dis-
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played aversion, but his anger seems to have predominated toward the end of
his life.
Plato's vigorous defense of religion was based on the assumption that his
argument was automatically correct if it could not be proven wrong. He
proposed an elaborate proof of God's existence in roughly ten pages of text
whose essential line of argument was both more vigorous and more questionable than any of his earlier pronouncements. 31 Once again he argued that
soul is the dominant stuff of the universe, and that one or more gods can be
identified with this more inclusive soul, thus necessitating their worship and
the recognition of their final authority in human affairs. He also insisted that
natural philosophers had been wrong in their effort to identify physical elements as the original stuff of the universe. Quite the opposite, he argued, the
soul alone provides a "motion that can move itself' as well as having serving
as the self-movement that initiated the universe:
. . . soul came first-that it was not fire, nor air, but soul which was there to
begin with-it is the existence of soul which is most eminently natural. 32

Plato insisted that the soul is more "elder-born than all bodies and prime
source of all their changes and transformations," and that soul has always
been the primary stuff of existence as Anaxagoras had earlier suggested. For
if soul both preceded the physical universe and could be identified with God,
he maintained, the deduction seemed plain that some kind of a personal God
played an essential role in the creation of the universe.
Plato also explained that soul "has self-movement as its definition," and
therefore, he explained, it may be considered "the source of movement" that
is "absolutely complete" as "the first-born of all things," thus giving it a
universal role on a strictly ethical basis. Then Plato went on to suggest that
the "good soul" effectively steers motion, thereby promoting virtue as an
essential feature of existence whereby transition itself manifests its effect.
Plato also abandoned any possibility of a natural cosmology by next suggesting conflict between good and evil was strictly a manifestation of soul: "it
[soul] controls heaven itself' whether this necessitates either a "single soul"
or "more than one." He went on to declare the likelihood of cosmic tension
between good and evil supernatural powers: "We must not assume fewer
than two, one beneficent, the other capable of the contrary effect."-hence
anticipating personification in the conflict between God and the devil later
featured in Christian doctrine. 33 And finally Plato expressed his qualified
approval of current polytheistic belief:
Since soul, or souls, and those souls good with perfect goodness, have proved
to be the causes of all, these souls we hold to be gods, whether they direct the
universe by inhabiting bodies . .. Will any man who shares this belief bear to
hear it said that all things are not "full of gods"? 34
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Whatever the quantitative ratio involved, Plato suggested, it is spiritual
authority that matters in a universe totally in motion.
In the end, however, it was Plato's indignation that dominated his analysis. At the very beginning of Laws X, he insisted, "There is the fact that all
mankind, Greeks and non-Greeks alike, believe in the existence of gods." 35
Just a few pages later, however, he warned that young men too readily harbor
disbelief which they later abandon: "I can assure you that no one who in
early life has adopted this doctrine of the nonexistence of gods has ever
persisted to old age constant in that conviction." 36 Presumably young atheists
become religious when they mature and become wiser. Then he seems to
have contradicted himself by declaring his hostility against older men whose
teachings inspire impiety among the youth: "All these views, my friends,
come from men who impress the young as wise, prose writers and poets who
profess that indefeasible right means whatever a man can carry with the high
hand. Hence our epidemics of youthful irreligion." 37 For if all young atheists
later become religious, how can there be any older atheists available to misguide young atheists?
In the final three pages of his essay, Plato goes on to complain at greater
length about the vices and temptations of atheism among both young and old,
suggesting many more atheists than he has indicated only a few paragraphs
earlier. He concedes that young atheists might still be virtuous, but also
insists that older "men of this class" [atheists] deal in prophecy and jugglery
of all kinds, and that they too often become "tyrants and demagogues and
generals and hierophants of private mysteries and the Sophists." 38 Again, his
assurance that young atheists simply do not retain their misguided assumptions suggests that old and presumably more sophisticated atheists could only
have been converted later in life.
Although Socrates had been tried and put to death for similar charges
years earlier, Plato, his principal disciple, brought Laws X to a close by
advocating similar punishment of more recent offenders found guilty of impiety:
Any person proved guilty of a sin against piety which is the crime of a grown
man, not the trivial offense of a child, whether by dedicating a shrine on
private ground or by doing sacrifice to any gods whatsoever in public, shall
suffer death for doing sacrifice in a state of defilement. 39

How ironic that such punishment could be advocated by Plato! The reader
is left to question what portion of Plato's final text resulted from his mature
judgment, what portion from borderline senility. 40 The question also poses
itself whether his attitude might have contributed to the otherwise inexplicable choice of Aristotle to leave the Academy just before Plato's death.

Chapter Three

Early Aristotle (384-322 BC)

Aristotle's life was beset with both opportunity and improbability. He was
born in Stagira, Macedon, the son of Nicomachus, the court physician of
Macedonia's King Amyntus III, who was also the grandfather of Alexander
the Great. Alexander later became Aristotle's student and still later, his patron. Aristotle traveled to Athens at the age of seventeen to study in Plato's
Academy, and he seems to have become Plato' s favorite and most productive
disciple, having authored a variety of texts and dialogues more or less supportive of Plato's philosophy. It seems Aristotle left Plato's Academy shortly
before Plato's death in 348-47 BC, possibly because of growing theoretical
differences as perhaps illustrated for example, by Plato's insistence in Laws
X that elderly atheists be executed despite Socrates' ordeal on similar
charges. After Plato's death Aristotle seems to have returned to Athens to
compete for the vacant leadership of the Academy, only to find that Plato's
nephew Speusippus, had already been selected to serve as its director. Aristotle then severed ties with the Academy and left Athens accompanied by
Theophrastus, a fellow student who became his principal disciple for the rest
of his life, as later suggested by his final will in which Theophrastus was
included along with Aristotle's own family.
Aristotle next taught at Assos, where he enjoyed a close friendship with
its dictator, Hermias and his adoptive daughter, Pythias, whom Aristotle
married. Within the next year or so he was summoned to Mitylene by King
Phillip to tutor his son, Alexander the Great, and he served in this capacity
for two years before Alexander became regent of Macedonia during Phillip's
military campaign abroad. Aristotle's ties with Alexander remained amicable
during Alexander's Asian conquests despite Alexander's execution of Aristotle's nephew Callisthenes for insubordination. On friendly terms with both
Alexander and Antipater, Alexander's regent in Greece, Aristotle returned to
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Athens in 335 BC after an absence of twelve years. Unable to join Plato's
Academy despite Speusippus's recent death, he established his own school,
the Lyceum, and remained there for the next thirteen years as a scholar and
teacher, both gathering a large assortment of scientific data and teaching his
students as they strolled among the colonnades (perapitos-hence the use of
the word "peripatetic" to describe his teachings). This was the most productive phase in his life. With the help of his disciples, he was estimated to have
authored as many as four hundred texts, which would roughly be equivalent
to long chapters in a modem book.
Among the 150 to 200 texts that can be identified by their titles, not more
than thirty or so can be definitively traced to Aristotle's authorship. Some
scholars have estimated that he could reliably be identified as the sole author
of only four of these texts and that most of the rest were recorded or partially
authored by his disciples. However, his unique style that combined precision
and complexity seems the same throughout most of them, suggesting that
Aristotle's authorship was for the most part his own. A million words of text
can be attributed to him, compared to Plato's output of 600,000 words.
Unlike Plato, Aristotle more readily took into account alternate possibilities
suggested by others, and his analysis displayed this skill in a variety of fields.
Whereas Plato could expatiate at length in response to relatively short questions posed by his disciples, Aristotle put effort into summarizing credible
analysis by others before launching into his own more conclusive findings in
such fields as physics, biology, aesthetics, metaphysics, rhetoric, government, politics, and, not least, deductive logic. He formalized ethics based on
the so-called Golden Mean as the pursuit of moderation relevant to all aspects of human behavior. Similarly, his Politics suggested appropriate roles
in society, and his Poetics identified the impact of catharsis--i.e. emotional
gratification--as the most essential aspect of literary achievement. Altogether
he played an essential role in establishing all these fields of inquiry and at
advanced levels.
Aristotle's intention was the full elucidation of complex issues rather than
inspirational effect, but his effort turned out to be successful on both accounts. His methodology alone was a valuable contribution in encouraging
the sustained pursuit of a "smaller and finite number of principles" as explained many centuries later by Ockham's famous "razor"--which was also
effectively Aristotelian--that the simplest adequate explanation is finally the
most likely. Aristotle offered exactly this justification, for example, in De
Caelo (On the Heavens), "Obviously then it would be better to assume a
finite number of principles. They should in fact be as few as possible, consistent with proving what has to be proved." 1 In other words, final analysis
should be both sufficient and appropriate to the theoretical issues under consideration. Notably, with regard to cosmology his unified explanation of the
universe turned out to consist of a basic theory of "mass in sustained mo-
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tion"-effectively combining two of the three ingredients in Einstein's famous equation. This reductive skill of Aristotle was important to the advancement of both science and philosophy.
As for Aristotle's secular perspective, a major difficulty is that much of
his analysis was in conflict with one or more orthodoxies, and censorship too
often became a factor either through the destruction of texts or through their
textual modification. The outright eradication of ancient secular texts was
commonplace throughout ancient and medieval history, and today's almost
total absence of extant writings by Strato, Theophrastus, and Clitomachus
suggests a similar fate, as does the absence of Democritus' theory of atomism, including Aristotle's single essay on Democritus.
To avoid censorship and the possibility of prosecution by the citizens of
Athens, Aristotle reserved the full examination of his theories for his students
and disciples, while his less offensive writings were made available to the
public. Plutarch records a letter to Aristotle from Alexander the Great that
obviously refers to this distinction:
Alexander to Aristotle greeting. You have not done well to publish your books
of oral doctrine [i.e. information exclusively for the benefit of students]; for
what is there now that we excel others in, if those things which we have been
particularly instructed to be laid open to all? For my part, I assure you, I had
rather excel others in the knowledge of what is excellent, than in the extent of
my power and dominion. Farewell. 2

Here Alexander asserted his presumed right as an ex-student to have
access to Aristotle's theories that were to be kept unavailable to the public at
large. By publishing his ideas, Aristotle had disregarded this supposed convention. Alexander's complaint discloses the distinction at the time between
"exoteric" public knowledge and "esoteric" oral doctrine or "knowledge of
what is excellent," the latter reserved for colleagues and disciples as opposed
to fellow citizens at large. 3 The right to examine this information was restricted to these privileged individuals, and whatever was later preserved was
recorded only in the so-called "acroamatic" transcripts in the possession of
Aristotle himself. Quite by accident it was the strictly esoteric texts that
became available for publication many centuries later. The texts available to
the public at large at the time have all been lost, whereas those kept confidential were later salvaged and continue to exist today.
Arguably, Aristotle's grand theoretical synthesis was the most remarkable
achievement of ancient Greek philosophy. While Plato's unified concept of
transcendent mind, as earlier suggested by Anaxagoras, provided a substantial philosophical advance upon the scattered assortment of theories by preSocratic natural philosophers, Aristotle provided a more challenging theoretical perspective that effectively reformulated these theories on a more defensible basis. By doing so he paradoxically laid the groundwork for both relig-
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ious orthodoxy and the many fields of scientific inquiry taken for granted
today. His encyclopedic achievements included the invention of both biology
and deductive logic as independent disciplines, and his later theoretical contributions anticipated Ockham's Razor, Bacon's induction, Spinoza's pantheism, Locke's behavioral psychology, Hegel's negative dialectics, Darwin's
evolutionism, Dewey's functionalism, and, not least, modem psychology.
I. COMPARISON WITH PLATO
Whereas Plato can be credited with having invented modem idealism, Aristotle's inductive analysis effectively set the stage for the secular achievement
of the Renaissance almost twenty centuries later. As opposed to Plato's invention of "ideal forms" within a spiritual universe, Aristotle employed empirical analysis applied to the physical universe. His dialectical confrontation
with Plato had been anticipated by the earlier standoff between Anaxagoras'
theory of soul and the various concepts of materialism advanced by preSocratic natural philosophers culminating with Democritus. In the beginning
Aristotle served as a loyal advocate of Plato's spiritual teleology, but he later
pursued a materialist alternative with an emphasis on the "intrinsic order of
nature" as confirmed by empirical evidence. This choice can be illustrated by
his explanation in Generation ofAnimals on the study of bees:
Such appears to be the truth about the generation of bees, judging from theory
and from what are believed to be the facts about them; the facts, however, have
not yet been sufficiently grasped; if ever they are, then credit must be given
rather to observation than to theories, and to theories only if what they affirm
agrees with the observed facts. 4

Aristotle's emphasis on confirmation by factual data elevated speculative
inquiry to a new and more sophisticated level, since it rested upon the close
examination of inductive evidence as opposed to supposedly fixed "truths"
that were otherwise unsubstantiated.
One can only speculate how long it took for Aristotle to realize that he
preferred the various assumptions of pre-Socratic philosophers to Plato's
concept of transcendence. By the time he wrote Physics Aristotle seems to
have almost entirely abandoned Platonism, but at this point his use of preSocratic natural philosophy might not have yet reached its final stage, as
suggested by his later choice to accept Melissus' concept of spatial and
temporal infinitude, a stance entirely different from his earlier hostility. 5
Plato's successful invention of metaphysics rested on Anaxagoras' theory
of universal mind which was in tum inspired by Parmenides as well as
Heraclitus' concept of Logos. In contrast, Aristotle sought what amounted to
a more inclusive synthesis of pre-Socratic philosophy. His materialist per-
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spective benefitted from the theoretical achievement of the Milesian school
as well as the holistic perspective of the Eleatic school that included Melissus. Other influences to be found in Physics were (l) the concept of conflict
in process inspired by Heraclitus; (2) the holistic concepts of matter and
incessant motion inspired by Anaximander, Anaximenes and Diogenes Apollonius: (3) the concept of spheres inspired by Pythagoras and Xenophanes,
(4) the concept of cyclical inertia inspired by both Heraclitus and Empedocles; and even (5) the reluctant acceptance of atomism featured by Leucippus
and Democritus. Aristotle's variety of sources might seem to have been
unabashedly eclectic, yet in the end he achieved an unprecedented synthesis
in the simple--even stark--concept of mass in motion, a far more functional
explanation of the universe than anything yet proposed. Whereas Plato had
featured the perpetual motion of soul in Laws X, Aristotle featured "mass in
perpetual motion," a concept more amenable to modem science.
That Aristotle emphasized pre-Socratic materialism to a much greater
extent than Plato is also indicated by comparing citations in their respective
standard editions both on an absolute and relative basis. For example, once
the number of Aristotle's indexed citations are compared with those of Plato,
a considerable imbalance in references becomes obvious pertaining to Anaximander (7 vs. 0), Anaximenes (8 vs. l ), Xenophanes ( 11 vs. 0), Pythagoras
and the Pythagoreans (73 vs. 7), Zeno (21 vs. 5), Empedocles (98 vs. 2),
Melissus (18 vs. 2), Leucippus (13 vs. 0), Diogenes of Apollonia (5 vs. 0).
Aristotle's total exceeds that of Plato even for Anaxagoras (64 vs.17), and, as
to be expected, Democritus (55 vs. 0) and reveal a considerable imbalance.
Plato's citations tum out to be more plentiful only for Thales (7 vs. 7),
Parmenides (23 vs. 22), and Heraclitus (32 vs. 22). Altogether, the disparity
between their totals, Aristotle's 430 citations as opposed to Plato's 86 citations, involves roughly a 5-1 ratio. In addition, natural philosophers who
were Plato's contemporaries-including Melissus, Democritus, and Diogenes of Apollonia-were virtually ignored in his dialogues. In contrast,
Aristotle referred to Plato himself 119 times and Plato's mentor Socrates 45
times. Aristotle was willing to take their assumptions into account but without overlooking pre-Socratic natural philosophy. In effect, Plato ignored
most of the earlier philosophers except for Anaxagoras and his suggestion of
the transcendent concept of soul, whereas Aristotle "resurrected" the other
major pre-Socratic natural philosophers by advocating a broad functional
concept of the universe on a strictly physical basis.
Even Aristotle and Plato's respective modes of thought and expression
suggest the difference between their philosophies. Aristotle's inductive persistence necessitated a prose style more specific and intricate than that of
most of the ancient poets and prophets who depended on broad repetitive
epithets as well as an almost endless conjunctive sequence such as "and then,
and then," or "Yes, oh Socrates." In contrast, Aristotle's sentences feature
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lucid complexity taken to its appropriate limit and sometimes beyond. This
may be observed, for example, in his explanation of the earth as a sphere
with weight (or gravity) based upon Melissus' theory of mass in light of
Pythagoras' emphasis on mathematical exactitude:
[The earth' s] shape must necessarily be spherical. For every portion of earth
has weight until it reaches the centre, and the jostling of parts greater and
smaller would bring about not a waved surface, but rather compression and
convergence of part and part until the centre is reached . . . . If, on the one hand,
there were a similar movement from each quarter of the extremity to the single
centre, it is obvious that the resulting mass would be similar on every side. For
if an equal amount is added on every side the extremity of the mass will be
equidistant from its centre, i.e. the figure will be spherical. 6

In translation this brief passage is held together by the connecting words,
(1) necessarily, (2) For, (3) not, (4) but rather, (5) If, . .. it is obvious that,
and (6) For if . .. will be. Apparently aware of speculative inquiry by
Eudoxus, Heraclides, and other contemporary naturalists whose astronomical
findings undoubtedly superseded the philosophical assumptions of Pythagoras and Melissus, Aristotle was nevertheless able to propose a credible explanation of the physical forces as well as taking into account the concepts of
mass, gravity, and the spherical structure of heavenly bodies that anticipated
and were later confirmed by Newtonian physics.
In contrast, Plato's explanation of the earth's spherical shape a few
decades earlier certainly provided a picturesque but far more speculative
explanation:
There are many hollow places all round the earth, places of every shape and
size, into which the water and mist and air have collected. But the earth itself is
as pure as the starry heaven in which it lies, and which is called aether by most
of our authorities. The water, mist, and air are the dregs of this aether, and they
are continually draining into the hollow places in the earth. 7

Plato accepted the Pythagorean assumption that the earth has a spherical
shape, but his simplistic description was almost irrelevant to any explanation
of the physical formation of the earth. Aristotle's analysis provided a precise
description of the earth's shape and matter, while Plato' s description leaves
open the possibility of a celestial origin of its water supply. With considerable serendipity, Plato accidentally may have been partly right, as recent
scientific research indicates that clouds of ice specks from outer space may
have produced a significant amount of the earth's water. Still, Aristotle' s
explanation involved careful analysis as confirmed by both logic and modem
geology. To this extent, at least, their two styles may be compared, though
they exemplify two entirely different visions of cosmology.
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Substantial differences between Plato and Aristotle's texts and respective
audiences also bear an impact on their modem interpretations. First since
ancient times, there has been a far more continuous history of the acceptance
of Plato's texts. Their indicated order might not exactly duplicate the chronological sequence of their composition by Plato, but over the centuries there
seems consensus on their general unity, and their ideas were later deemed
acceptable by the Catholic ecumenical councils at Nicaea, Ephesus, and Constantinople. In contrast, Aristotle's ideas seem to have become more complicated as he grew older, especially pertaining to the issue of religion. Physics,
for example, provided his first sustained analysis on cosmology, followed by
Metaphysics, which seems to have been compiled as a loose collection of
essays in response to issues raised in Physics. Ironically, the book's title
seems to have been intended to indicate this intention-beyond (or additional
to) the topic of physics- rather than a new and different field of inquiry on
transcendental matters. In fact, the title seems to have invented the field, not
the other way around. Other dislocations become obvious in exploring the
separate chapters, some of which are important. Moreover, there are substantial variations among the chapters. Aristotle both formulated theory and
seems to have sought out additional sources in doing this, and the overall
effect suggests continuous modification on his part until his flight from Athens.
A brief and often overlooked two-sentence summary by Plutarch of Aristotle's cosmology helps in sorting out the sequence of his texts. Plutarch
identified exactly two texts by Aristotle, De Caelo and De Anima, as primary
sources on cosmology as a field of inquiry. Plutarch then went on to supplement these with comparable works by Aristotle's followers and disciples
connected with the Lyceum. He specifically identified four disciples who
could be linked with Aristotle's cosmology--Theophrastus, Strato, Heracleides, and Dicaearchus. Like Aristotle, according to Plutarch, these disciples "constantly challenged Plato's transcendental philosophy, contradicting
him about the most fundamental and far-reaching questions relevant to natural philosophy." 8 Unfortunately, their texts no longer exist, so Aristotle's
perspective stands alone today in its commitment to secular cosmology. In
effect an entire field of inquiry dedicated to the holistic investigation of the
physical universe on a secular basis was eradicated except for the writings of
Aristotle. 9 Why, one asks, did Plutarch omit both Physics and Metaphysics
from his list? The most obvious explanation would be that they consisted of
complex preliminary assessments superseded by more outspoken secular
analysis.

70

Chapter 3

II. CHRISTIAN INTERPOLATIONS
For modem readers a second difficulty in the interpretation of Aristotle's
writings is the presence throughout his works of forged passages-interpolations-especially in texts that might otherwise express a secular viewpoint.
Unlike Plato's dialogues that were generally compatible both with contemporary beliefs and with Christian theology, Aristotle's theory necessitated the
effort to obscure or eliminate secular passages at odds with received religious
assumptions. Offending secular passages could be eradicated, as many undoubtedly were (for example Aristotle's essay upon Democritus), but scribes
also salvaged other texts of possible value to their beliefs by adding brief
segments of their own to render Aristotle compatible with Christian doctrine.
There is little or no evidence available today how and why this happened, but
this expedient seems to have primarily been undertaken when Aristotle's
works were finally translated into Latin during the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries. With their added interpolations, these texts ceased to be treated as
unacceptable ventures in impiety. Today, these editorial modifications often
are obvious, especially those that refer to a single god with a capital "G" or
that become exultant in their declarations of piety. Most can be recognized
by careful readers, but others will probably continue to go unnoticed until a
statistical analysis of Aristotle's style is sufficiently advanced to identify and
eliminate them. As a measure of Aristotle's importance, no other author in
western tradition has been saddled with so many counterfeit inclusions to
prevent the destruction of his writings.
Today these anachronistic pronouncements often stand out. An example
is this interpolation from Nicomachean Ethics:
We assume the gods to be above all other beings blessed and happy . . . .
Therefore the activity of God, which surpasses all others in blessedness, must
be contemplative; and of human activities, therefore, that which is most akin to
this must be most of the nature of happiness." lO

Who is we? Also, the repeated conjunction of "blessed" and "happy," the
praise of contemplative behavior, the mixed reference to God and gods, the
singular reference to God's "activity," and the notion of such an activity
"surpassing" another in "blessedness" suggest an anachronistic expression of
an entirely different and more orthodox religious perspective.
The same problem arises in Eudemian Ethics, in which three references to
god are polytheistic, two are monotheistic, and the sixth seems to have been
Platonic in suggesting the soul as God. The logic of one particular interpolation, for example, is entirely at odds with Aristotle's earlier description in De
Anima of mind and intelligence as opposed to a transcendent vision of god(s)
that primarily involves the soul:
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The object of our search is this-what is the commencement of movement in
the soul? The answer is clear: as in the universe, so in the soul, it is god. For in
a sense the divine element in us moves everything. The starting-point of reasoning is not reasoning, but something greater. What, then, could be greater
even than knowledge and intellect but god? 11

Almost completely at odds with Aristotle's philosophy, this passage consists of an abrupt sequence of five short sentences with an average of twelve
words apiece that differs from Aristotle's more convoluted analytic style.
Moreover, the concept of soul in this passage might be both compact and
even persuasive, but it completely deviates from Aristotle's explanation
throughout De Anima, where the soul [i.e. consciousness] is often identified
not with any kind of a god, but instead with consciousness shared by animals
as well as human beings. 12
Another example, an even more blatant interpolation is the following
passage steeped in monotheistic certitude:
Moreover, life belongs to God. For the actuality of thought is life, and God is
that actuality; and the essential actuality of God is most good and eternal. We
hold, then, that God is a living being, eternal, most good; and therefore life and
a continuous external existence belong to God; for that is what God is. 13

Once again both the syntax and strained piety in combination clearly
deviate from the articulate complexity to be expected of Aristotle. Moreover,
the anachronistic reference to a monotheistic "God," with a capital "G," is
repeated five times for rhetorical effect, and the inverted noun phrase, "life
most good and eternal," is followed by another rhetorical flourish that is even
more noticeably inverted, "eternal, most good." "Most" indeed! This emphatic effect is then redoubled by a final righteous deduction, "for this is
what God is." Also, the rhetorical emphasis terminating with the word "God"
closely resembles the wording of the passage already quoted from Eudemian
Ethics-"What, then, could be greater even than knowledge and intellect but
god?" 14 It seems likely that Christian scribes were responsible for these
interpolations. Such liberties might well have been useful in preserving Aristotle's philosophy during the late Middle Ages, but they pose difficulties for
thoughtful modem readers. Still, the very fact that medieval scribes resorted
to this intrusiveness confirms their recognition that Aristotle's perspective
might otherwise be interpreted as blasphemy. We can be grateful for their
success in preventing the destruction of Aristotle's works, but their changes
should be recognized.
Other interpolations suggest miracles, an afterlife, and other modes of
intervention by God (or gods) in addition to the concept of initial creationism. Quite the opposite, however, Aristotle featured in his mature cosmological writings an infinite physical universe devoid of supernatural intervention.
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He might have considered the possibility of an unmoved mover in Books VII
and VIII of Physics and later in Book XII of Metaphysics, but his later
arguments suggest otherwise, especially in his final texts upon cosmology.
For the close reader the detection of interpolations becomes almost a sport.
They seem to crop up wherever Aristotle's argument suggests secular possibilities, as for example in De Caelo, On Generation and Corruption, and
De Anima. They may be found most often at the beginning of such texts and
within the proximity of especially controversial passages.
III. PHYSICS
Aristotle's first major work pertaining to cosmology and supernatural authority was undoubtedly Physics, a text in which he confirmed his abandonment
of Platonic doctrine while formulating his own. His basic arguments appear
in the first chapter of Book I, in which the second sentence simply declares,
"For we do not think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its
primary causes or first principles, and have carried our analysis as far as its
elements." In his second chapter he summarizes a variety of theories of the
pre-Socratic philosophers, and finally suggests his own, "We ... must take
for granted that the things that exist by nature are, either all or some of them
in motion-which is indeed made plain by induction." 15 As suggested by this
sentence alone, Aristotle's concept of "things in motion" anticipated his full
explanation in De Caelo and On Generation and Corruption. He mostly
ignores Plato in the chapter and seems to refer to him as having been among
"the later [or more recent] of the ancient thinkers" who were bothered by the
comparison between "one and the many." Also, his oxymoronic implications
of "the more recent of the ancient thinkers" suggests the possibility of irony
at the expense of Plato. 16 In Book III of Physics Aristotle concedes the
seemingly harmless abstract definition of the whole as "the whole that from
which nothing is wanting." 17 However, he attributes the principle to the
physical universe in its entirety rather than the spiritual dimension emphasized by Plato.
Aristotle criticizes the static limitations of both Parmenides and Melissus'
respective models of the universe for emphasizing undifferentiated spiritual
and material infinitude. "We physicists on the other hand," he insists, "must
take for granted that the things that exist by nature are, either all or some of
them, in motion-which is indeed made plain by induction." 18 This aspect of
Aristotle's theory becomes the central consideration in his later text, De
Caelo , where his concept of motion is expanded to apply to all aspects of the
universe and linked with the concept of matter. Aristotle traces this emphasis
to the earlier theories of so-called "physicists"--or "natural philosophers"-such as Heraclitus, Anaximenes, Empedocles, and even Anaxagoras. He also

Early Aristotle (384-322 BC)

73

suggests a fundamental aspect they share, which is that whatever predominates in its early manifestation is more likely to produce an alternative that
somehow occurs as its opposite. These before-and-after phases can be identified as sequential "contraries:" Suggestive of Heraclitus (as well as Hegel
many centuries later), Aristotle explains that, "Everything, therefore, that
comes to be by a natural process is either a contrary or a product of contraries." 19 He specifies, however, that this strictly relates to process, and he goes
on to illustrate this dynamic with his abstract definition of evolution, "that
there must always be an underlying something, namely that which becomes ... " 20 Process effectively involves transition from one stage to another, necessarily its successor, and essential to this transition is difference
that somehow amounts to negation.
In Book II, Aristotle mentions the possibility of a first cause of the whole
universe, and he links its origin with spontaneity and chance as earlier suggested by Hesiod. However, he also suggests the possibility that intelligence
was a later product of the universe. Aristotle goes on to propose four materialist categories: (1) matter, (2) form, (3) mover, and (4) final outcome ("that
for the sake of which"). 21 The second, third, and fourth of these categories
possibly suggests the influence of a God or gods, but Aristotle does not
venture to offer such an explanation. Instead, he mentions organized spontaneity "in a fitting way" as selective intelligence imbedded in nature rather
than from outside by supernatural authority. If anything, the concept of matter in motion combines form's organization of matter with motion as· the
agent of change, and with a result stable enough that change has been controlled. There is a plateau effect afterwards that persists until change catches
up with possibilities once again. As suggested by David Sedley, author of
Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity, and others, this portion of Book II
effectively sets the stage for the more specific analysis of Book VIII relevant
to metaphysical considerations.
Aristotle explores the likelihood of infinitude in greater depth in Book III.
He accepts the received concept of endlessness as "uncreatable" and indestructible, and he goes on to propose the existence of an imperishable universe as a necessary consequence of infinity. However, he also proposes that
the physical attraction which is now identified as gravity resists the effect of
infinitude, since a body "has a natural locomotion towards the center if it is
heavy, and upwards ifit is light." 22 Things of more weight displace things of
less weight, and these get thrust upwards as a result--just as water fills the sea
and air exists above water.
In Book IV Aristotle challenges the concept of atoms suspended in a void
as proposed by Democritus, but he does so without mentioning atomism or
its proponent by name. Instead, he rejects the possible existence of a void by
insisting on the necessity that "everything which is, is body." [sic] The supposed non-existence of air, for example, involves relatively low density as
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opposed to Democritus' notion of empty space that separates atoms. Aristotle's emphasis on mass in motion accordingly depends on the concept of
spatial continuity as opposed to Democritus' concept of atomism that was
based on the assumption that atoms are suspended in space, which itself was
basically-effectively "a place with nothing in it." 23 Toward the end of his
argument, however, Aristotle seems to concede the possibility of synthesis
based on the assumption of movement among bodies that make room for one
another. 24
Books IV through VI of Physics concern such issues as void, motion,
time, matter, and the immovable with little obvious relevance to the question
whether God or gods play any transcendent role in human affairs. Book IV
Section 6 is certainly useful in helping to explain the presumably godless
concepts of the void by the atomists Leucippus and Democritus as well as
Melissus and the Pythagoreans. Also possibly relevant is the discussion linking soul with time in Physics, Book V Section 14. However, it is not until
Book VI Section 6 that Aristotle returns to the task of showing that motion in
the universe could never have had a full beginning and so, as suggested by
Parmenides, there was no need for a prime mover for creation to take place.
In modem terms, of course, the concept of a so-called Big Bang might seem
to justify the notion of creationism on a strictly material basis, but this possibility supposedly occurs in a far bigger celestial realm in which countless
similar cosmic events take place on a more inclusive scale. Thus Aristotle's
assumption, perhaps inspired by Anaximander and Heraclitus still remains
credible, that everything in motion "must have been in motion before ... so a
thing cannot be becoming without having become or have become without
having been becoming." 25 Excluded from this paradox is religious creationism, the concept of an abrupt initial transition from total void to sudden
existence produced by an agent that always existed without becoming. Such
a concept of privileged creation is excluded from Aristotle's list of credible
alternatives.
It seems accepted among modem scholars that Book VII is probably
inauthentic, and in fact its arguments differ significantly from most everything Aristotle says elsewhere in Physics.
On the other hand, Book VIII, the final and longest book in Physics,
culminates with a paradoxical summary that can be interpreted any number
of ways. The basic choice, however, is between (a) accepting the initial
creation of the universe by a God or gods and (b) rejecting this possibility in
favor of the universe's eternal existence without the need for any kind of a
creator as already suggested by Melissus. The first paragraph of Book VIII
declares this essential choice with full clarity but makes no effort to identify
a creator able to initiate motion. The basic question, Aristotle suggests, is
simply whether existence preceded motion:
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Was there ever a becoming of motion before which it had no being, and is it
perishing again so as to leave nothing in motion? Or are we to say that it never
had any becoming and is not perishing, but always was and always will be? ls
it in fact an immortal never-failing property of things that are, a sort of life as it
were to all naturally constituted things? 26

Aristotle cites the pre-Socratic philosophers Empedocles and Anaxagoras
as having accepted the premise of eternal existence, and he later suggests he
could have easily added all the rest of the philosophers preceeding Plato to
the list, since he had exclusively featured initial creation as a necessary
aspect of the physical universe. Moreover, Aristotle explained, "Plato alone
asserts the creation of time," on the assumption that it began when the universe did. 27 This seemingly harmless concept suggests the need to renew preSocratic natural philosophy after its rejection by Socrates and Plato, who
themselves sought a credible alternative to the dubious multitude of gods and
goddesses featured by Homer and Hesiod. While Plato seems to have been
tolerant of creationism, early natural philosophers as well as Aristotle rejected this. As implied by Aristotle, the alternative to perpetual existence
depends on the simple assumption that "before this first change [whatever it
might consist of] there will be a previous change. " 28 Thus, endless time both
before and after predominates, as emphasized by Parmenides, and therefore
perpetual motion without an absolute beginning becomes credible.
At this juncture in the text, Aristotle declares his intention to refute all
seemingly valid arguments at odds with his own: "The arguments that may
be advanced against this position [an endless universe without a creator] are
not difficult to dispose of." 29 However, Aristotle's analysis becomes quite
confusing at this point, perhaps intentionally so. He mounts credible alternative arguments in explaining motion relevant to the existence of God (or
gods), and it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to determine what he
himself believes beyond his earlier assurance that he concurs with pre-Socratic physicists.
Among his arguments, Aristotle turns to the more specific hypothetical
concept of a first mover, one of the primary traits often assigned to godhead:
And here it is sufficient to assume only one "movent," the first of unmoved
things, which being eternal will be the principle of motion in everything
else. 30

On this basis the involvement of a single God might seem credible in
explaining motion at every level of manifestation. However, Aristotle complicates his analysis by once again emphasizing the involvement of cyclical
motion:
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Rotatory locomotion is prior to rectilinear locomotion, because it is more
simple and complete. . . . Rotatory motion can be external; but no other
motion, whether locomotion or motion of any other kind, can be so, since in all
of them rest must occur, and with the occurrence of rest the motion has perished. 31

Based on the unavoidable necessity of circularity, Aristotle reduces the
function and identity of an unmoved first mover to a disposable agent that
otherwise lacks physical existence. According to Aristotle, the seemingly
contradictory explanation of such a supernatural agent devoid of motion (e.g.
the received concept of God or gods) turns out to depend on two basic
principles mentioned in adjacent sentences that are easily overlooked: "Nothing finite can possess an infinite force . So it is also impossible for a finite
force to reside in an infinite magnitude." 32 Here one might object that all
finite forces in fact do occupy at least a portion of infinitude as well as
exerting a miniscule portion of infinite force. On the other hand, this constraint would seem to eliminate any kind of finite authority for a supposedly
infinite God. Simply enough, whatever God can be identified as "all" is
neither visible nor effective in interceding in human affairs.
Aristotle concludes his analysis- and the text of Physics in its entirety-by suggesting the likelihood of a perpetual universe lacking both a beginning
and an end, and therefore necessarily without the authority of godhead identified as "the mover." This he maintains in an involuted deductive argument-effectively a loose version of sorites that brings Physics to a close:
We have now already proved that it is impossible for a finite magnitude to
have an infinite force, and also that it is impossible for a thing to be moved by
a finite magnitude during an infinite time. But the first "movent" causes a
motion that is eternal and does cause it during an infinite time. It is clear,
therefore, that the first "movent" is indivisible and is without parts and without
magnitude. 33

Finally, he concedes that godhead might exist, but only if its indivisible
lack of magnitude does not manifest itself. As a result, at least by implication, it does not play an active role in human affairs. Aristotle's elaborate use
of logic obviously serves two purposes: first in declaring the improbability of
the god concept in light of cosmic circumstances he has already described,
and second in obscuring his necessarily controversial assumption with extraordinary effectiveness. He both excludes from consideration the concept
of a personal God who created the universe in its entirety and rejects the
more abstract concept of a first (or primary) motion that initiates and then
dominates existence. Instead he suggests the infinite physical determinism of
an endless self-sufficient universe as taken for granted in his later texts, De
Caelo , On Generation and Corruption, and De Anima.
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IV. METAPHYSICS
Metaphysics is often considered Aristotle's major effort to link religion with
philosophy. It was undoubtedly written after Physics as indicated by at least
three internal references to Physics. 34 Moreover, as far as can be determined,
Aristotle's first editor, Andronicus of Rhodes, invented the title Metaphysics
in order to indicate an assortment of issues pertaining to physics rather than
"above" or "beyond" it, and the prefix "meta" apparently meant "additional
to," not "transcendent." Aristotle himself used the words "divine science"
when referring to the study of spiritual matters. Moreover, Andronicus omitted a portion of the text that specifically dealt with the explanation of God's
existence in the original edition of Book 12 (described as "Lamda"). This
chapter's later insertion might well have been performed by somebody else.
In Book I of Metaphysics, Aristotle characterizes his inquiry as a divine
science about the power of God-notably a single God rather than a polytheistic assortment of gods. However, his argument in this passage is so convoluted that it requires close analysis to disclose its secular implications. The
Ross translation reads as follows:
For the science which it would be most meet for God to have is a divine
science, and so is any science that deals with divine objects ... for God is
thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle, and
such a science either God alone can have, or God above all others. All the
sciences, indeed are more necessary than this, but none is better. 35

Here Aristotle seems to have resorted to irony. A monotheistic God is
mentioned four times with a capital "G," and the remark, "God is thought to
be, etc." suggests possible disagreement about such a likelihood. Moreover,
the word better might signify superior knowledge, but it could also suggest
an entirely different meaning, "more useful among religious believers." The
Tredennick translation of this passage in the Loeb classics contains several
modifications that convey this ambivalence. For example, the wording of"all
believe that God is one of the causes . . . " supplants "God is thought to be
among the causes ... " Tredennick's version also suggests shared certitude
about the existence of gods, whereas Ross's version suggests the possibility
of doubt. This difference bears significant implications. In both translations
Aristotle also compares poetry with divine science (his wording for metaphysics) as two acceptable modes of expression because they serve a purpose
at least as important as the truth-on one hand as heightened poetic experience, and on the other as moral improvement through religious belief. Both
translations acknowledge transcendent poetic liberties that Aristotle ascribes
to poets, "bards tell many a lie," followed by his quick assurance that divine
science is "most honourable" (or "precious") and therefore perhaps a better
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and more valuable distortion of truth than poetry. But Aristotle seems unclear
in explaining himself, letting the reader extend its application to divine science as well as poetry in the sense that both exemplify his much later suggestion in De Anima that men "often act contrary to knowledge in obedience to
their imaginings."36
Aristotle brings the passage to a close by contrasting metaphysics with
"more necessary" sciences, presumably including the various fields of inquiry that he himself encouraged at the time. On this basis he apparently feels
justified in differentiating divine science from the pursuit of verifiable truth.
This entire passage seems cluttered with ambiguity because of his effort to be
both accurate and socially acceptable in the same context.
Aristotle's respect for the study of religion also seems questionable in
Book III when he characterizes believers, " ... the people who said there are
gods, but in human form ... were positing nothing but eternal men." 37 Also,
he suggests in Book VI of Metaphysics a necessary choice between science
and metaphysics as one's "first philosophy." He argues that natural science
would be the "first science" if nature entirely consists of substance, but as
suggested later by Simplicius, he concedes the possible transcendent existence of an "immovable substance" such as the soul, whereby divine science
would necessarily predominate. 38
According to Simplicius, Aristotle considers God to be either mind (i.e.
Plato's version of existence) or something beyond mind (for example the
physical universe itself). 39 Aristotle does not explore this choice in depth in
Metaphysics, but he does acknowledges the possibility of a strictly physical
realm "beyond mind," in other words different from mind as explained by his
later treatises De Caelo, Generation and Corruption, and De Anima.
In Book XII, Aristotle more specifically concedes the value of popular
religion as a sincere tradition "in the form of a myth" worthy of esteem on
this basis alone. He describes early pantheistic assumptions with obvious
disdain but suggests his own willingness to accommodate the "persuasion of
the multitude" relevant to its needs:
Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down to us their posterity
a tradition, in the form of a myth, that these bodies are gods and that the divine
encloses the whole of nature. The rest of the tradition has been added later in
mythical forms with a view to the persuasion of the multitude ... [But] these
opinions, with others, have been preserved until the present like relics. 40

The word "multitude" seems to have been the preferred translation of
anthropopoedeis, the word he specifically used in ancient Greek, but at least
one translation, by Tredennick, goes so far as to substitute the more pejorative epithet, "the vulgar." 41 The implied disdain for the populace apparently
reflects Aristotle's attitude toward its customary religious belief.
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Aristotle also contrasts Plato's doctrine of an unmoved mover with his
own assumption that he shared with most pre-Socratic natural philosophers:
"That nothing comes to be out of that which is not, but everything out of that
which is, is a dogma common to nearly all the natural philosophers." 42 This
assumption about a universe without beginning had already been proposed
by Parmenides, Melissus, and even Aristotle himself. Aside from the question of its validity, what is important in this context is that Aristotle himself
assumed its validity and by doing so reaffirmed his willingness as a natural
philosopher able to accept the notion of temporal infinitude.
Book XII provides Aristotle's "only systematic essay in theology" in his
entire writings, and its analysis of religion seems to bear little relevance to
any other portion of his work as acknowledged by David Ross, the editor-inchief of the Aristotle ' s standard Oxford edition. 43 Moreover, Aristotle's specific arguments on religion can be found in sections 6-10 of Book XII, where
a substantially different level of interpretation seems to prevail. 44 What appears to be his sole concern at this point, the possibility of God's existence,
occupies not more than about eight pages, and his principal three arguments
may be listed according to their apparently umesolved contradictions:
So the unmovable first mover is one both in definition and in number; so too,
therefore is that which is moved always and continuously; therefore there is
one heaven [i.e. transcendent space] alone. 45
We must consider also in which of two ways the nature of the universe contains the good and the highest good, whether as something separate and by
itself, or as the order of the parts. . . . And all things are ordered together
somehow, but not all alike .. . 4 6
In all things the good is in the highest degree a principle. The school we first
mentioned [Platonism?] is right in saying that it is a principle, but how the
good is a principle they do not say- whether as end or as mover or as form. 47

In their implications, all three of these passages essential to Aristotle's supposed proof of God's existence in Metaphysics seem contradictory, and now
and again their cumbersome wording suggests heavy interpolation. Aristotle
also appears to revert to Platonism in his effort to explain the actual governance of the universe based on religion, and seemingly in accord with Plato,
he suggests God's sacred role as the ultimate agent of all thought dependent
on the effectively tautological assumption, "Throughout eternity is the
thought which has itself for its object." 48 Aristotle also suggests Plato's cosmology when he identifies transcendent virtue with God, "In all things the
good is in the highest degree a principle." Here Aristotle's agreement seems
a later interpolation. Its prose is simplistic and steeped in Platonic idealism
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essential to Christian cosmology not to be found elsewhere in Aristotle's
texts.
In Section 10, the final portion of Book 12, Aristotle ends his brief treatment of religion by listing what seems a variety of issues that remain unsolved. In regard to the concept of the soul he suggests the need to explain
the "motive principle" as something different from thought itself. He asks
why some things perish and others do not, but also how there can be an
infinite process of becoming as later featured by his theory of motion in De
Caelo. Moreover, he questions how wisdom can be the highest knowledge if
we are not particularly wise or well-informed, and he almost seems willing to
jettison the primary assumptions of Metaphysics in light of natural philosophy: "If besides sensible things no others exist, there will be no first principle, no order, no becoming, no heavenly bodies." 49 It turns out that nonsensible "things" might exist at what seems a spiritual level, but strictly
pertaining to the physical universe including human behavior as suggested by
Aristotle's later analysis in De Anima. That the last chapter of Metaphysics
culminates with a list of mixed considerations presumably deserving of further inquiry almost seems intended to suggest Aristotle's relative indifference about the assumptions he took into account throughout Metaphysics.

Chapter Four

Late Aristotle

I. DE CAELO (ON THE HEAVENS)
What confuses modem readers about Aristotle's final and essentially atheistic stance in De Caelo is a result as much as anything of the title's misleading
English translation as On the Heavens, a cosmic site usually considered the
abode of one or more gods. However, the original title of the text in Greek,
ouranos, bore a broad reference to the heavens more or less as the sky, the
cosmos, and/or the entire physical universe much as already described by
Plato in Timaeus 34ab and Laws X, 893. The translators and scholars committed to a religious interpretation may prefer the English equivalent, heavens, but its secular implications as suggested by both ouranos and the Latin
translation, De Caelo , indicate the universe in its entirety. In Physics Aristotle himself had already sought to clarify this distinction:
In one sense, we apply the word ouranos to the substance of the outermost
circumference of the world, or to the natural body which is at the outermost
circumference of the world . . . especially to the outmost and uppermost
region, in which also we believe all divinity to have its seat. [Secondly] to the
outermost circumference . . . in which are the moon and sun and stars . . . And
yet in another sense . .. give the name of ouranos to the world as a whole. 1

Aristotle conceded, perhaps for the benefit of his religious contemporaries, that a small portion of this celestial region is customarily understood to
be the domain that "we take to be the seat of all that is divine." 2 But he also
suggested that he himself did not necessarily share this belief despite his
rhetorical use of "we." In the very next sentence he declared his own perspective with a secular argument that applies to cosmic cycles at all levels:
81
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It is too in unceasing motion, as is reasonable; for things only cease moving
when they arrive at their proper places, and for the body whose motion is
circular the place where it ends is also the place where it begins. 3

In effect he rejected the apocalyptic assumptions of religion in favor of a
cyclical theory of the universe that featured endless motion as earlier suggested by Heraclitus. Like the motion of stars, he suggested, life itself perpetuates itself into the indefinite future by means of sustained reproduction from
one generation to the next rather than temporary individual experience on
earth before eternal existence in some kind of an afterlife.
In his three texts upon cosmology, De Caelo (On the Heavens), On Generation and Corruption, and De Anima (On the Soul), Aristotle seems to
reexamine his assumptions on a more radical basis yet. Possibly in response
to the theories of Heraclitus and Empedocles, he maintains that the unlimited
perfection of the universe is only possible through "continuous circular motion" as to be observed in the motion of stars and planets at night. Of course
the cause of this perceived effect results from the rotation of the earth rather
than the circular orbit of stars across the sky, but astronomical motion does
occur as perceived by Aristotle, and all cycles, including the cycle of life can
be compared with it. Aristotle suggests a simpler and more functional cyclical model than Empedocles' theory of four basic elements in motion, and in
doing so he advanced his own version of what amounted to a "unified field
theory." Indeed, cycles do occur in the sky, as well as with biological reproduction, and perhaps numerous other modes of passage as well, and although
Aristotle seldom declares this in such obvious terms, it is implicit throughout
his text.
The obvious problem with this self-sufficient materialist cosmology is
that it gives divine authority a diminished role, if any at all. A strictly cyclical
theory of cosmology can be construed as a recipe for atheism, reducing the
god concept to little more than a redundant hypothesis of a God primarily
concerned with cosmic cycles. Aristotle's willingness to risk this supposition
seems implied, and so it is not surprising that sympathetic theologians many
centuries later sought to impose the modifications needed to render Aristotle's theory more compatible with orthodox religion. Undoubtedly this effort
included deletions that cannot be detected today. However, scribes also seem
to have been willing to add a number of orthodox Christian interpolations
that can still be detected. As a result, the task of modern readers sympathetic
with Aristotle's secular viewpoint is to salvage his original analysis as well
as possible despite these earlier efforts to obscure it. An unusual number of
such modifications occur toward the beginning of De Caelo, in which the
likelihood of atheism is suggested as effectively as anywhere in his writings.
The reader is thus confronted with the task of isolating his cosmology. For
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example his initial effort to explain circular motion as a basic aspect of
nature is abruptly interrupted by the passage:
These premises clearly give the conclusion that there is in nature some bodily
substance other than the formations we know, prior to them all and more
divine than they. 4

The prose seems appropriate except for the assurance, "clearly give the
conclusion" as well as the adjectival modifier, "prior to them all and more
divine than they," which bears obvious religious implications contrary to
Aristotle's thesis as explained elsewhere in the text. More obvious yet is a
later passage that displays cumbersome pontification entirely at odds with
Aristotle's style and conceptual assumptions:
For all men have some conception of the nature of the gods, and all who
believe in the existence of gods at all, whether barbarian or Greek, agree in
allotting the highest place to the deity, surely because they suppose that immortal is linked with immortal and regard any other supposition as impossible.
If then there is, as there certainly is, anything divine, what we have just said
about the primary bodily substance was well said. The mere evidence of the
senses is enough to convince us of this, at least with human certainty. 5

This rambling assertion is simply not Aristotle speaking. The author declares
with awkwardness that "all men" do somehow believe in "the deity"--itself
an obvious anachronism. Moreover, his righteous wording, "What we have
just said," "was well said," and "the mere evidence of the senses" seems
entirely atypical of Aristotle. What is intended, for example, by the implications of "mere"? That such pontification clutters Aristotle ' s prose at the very
beginning of De Caelo suggests that whoever inserted it felt compelled to go
to this extreme as a preliminary measure to justify the text's existence despite
its implicit incompatibility with Christian doctrine at the time. It seems likely
there were too many remarkable insights for the text to be destroyed, so
textual modifications were inserted to justify its retention.
Once initial additions supportive of Christian orthodoxy have been discounted, Aristotle's sustained analysis is almost totally oblivious to a spiritual God or gods. If sublime authority exists, it is described as a function of the
entire universe as mass in motion. There seems little effort on Aristotle's part
to reconcile the contrast between Plato's concept of transcendent mind equivalent to godhead and his own alternative explanation of the physical universe
in perpetual motion. He instead suggests his own version of materialism that
is a synthesis of pre-Socratic secular cosmologies of Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and even Melissus. Missing from his synthesis, on the other hand, are transcendental alternatives suggested by Parme-
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nides and the limited portion of Anaxagoras' theory featured by Plato's version of metaphysics.
As compared to his stance in earlier texts, Aristotle's increased support of
materialism in De Caelo is also indicated by his obvious shift in attitude
toward Melissus' concept of infinite space. In his much earlier text, Sophistical Refutations, he had obviously opposed Melissus' theory as a corollary of
Parmenides' theory of temporal infinitude:
The argument of Melissus that the universe is infinite assumes that the universe has not come into being (for nothing could come into being from what
does not exist) and that everything which has come into being has come from a
beginning; if, therefore, the universe has not come into being, it has no beginning and therefore is infinite. But this does not necessarily follow; for even if
what has come into being always has a beginning, anything that has a beginning need not have come to be, any more than it follows that a man which is
hot must be in a fever because who is in fever is hot. 6

Obviously, the analogy does not hold, since eternal existence and the lack
of a beginning are effectively identical, whereas heat and fever are often
linked but not identical. Also, Aristotle seems to have overlooked that it was
Parmenides who first emphasized temporal infinitude, and in fact that Melissus' principal contribution was in having both accepted and enlarged Parmenides' thesis to include spatial infinitude as well. In any case, Aristotle concluded his analysis:
... for he [Melissus] claims that if that which has come to be has a beginning,
that which has not come to be has no beginning, and so if the heaven has not
come to be, it is also eternal. But this is not true; for the sequence is the
reverse. 7

"But that is not so," Aristotle actually insisted. Later, in his first pages of
Physics he accused both Melissus and Parmenides of harboring false principles relevant to time and space as opposed to his own assumption that "things
of Nature ... some of them do move and change" As yet unaware that these
concepts could be linked, he declared that Melissus' analysis was simplistic,
and that he made "unsound assumptions" and argued "unsoundly from
them." 8 Nowhere else in his writings did Aristotle criticize a natural philosopher as aggressively as in this brief diatribe attacking Melissus. Still later, in
Metaphysics he once again criticized both Parmenides and Melissus for having proposed cosmic unity that he himself would later concede, and in particular he specifically rejected Melissus' emphasis on "materially one" as a
dubious variant of Parmenides' concept of"the Unity" as one in definition."
To this extent, he suggested, Melissus could be compared with Xenophanes
and "may be completely ignored" and both having been "somewhat too crude
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in their views." 9 How could anybody believe in the concept of one in matter,
he asked? This would later become an essential aspect of his own concept of
matter in motion, but at the time he was obviously still unaware of such a
possibility.
Only in De Caelo does Aristotle finally express a more generous assessment of the shared cosmology of both Melissus and Parmenides, one based
on metaphysical analysis justified by astronomical observation. In fact he
seems in almost full agreement:
Nothing that is, . . . is generated or destroyed, and our conviction to the
contrary is an illusion. So maintained the school of Melissus and Parmenides.
But however excellent their theories may be, anyhow they cannot be held to
speak as students of nature. There may be things not subject to generation or
any kind of movement, but if so they belong to another and a higher inquiry
than the study of nature. IO

By "higher" Aristotle apparently implies "more inclusive," and he thereupon suggests his own concept of a transcendent cosmology whereby cyclical motion occurs as indicated by several of Heraclitus' paradoxes to this
effect. 11 Finally in what seems his most advanced cosmology as explained in
De Caelo, Aristotle suggests what seems a defensible supposition-holistic
stasis effectively based on endless mass in perpetual motion that is visible at
night. Parmenides and Melissus had already proposed their respective holistic theories, Leucippus and Democritus had proposed the concept of mass
(i.e. atoms in combination) immersed in a cosmic vacuum, and finally Aristotle seems to have fully recognized the possibility of infinite unity of what
seems endless mass in motion. 12 This strictly physical metaphysics seemed
to justify the abandonment of Plato ' s holistic concept of a spiritual universe
for an enlarged and more credible holistic concept based on the principle of
mass in motion. In short, just as Anaxagoras, followed by Plato adopted
Parmenides' assumptions regarding spiritual unity relevant to the whole, as
already suggested by Heraclitus' concept of Logos, Aristotle adopted Melissus' version of a strictly physical universe first suggested by Anaximander
and Anaximenes based on cyclical motion, later featured by Heraclitus and
Empedocles.
In effect, Aristotle's holistic secular perspective seems confirmed by his
concept of the universe as an infinite self-sufficient cyclical system. It can be
self-sufficient because it is physical, and it can be cyclical because it is selfsufficient. Moreover, the need for any particular god's supportive role becomes irrelevant if the universe never had a beginning and therefore was not
the product of supernatural intervention- also if there is no possibility for
transcendent space outside the universe. Physical and temporal continuity
accordingly predominate based on the unstoppable cyclical motion of stars
and planets. On this basis Aristotle was able to maintain the radical (but
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credible) assumption that the cyclical movement of planets is somewhat
similar to that of animals and plants at least as a manifestation of regularity. 13
While Aristotle proposed the ultimate necessity of an immutable universe, he
also defended the more inclusive paradox that this cosmic necessity sustains
itself at all levels. Life itself plays its role, as does human behavior from one
generation to the next.
In addition Aristotle proposed three radical secular assumptions regarding
the holistic composition of the universe on a dialectic basis. In doing so he
mentioned the gods, but without suggesting any kind of a functional role.
These included first the total rejection of any separate realm-heaven for
example-that might seem to exist beyond the physical universe; second, the
rejection of original creation except as the result of change from an earlier
existence, and third, the rejection of the possibility of existence beyond death
as suggested by "ancient beliefs." Aristotle effectively framed these negative
principles in abstract terms and on a positive basis:
It is evident not only that there is not, but also that there could never come to
be, any bodily mass whatever outside the circumference. The world as a
whole, therefore, includes all its appropriate matter, which is, as we saw,
natural perceptible body. 14
A limit is a thing which contains; and this motion, being perfect, contains
those imperfect motions which have a limit and a goal, having itself no beginning or end, but unceasing through the infinity of time, and of other movements, to some cause of their beginning, to others offering the goal. 15

In combination these passages again tend to confirm Aristotle's belief that
we do in fact inhabit a godless universe, and that its combined spatial and/or
temporal aspect cannot be acknowledged on a religious basis except in pantheistic terms that identify God's existence with the universe itself. Only an
explanation of the universe itself as a manifestation of God is acceptable
much as insisted by Spinoza many centuries later.
Entirely in accord with Melissus, Aristotle insists in Part I, Chapter 9, on
the existence of a single universe without any outlying region such as the
remote domain of one or more gods as already suggested by Melissus. 16
Aristotle also argues that "all the worlds must be composed of the same
bodies, being similar in nature," thereby rejecting both transcendent existence and the existence of a unique spiritual realm. 17 To describe the universe as a self-sufficient realm he once again resorts to the concept of an
enormous cosmic cycle unique unto itself. 18 As suggested by modem astronomy, this assumption seems valid if Aristotle's reference to "the world" takes
into account the universe in its entirety including countless stars within
countless galaxies. Aristotle also rejects Greek tradition's legendary explanation of creation first suggested by Hesiod and later in Genesis that chaos
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came first. This supposition was unacceptable to Aristotle, because it implies
a privileged cosmic site where God could dispense his authority over all
things and events. With obvious irony he declares, "and if such a thing
should really exist well might we contemplate it with wonder. 19
Instead, Aristotle insists that stasis occurs through sustained repetition.
This is also suggested by Heraclitus' fragments that beginning and end are
"general" in a circle, and that wisdom consists of understanding this final
"purpose which steers all things through all things." 20 As before, Aristotle
resorts to a broad universal concept to explain all instances of incessant
motion including the seasons, the passage of life from birth to death, from
hunger to satiation, etc. His explanation rests upon the paradox that celestial
regularity is nevertheless comparable to the irregular and often seemingly
chaotic interplay among things and events in human behavior. Whatever its
outward complexity, life depends on biological replication--once again mass
in motion, if at a more immediate level as Aristotle later suggests in· De
Anima.
In Book II of De Caelo, Aristotle expands this argument by demonstrating that all stasis is necessarily temporary and that transition inevitably
brings negation into play. Locked in cyclical transition, each stage somehow
takes effect as the opposite of an earlier stage much as Heraclitus had proposed and as Hegel would much later adopt in his version of metaphysics. To
this extent, all cyclical change relating to earthly matters replicates celestial
motion, and the inevitability of transition pertains to all behavior, however
erratic. Whatever its circumstances, its outcome somehow is a rejection of an
earlier state of affairs. In his final two sentences of Book I, Aristotle declared
the abstract basis for this paradox first suggested by Heraclitus:
Whatever is destructible or generated is always alterable. Now alteration is due
to contraries, and the things which compose the natural body are the very same
that destroy it. 21

Just as fire burns wood to produce ashes, all process occurs as an act of
denial preliminary to the later existence of its agent, if nothing more than a
pile of ashes. On a much larger scale in biological history, a reduction in
sunlight several million years ago seems likely to have first made life possible on earth as compared to Mars, but continued reductions into the indefinite future can be expected to make life difficult, then impossible.
In his introductory sentence of Book II, Aristotle once again concurs with
Parmenides that the universe as a whole possesses neither a beginning nor an
end. By doing so he suggests the lack of any role by a God or gods in having
created the universe or provided any kind of an eternal afterlife. Aristotle
also mentions how early idolatry-including Homeric worship--took for
granted the ability of its particular assortment of gods to exist forever without
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suggesting such a possibility for humanity or even the universe itself. 22 He
implies in contrast that the divine capacity for movement turns out to be
movement itself. God consists of the universe in motion, and vice versa. If
such exists, the unique authority of transcendent godhead entails the universe
in its entirety.
Of course Aristotle lived three centuries before Christ, so his attitude
toward religion was colored by Homeric mythology rather than Biblical tradition, but his attitude toward popular religious belief at the time was hostile.
To illustrate his disdain for Homeric mythology, he described with irony the
concept of Atlas as a muscular deity who holds up the universe-a mythical
belief among the Greek populace that supposedly explained how upright
beings owe their safety to Atlas in thwarting the principle of gravity. 23 Similarly, Aristotle expressed his disdain for Plato's assumption: "that it [the
universe] should persist eternally by the necessitation of a soul. " 24 Aristotle
suggested in response that such infinitude might tum out to be surprisingly
unpleasant if typified by the fate of Ixion, a mythical figure tied to a fiery
spinning wheel forever. To the extent that supernatural power might be involved, he contends, it entails nothing more than an eternal process of things
in motion. His analysis was admittedly simplistic, but for his time he proposed a remarkable theory pertaining to the universe as a whole.
In the final two books of De Cae/o-respectively Books III and IVAristotle repeated his sympathetic response to Empedocles ' cyclical analysis
and Democritus' concept of a void among atoms. He somewhat anticipated
the theory of gravity with his brief comparative assessment of weight as an
abstract concept but did not extend his analysis. In Book III, Chapter 2, he
actually suggested the possibility of a more cohesive original unity before
"separation" occurs as the result of cosmic interaction [perhaps a "Big
Bang"?] that ultimately "proceeded from unity and combination" at an even
more cohesive level: "The elements of the cosmos are in a state of separation, so that its formation must have proceeded from unity and combination."
Lucretius later proposed that this transition suggests that such possible modifications may result in catastrophic impact. 25 In Chapter 4 of Book III,
Aristotle shifted his focus to the concept of atomism, advancing from macroscopic infinitude to microscopic spatial considerations by suggesting that the
number of elements is finite, not infinite as suggested by both Democritus
and Anaxagoras. 26 In Chapters 5-8 he offered the dubious paradox that atoms
as "primary masses" cannot be "infinite in number and indivisible in mass,"
since this would somehow necessitate their being more minutely differentiated.
In Chapter 2 he returned to Democritus' concept of void in light of Heraclitus and Empedocles' respective theories of fire and the impact of weight.
He concluded by exploring the distinction between these two antithetical
components of existence-mass and the void- as an explanation of mo-
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tion. 27 These somewhat random considerations inspired by Democritus effectively bring De Caelo to an end, setting the stage for the later theoretical
pursuits of both Theophrastus and Strato, his two principal disciples who
would later succeed him as leaders of the Lyceum. Both were fully as productive as Aristotle himself, but unlike Aristotle's writings, theirs were later
almost entirely lost. Both later sought a synthesis between Aristotle's assumptions based on continuity and Democritus' dichotomy between atomic
particles and the void that presumably surrounds them.
It should finally be noted that Aristotle paid little attention in De Caelo to
Plato's version of cosmology as featured in Timaeus. He mentioned his contribution only six times throughout the text in almost dismissive asides perhaps indicating there was no need for further discussion pertaining to his own
argument. 28 In contrast, he referred in generally positive terms to Empedocles twelve times, Democritus and Leucippus nine times, and both Anaxagoras and the Pythagoreans six times apiece. It would be a mistake to consider
Aristotle's text as evidence of his sustained adherence to Platonism, for quite
the opposite, his arguments demonstrate the extent to which he instead used
pre-Socratic assumptions to propose a seemingly better and more credible
explanation of the universe.

II. ON GENERATION AND CORRUPTION
Aristotle seems to have written On Generation and Corruption soon after De
Caelo, and their sequence is strongly suggested by the link between their last
and first sentences. De Caelo ends with the assertion, "We have now finished
our examination of the heavy and the light and of the properties connected
with them," and On Generation and Corruption begins with what seems a
continuation, "Our next task is to study coming-to-be and passing-away." 29
Whereas mass in motion is featured in the first text, the second specifically
addresses questions related to motion and transition. Both texts differentiate
religion and secular philosophy, but On Generation and Corruption seems to
introduce more rigorous concerns about religion. Moreover, it further confirms Aristotle's renewed appreciation for pre-Socratic assumptions. Also,
because of its brevity, it offers the most vigorous defense of Aristotle's
secular cosmology.
Perhaps the most significant theoretical contribution of On Generation
and Corruption, is Aristotle's explanation of causation as a "coming to be"
that might be able to persist forever because of infinite cyclical motion.
Manifestation serves as change-what "does" necessarily takes place in sequence, and its circular pattern becomes almost a central theme that anticipates the cyclical implications of human reproduction later discussed in De
Anima, again helping to confirm the sequence of Aristotle's books from
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Physics to Metaphysics followed by De Caelo, Generation and Corruption,
and finally De Anima. The large assortment of concepts featured in On Generation and Corruption is noteworthy to this particular stage in the overall
progress of his theoretical assumptions as illustrated by his cyclical explanation of multiplicity as the outcome of simple causes:
But if there is to be movement there must be something which initiates it; if
there is to be movement always, there must always be something which initiates it; if the movement is to be continuous, what initiates it must be single,
unmoved, ungenerated, and incapable of 'alteration'; and if the circular movements are more than one their necessitating causes must all of them, in spite of
their plurality, be in some way subordinated to a single originative source. 30

Some version of supernatural authority, most obviously a monotheistic
God, might be construed to provide this "single principle," but Aristotle
seems to attribute this circularity instead to the inertia of the material universe itself:
But among continuous bodies which are moved, only that which is moved in a
circle is continuous in such a way that it preserves its continuity with itself
throughout the movement. The conclusion is that this is what produces continuous movement, viz. the body which is being moved in a circle; and its movement makes time continuous. 31

By means of continuous cyclical motion celestial formation governs itself
as anticipated by Empedocles' simpler model of cosmic sequence. However,
Aristotle proposes the likelihood of circular momentum free of the cumbersome fourfold sequence of reversals described by Empedocles. Also, without
identifying himself as an atheist, Aristotle is more willing to dispence with
the possibility ofan external creator of the universe.
Many of Aristotle's sentences in On Generation and Corruption can be
quoted as fragments to help clarify his version of materialism. He discusses
Platonism in perhaps twenty contexts. In contrast he does the same with
Empedocles two dozen times, and Democritus and Leucippus at least two
dozen times. Moreover, the aphoristic vitality of many of his theoretical
pronouncements seems almost a parody of fragments by pre-Socratic natural
philosophers:
A single matter must always be assumed as underlying the contrary ' poles ' of
any change--whether change of place, or growth and diminution or 'alteration.' 32

In so far as the One results from composition (by a consilience of the Many),
whereas they result from disintegration, the Many are more elementary than
the One, and prior to it in their nature. 33
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But now it is obvious that a body is in fact divided into separable magnitudes
which are smaller at each division-into magnitudes which fall apart from one
another and are actually separated.... But there is a limit beyond which the
"breaking up" cannot proceed. The necessary consequence-especially if
coming-to-be and passing-away are to take place by association and dissociation respectively-is that a body must contain atomic magnitudes which are
invisible. 34
Why, then, is this form of change necessarily ceaseless? ls it because the
passing-away of this is a coming-to-be of something else, and the coming-tobe of this a passing away of something else? 35
The substratum is the material cause of the continuous occurrence of comingto-be, because it is such as to change from contrary to contrary and because, in
substances, the coming-to-be of one thing is always a passing away of another,
and the passing-away of one thing is always another's coming-to be. 36
It is evident, therefore that the coming-to-be of the 'simple' bodies will be
cyclical; and that this cyclical method of transformation is the easiest, because
the consecutive elements contain interchangeable complementary factors. 37
Since the elements are transformed into one another, it is impossible for any
one of them-whether it be at the end or in the middle-to be an 'originative
source ' of the rest. 38
Every addition of a new 'element' will carry with it the attachment of a new
contrariety to the preceding element. Consequently, if the 'elements' are infinitely many, there will also belong to the single element an infinite number of
contrarieties. 39
What, then, is the first mover and the cause of motion? Presumably not Love
and Strife: on the contrary, these are causes of a particular motion, if at least
we assume that the first mover to be an originative source. 40
An additional absurdity is that the soul [i.e., conscious behavior] should consist of the "elements," or that it should be one of them. 41
The rival treatments of the subject now before us will serve to illustrate how
great is the difference between a 'scientific' and a 'dialectical' method of
inquiry. 42

All of the fragments listed here can be compared to pre-Socratic assumptions, especially those of Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Empedocles. Only
one of them, the very last, leaves open the possibility of Plato's stance
(dialectic) as opposed to that of Democritus (scientific).
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Aristotle specifically suggests the possibility of God in only one passage,
and it occurs in an awkward sentence toward the end of the text that seems an
interpolation at odds with everything that is discussed elsewhere. A conventional vision of God is specifically taken into account for the first time:
For in all things, as we affirm, Nature always strives after 'the better.' Now
' being' .. . is better than ' not-being;' but not all things can possess ' being,'
since they are too far removed from the ' originative source' . God therefore
adopted the remaining alternative, and fulfilled the perfection of the universe
by making coming-to-be uninterrupted: for the greatest possible coherence
would thus be secured to existence, because that 'coming to be should itself
come-to-be perpetually' the closest approximation to eternal being. 43

Perhaps Aristotle authored this, but probably not. This is the only passage
in which a monotheistic deity is linked to the terms "eternal being" and
"perfection of the universe." The passage is located near one in which Aristotle has begun declaring his own argument, and its very wording seems awkward even as quoted in translation. Moreover, why is this unique God featured with a capital "G" as opposed to the custom at the time to refer to one
or more gods with a small "g"?
In contrast, Aristotle suggests just a few sentences later suggests a strictly
material explanation of the role of motion as the single basic principle at the
root of the universe:
But ifthere is to be movement ... there must be something which initiates it; if
there is to be movement always, there must always be something which initiates it; if the movement is to be always, what initiates it must be single,
unmoved, ungenerated, and incapable of alteration; and if the circular movements are more than one, they must all of them, in spite of their plurality, be in
some way subordinated to a single originative source. 44

Aristotle's argument is sufficiently abstract that both Christians and modem secularists would find it acceptable since the identity of the single originative source is left unidentified by Aristotle--whether the authority of one or
more gods or the basic matrix of a strictly physical universe. Aristotle seems
to describe this sustained primal force as a cosmic function imbedded in the
universe, possibly suggesting pantheism or a limited mode of godhead. However, he then links this function with circularity similar to the so-called cycle
of life on earth. In the context of Aristotle's explanation God' s contribution
effectively minimizes any kind of authority beyond the task of governing
infinite recurrence.
In the last chapter of Book II, Aristotle reiterates his basic assumption,
"Since what is infinite has no beginning, neither will there be any primary
member that will make it necessary for the remaining members to come-to-
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be." 45 In other words, if there is no beginning, there is no need for any kind
of a God to initiate it. In contrast, the simpler designation "principle" limits
governing law to a useful function through incessant cyclical motion.
Aristotle concludes On Generation and Corruption by contrasting cyclical permanence with the so-called "rectilinear" outcome of human experience that culminates in death without the possibility of resurrection. An
individual's life is linear only in the sense that it consists of a relatively small
arc in a much bigger cycle of life. For any species in its entirety, he argued,
such a cyclical process necessarily repeats itself on a larger scale through
reproduction by a sufficient portion of the species participating in the task:
Now it is evident that those things, whose substance-that which is undergoing the process-is imperishable, will be numerically the same for the character of the process is determined by the character of that which undergoes it.
Those things on the other hand, whose substance is perishable (not imperishable) must return upon themselves specifically, not numerically .... at any rate
this does not happen with things whose substance comes-to-be-whose substance is such that it is capable of not-being. 46

Here Aristotle resorts to tortuous abstraction, at least in translation, to
suggest that individuals do expire when their deaths finally occur, whereas
the species as a whole continues to survive from one generation to the next
thanks to the so-called "character of the process," Aristotle's genteel term for
sexual reproduction from one generation to the next. Otherwise, the perishable fate of individuals could be described as rectilinear instead of cyclical as
it is destined to end because its "substance" upon death has achieved nonexistence. Instead, individuals do effectively renew their species despite their
own deaths if their descendants live on. Humanity thus sustains itself without
the need for heavenly rewards by a hypothetical God or gods.
III. DE ANIMA (ON THE SOUL)
Just as the ancient Greek wording of "On the Heavens" is more accurately
translated to English as "On the Physical Universe," the wording of "On the
Soul" refers to conscious behavior rather than transcendental experience. In
effect, mental performance is the basic topic rather than the pursuit of heavenly rewards. The two titles in sequence, On the Heavens and On the Soul,
feature the words heaven and soul, and necessarily suggest a Christian version of Platonism, but the word combination is a misleading reflection of
Aristotle's theoretical stance. For just as the word caelo represents sky or
outer space in its entirety, the word anima represented mind, consciousness,
and even animal consciousness as a biological necessity. Thus, the title De
Anima presents human thought as the keystone of Aristotle's mature philo-
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sophical perspective-perhaps less grandiose than Plato's universal soul, but
the mental ability that both supports life and is able to discern basic truths.
Just as Aristotle explains sky as endless space in De Anima, he explains the
human mind as a unique product of biological existence that is also cyclical
but without immortality except by means of reproduction. Otherwise, he
ignores the concept of human immortality. The species as a whole might
survive into the indefinite future, he suggests, but individual human beings
live and die without later access into a transcendental realm identified as
heaven. Aristotle makes this inevitability plain in two passages: " .. How
comes it that it [the soul] is destroyed simultaneously with the disappearance
of the quiddity of the flesh and of other parts of the animal?" and, more
specifically " ... the soul seems rather to hold the body together; at all
events, when it has departed, the body disperses in air and rots away." 47 Of
course such a departure might suggest passage to a better world, but Aristotle
ignores this possibility.
As opposed to the Platonic vision of mind as a final and transcendent
manifestation of spiritual achievement, Aristotle limits its function to the
purposefulness of nature and the task of survival at every level of physical
existence:
For the soul [anima] is the cause of animate bodies as being in itself the origin
of motion, as the final cause, and as substance. . . . And for living things
existence means life, and it is the [soul] which is the cause and origin of
life .... Manifestly, too, the [soul] is final cause. For nature, like intelligence,
acts for a purpose, and this purpose is for it an end. 48

Motivation is accordingly an essential feature of mental performance, but
so also are perception, ideation, and every other dimension of mental behavior.
Also noteworthy is the lack of reference to gods except for having told of
Thales' belief in them, and elsewhere in De Anima he concedes Plato's
suggestion in Timaeus that God created cosmic cycles. However, he also
attributes a striking impiety to Empedocles that "God is quite the most unintelligent of beings" because of His seeming ignorance of strife (i.e. much of
what happens in the universe). 49 As explained by modem psychiatry, Aristotle seems to have projected onto a philosopher he respected a sacrilege he
preferred not to acknowledge as his own.
Roughly half the length of De Caelo, De Anima enlarges Aristotle's secular perspective by explaining mental activity as an aspect of human behavior
important to individual and genetic perpetuation that can be compared to the
cyclical motion of stars and planets in the sky: "For when mind moves it
thinks; when a circle moves it revolves. If then thought is a revolution, the
circle which has such a revolution must be mind." 50 Essential to his analogy
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is the crucial role that mind (or "soul") plays in the realm of biology, for
human behavior is steered by sensation linked with cognition, and thought
serves at a higher level yet in promoting the survival of both the individual
and the species. This relationship has already been suggested in Book II of
De Caelo:
We must, then, think of the action of the lower stars as similar to that of
animals and plants. For on our earth it is man that has the greatest variety of
actions. 51

On the other hand, Aristotle mentions the importance of procreation with
the vague wording, "actions ... various and directed to ends," but he refers
to this dependence more specifically in De Caelo and On Generation and
Corruption, as well as providing a brief but more lucid explanation in an
entirely different text, Generation ofAnimals:
For since it is impossible that such a class of things as animals should be of an
eternal nature, therefore that which comes into being is eternal in the only way
possible. Now it is impossible for it to be eternal as an individual-the substance of the things that are is in the particular; and if it were such as it would
be eternal-but it is possible for it as a species. 52

This explanation of reproduction "possible for it as a species" might have
been deleted from de Anima by censors but overlooked in Generation of
Animals.
Aristotle effectively reverses Plato's theoretical stance by subsuming all
aspects of mental behavior to the continuation of mankind based on the
advance from one generation to the next as one particular demonstration of
mass in sustained motion. Instead of accepting Plato's concept of soul as
elevated transcendence that exceeds animal behavior, he focuses on all mental behavior conducive to survival, the dominant purpose of biological existence. Even the limited capabilities of a roundworm's brain, estimated to
comprise 302 neurons, justify Aristotle's analysis of effective mental performance relevant to intentional motion. As he explains on what seems an
evolutionary basis,
Now there are two points especially wherein that which is animate is held to
differ from the inanimate, namely, motion and the act of sensation, and these
are approximately the two characteristics of [soul] handed down to us by our
predecessors. 53

On this doubled reductive basis, all thought pertaining to all aspects of
life at every level of performance is crucial to "the whole domain of truth
and, more particularly, to the study of nature, the soul [anima] being virtually
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the principle of all animal life." 54 Perception guides behavior, and behavior
just as inevitably takes action according to what is perceived. Even at this
simplest level of response the concept of anima is applicable as the most
essential function of consciousness--the sustained perpetuation of life, a goal
more or less compatible with the larger momentum of the whole physical
universe. Not accidentally, both stimulus and response play roles in cyclical
recurrence, each in its own way.
Aristotle also suggests what seems a sophisticated pre-Darwinian similarity between human and animal consciousness despite the difference between
their respective levels of cognitive performance. He explains mind not simply as a material feature of the body, but as a neural system of functions that
serves the whole body according to its needs:
Now the soul [i.e. mental performance] is that whereby primarily we live,
perceive, and have understanding: therefore it will be a species of notion or
form, not matter or substratum .... It is not body, but something belonging to
body, and therefore resides in body, and what is more, in such and such a
body. 55

Unlike Plato, Aristotle offers a broad definition that includes the consciousness of anything alive with legs, wings, or even fins as opposed to the
nebulous transcendence of "mind" at the highest spiritual level suggested by
Anaxagoras and featured by Plato. This principle even applies to insects,
oysters, and possibly even vegetables that turn their leaves to gain better
access to sunlight. Aristotle extends his analysis of intelligence from humans
to apply to the mental and pre-mental performance of all life remotely capable of purposeful behavior. On the other hand, he explains human consciousness as pragmatic behavior relevant to abstract issues as well as to
needed change.
Aristotle also proposes that the union of body and thought is based on a
close relationship in which each acts upon the other. He even goes so far as
to propose a cyclical interaction--a physical need affects the soul [or mind],
and in turn the mind guides the body according to its circumstances-for
example by eating food, building a house, or simply by changing where one
sits. Aristotle summarizes a variety of other relevant behavioral theories but
obviously holds little regard for those that explain body and soul without
taking into account biological need: "Most theories about the soul [consciousness] ... join the soul to body, or place it in a body, without adding
any specification of the reason for their union, or of the bodily conditions
required for it." 56 Without mentioning Plato as an example, he suggests that
such theories bear little if any connection to functional consciousness whereby body and mind interact in a harmonious manner.
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In the second book of De Anima, Aristotle links the concept of soul with
the capacities of sensation, thought, appetite, touch, motion, and in general
the desire for pleasure. Both the imagination and "reasoning faculty" remain
essential components of soul as functional aspects of mental behavior, but at
the most basic level the soul is ultimately the final agent of sustenance, and to
this extent the body is the principal beneficiary of choices imposed by the
soul. Nothing beyond can be anticipated. Upon one's death this partnership
ceases to function altogether, for neither can exist without the other.
In the third and final book of De Anima, Aristotle once again bases human
experience on sustained interaction between body and soul (or consciousness): "The soul is the first actuality of a natural body having in it the
capacity of life. " 57 However, interaction between physical and mental performance is entirely interdependent: "So that there is an analogy between the
soul and the hand; for, as the hand is an instrument of instruments, so the
intellect is the form of forms, and sensation the form of sensibles." 58 Just as
the body acts to satisfy its needs as interpreted by the brain (i.e., soul),
Aristotle suggests, the brain directs the body to satisfy these needs in such a
manner that consciousness and physical existence both control and depend
on each other. This is perhaps best exemplified by the experience of hunger
followed by its satisfaction. Consciousness enlists the body to fulfill its need
by eating food to eliminate hunger. However, the body has already played an
equally important role by inducing the sensation of hunger in the first place.
Here at least, Aristotle describes mental performance in response to need
much as explained by modem behavioral psychology.
The binary distinctions Aristotle proposes suggest any number of modem
variations: mind and body, thought and action, perception and belief, restraint and behavior, and so on. Perhaps the most controversial example
would be Freud's neglected dichotomy between the so-called reality and
pleasure principles, the inescapable difference between understanding and
desire, between thought and belief. In the words of Aristotle:
Imagination, in fact, is something different both from perception and from
thought, and is never found by itself apart from perception, any more than is
belief apart from imagination. Clearly thinking is not the same thing as believing. 59

Aristotle concedes the benefit of imagination as a source of emotional
gratification, but he also maintains that its accuracy is susceptible to distortion by means of skillful creativity whereby untruths are rendered to seem
valid. He accordingly identifies imagination's capacity to "think falsely" as
an often useful function of intellect for the acceptance of hypothetical supposition. He has already suggested such a possibility in Book I of Metaphysics,
to the effect that "bards tell many a lie." Here with obvious irony he seems to
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grant this category of self-delusion a much larger role relevant to the shared
assumptions of society as a whole: For men often act contrary to knowledge
in obedience to their imaginings, while in the other animals there is no
process of thinking or reasoning, but solely imagination. 60 But of course
exactly the opposite can be argued, that animal consciousness falls short of
imagination. Perception and a relatively primitive logic are possible, but not
the ability to pursue suppositions to any extent. On the other hand, similar if
less constrictive limitations also apply to the level of imagination among
most of humanity-for example Aristotle's fellow citizens in Athens were
able to applaud a tragedy by Sophocles but lacked the ability to take into
account abstract formulations to any extent. Aristotle extends this discrepancy to explain all false thought relevant to politics, religion, and the many
popular assumptions that typically cloud the public mind. And literature
sometimes succeeds in configuring imagination on a presumably useful basis
whereby the reader or playgoer emerges from vicarious experience a better or
more enlightened individual, quite aside from questions of factual accuracy.
However, difficulties arise when the "suspension of disbelief' typical of
fictive imagination as later described by Coleridge obstructs accurate analysis of the most important aspects of life.
Aristotle seems to extend this consideration to both religion and philosophy itself. He identifies the satisfaction of belief as a particular version of the
imagination that deviates from conceptual integrity. At least by implication
he includes religious belief typified by Greek mythology as an obvious mode
of imagination with hypothetical benefits. On the second page of Book I, for
example, he offers a variety of definitions of god [with a small "g"] based on
the distinction between levels "either as nonexistent or, if existent, as logically posterior." 61 He seems to concede the emotional benefits of religion as a
useful agent of satisfaction for those with questionable deductive skills.
Then again, Aristotle suggests, philosophy itself, for example as illustrated by Plato's concept of the transcendent soul might serve the same purpose
as both poetry and the arts in general as already explained in Book I of
Metaphysics. 62 But of course this level of conceptual risk often clouds objective inquiry as well as received belief, each in its own way. As a result,
systematic analysis is more valuable whenever truth is exclusively the final
concern. Toward the end of De Anima, Aristotle suggests his rejection of
Plato's transcendent assumptions on this basis by contrasting objective judgment based on empirical evidence with optimistic creative innovation already
mentioned in Book I of Metaphysics. For just as fiction and religion too
easily lapse into obvious wish fulfillment that defies true verification, theory
supportive of questionable assumptions, no matter how complex, can be
prone to error through the subordination of meaning to belief:
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For perception of the objects of the special senses is always true and is found
in all animals, while thinking may be false as well as true and is found in none
which [do] not reason also . ... Clearly thinking is not the same as believing. 63

Whereas belief can be beneficial in bringing thought into play, productive
thought based on thorough analysis nevertheless supersedes the immediate
rewards of credulousness. There is obvious appeal in Plato's concept of the
human soul as a unique agent of transcendent godhead, but Aristotle rejects
this possibility by excluding it from consideration just as he ignores Plato's
assumptions throughout most of the text. Significantly, he identifies Plato by
name not more than twice in an entire text supposedly relevant to Plato's
primary thesis, the dominance of the soul. In contrast, he mentions such preSocratic philosophers as Anaxagoras (six times), Democritus (eight times),
and Empedocles as many as nine times. His primary consideration throughout De Anima is human consciousness, and, simply enough, Plato's theory of
soul has little to do with it.
In light of philosophy's difficulties in the sustained pursuit of the truth,
philosophy becomes Aristotle's culminating issue discussed in De Anima.
His approach anticipates the later and more advanced distinction between
idea and perception offered by the seventeenth-century English philosopher
John Locke. According to Aristotle, for example, thought and perception
necessarily differ in their respective levels of accuracy:
Perception of the objects of the special senses is true, or subject to the minimum of error. Next comes the perception that they are attributes; and at this ·
point error may come in .. . . Thirdly, there is perception of the common
attributes, that is, the concomitants of the things to which the special attributes
belong: I mean, for example motion and magnitude, which are attributes of
sensibles. And it is concerning them that sense is most apt to be deceived. 64

The binarism "motion and magnitude"- roughly comparable to mass and
motion--also suggests pre-Socratic naturalist assumptions about tangible existence, and the alternative proposed by Aristotle once again entails the role
of imagination too often in conflict with this truth. Obviously the hierarchy
he proposes here has higher levels yet. He takes it for granted that truth
exists, but he also warns that imagination-including unsubstantiated belief-necessarily distorts the truth, and he believes that philosophers should be
fully aware of this likelihood. As for the link between idea and perception
complicated by the imagination, Aristotle proposes the obvious paradox that
the human mind can often be the most prone to error at its most advanced
level of analysis. The more elaborate our thinking, the more likely our ideas
go wrong-hence by implication the greater the necessity to exercise our
cognitive skills to the best of our ability:
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Now it is clear that perception and intelligence are not the same thing. For all
animals share in the one, but only a few in the other. And when we come to
thinking, which includes right thinking and wrong thinking, right thinking
being intelligence, knowledge, and true opinion, and wrong thinking the opposites, neither is this identical with perception. 65

In their relatively simple pursuit of food and shelter, small rodents with
simpler minds might lapse into error fewer times than Plato, Aristotle, and
other philosophers whose more difficult task is to formulate their various
philosophies with conceptual adequacy. At least by implication, Aristotle
suggests that the philosopher's ability to unravel complexity at a second and
higher level is more likely to depend on a strictly cognitive function, the
valid analysis of empirical evidence. This seems to have been his final assessment of philosophy as the most advanced mental achievement, one necessarily dependent on thorough research.
IV. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

Aristotle extended his deterministic assessment of life to personal conduct
and social behavior as explained in Nicomachean Ethics, much as he did for
institutions and social practices in Politics. His basic recommendation in
these two texts was that the health and prosperity of individuals and society
as a whole depend on the collective adherence to sustained moderation according to the golden mean, a healthy intermediate position between extremes of all voluntary behavior. For all individual and social behavior, there
are two possible extremes--of excess and deficiency--and the best and most
useful choice in all instances is to choose the intermediate possibility. Of
course there will be circumstances when this cannot be done, but here again
the best choice is to not let these circumstances become habitual.
The origin of the concept golden mean seems to have preceded Aristotle
by many centuries. Carved on a temple at Delphi, "Nothing in Excess" (Medan Agan), was said to have originated with Theano, wife of Pythagoras.
Later, Heraclitus declared its benefits in fragment 116, "All men have the
capacity of knowing themselves and acting with moderation," and both Socrates, and Plato likewise advocated moderation. However, Aristotle featured
its central importance to effective human behavior in De Anima. In Nicomachean Ethics, he made this assumption even plainer:
. .. both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general
pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases
not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects,
towards the right people, with the right aim, and in the right way, is what is
both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with
regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. Now virtue
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is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure,
and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and
both these things are characteristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of
mean, since it aims at what is intermediate. 66

Since human behavior almost inevitably benefits by maintaining a benign
middle course between antithetical excesses, Aristotle advocated the pursuit
of moderation in all aspects of behavior. He linked every mode of human
performance with the need for moderation. For if moderate behavior is the
best agent of survival, the golden mean turns out to be the most suitable
standard of conduct toward such a result. Just as life enacts mass in motion,
human behavior best serves this purpose by sustaining life the most effectively.
V. AFTERWORD
Aristotle played a substantial role in the history of ancient philosophyperhaps the most influential of all--but the disordered history of his influence
was beset by difficulties that were unique. Not more than forty-seven of the
two hundred treatises he was said to have authored have survived, yet on the
whole their theoretical contribution has been even more influential than the
output of Plato or anyone else. No history of an author's productivity has
ever been as chaotic and beset with difficulties, yet his dominance, compounded by the additions of Theophrastus and Strato has been without parallel despite the misinterpretation of many of his ideas that has been almost as
universal. Written while he was a disciple of Plato, most of his early dialogues were lost and forgotten within a few generations, and the recovery of
his mature writings was accidental as already indicated in this book's Introduction. More specifically, Theophrastus, his friend and chosen successor as
the director of the Lyceum, bequeathed his collection of Aristotle's original
manuscripts to his disciple, Neleus of Scepsis, on the assumption that he
would become the Lyceum's next director. When Strato was chosen instead,
Neleus apparently refused to give up Aristotle ' s entire collection that he felt
was his rightful inheritance, and subsequently bequeathed them to his family,
who stored them in their cellar for almost two centuries without recognizing
their importance. Much later a collector, Apellicon of Teos, bought and
published them in an unedited version, but which had few if any readers. In
effect Aristotle was all but forgotten at that point. In 86 BC the Roman
general Sulla took possession of the collection, and two years later, in 84 BC,
he transported it to Rome, where the scholar Andronicus of Rhodes edited
and published it somewhere between 70 to 60 BC, two and a half centuries
after Aristotle's death. 67 Such authors as Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus,
and Diogenes Laertius were impressed by his philosophy, but there is no
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clear evidence to what extent the Roman public at large might have been
acquainted with his ideas.
Early medieval Christian philosophers initially limited their exploration
of Aristotle's texts to those upon logic, which were translated by Victorinus
and Boethius. His philosophy was preserved by such figures as Philoponus,
Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Simplicius. In response to their effort to integrate his arguments with Christian doctrine, the Emperor Justinian actually
took the remarkable step in 529 of banning the teaching of Greek philosophy
in Athens. Although all philosophy was banned, the philosopher who was
targeted seems to have been Aristotle. Except for his invention of logic, his
philosophy seems to have been widely censored.
Aristotle's influence was then limited to Arab civilization until the
twelfth century, culminating with the analyses of Avicenna and Averroes that
inspired such figures in Europe as Siger of Brabant and Albert the Great to
promote an acceptable synthesis between Aristotle and Christianity. Once
justified by appropriate interpolations, the original Latin translation of De
Anima seems to have been available by the twelfth century, and a second
translation, perhaps by Michael Scott, was available by the third decade of
the thirteenth century. Full Latin translations became available of all of Aristotle's major texts by Gerard of Cremona and, most important, by William of
Moerbeke, a close friend of St. Thomas Aquinas. By 1300, Aquinas' Summa
Theologica provided a grand synthesis that integrated Aristotle's philosophy
with Catholic doctrine. Aquinas actually quoted Aristotle 3,500 times to
document his analysis, and within a century all of Aristotle's extant theories
were taught at the University of Paris, Europe's dominant university in philosophy at the time. For a few centuries Aristotelian cosmology effectively
supplanted Platonism as the dominant synthesis between religion and philosophy.
However, by the tum of the seventeenth century such figures as Bacon,
Descartes, Hobbes, and Gassendi went on to promote their own versions of
empirical philosophy that featured experimentation to an even greater extent.
The rejection of Aristotelian assumptions also played an important role in
the division between Catholic and Protestant theology. Ironically, Protestants
rejected Catholicism based on its adherence to nominalism, an emphasis on
universals they linked with Aristotle's version of materialism. This was despite the fact that Ockham's famous "razor" proposed by the Catholic theologian William of Ockham that the simplest explanation is the usually the best
had first been suggested by Strato who was inspired by Aristotle. Since then,
Catholicism has sustained its adherence to Aristotle's perspective despite
ample evidence of his secular assumptions to be found in such texts as De
Caelo and De Anima. Few if any of the obvious interpolations have been
deleted, and respectable classicists have effectively ignored them in their
necessarily biased analysis of his arguments as a result. On the other hand,
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modem scientists almost entirely depend on data collection as initiated by
Aristotle as well as the use of experimentation as initiated by his disciple
Strato. Despite this remarkable paradox in western civilization ' s intellectual
history (but also perhaps because of it), Bertrand Russell, modem philosophy's most eminent advocate of secularism, has been able to declare in the
mid-twentieth century, " . . . after [Aristotle's] death it was two thousand
years before the world produced any philosopher who could be regarded as
approximately his equaJ."68

Chapter Five

The Lyceum after Aristotle

The Hellenistic age lasted three centuries, extending from the deaths of Aristotle and Alexander the Great to the establishment of the Roman Empire
under Augustus. During this period the city of Alexandria in Egypt supplanted Athens as both the dominant port city in the eastern Mediterranean
region and its cultural epicenter, except for the sustained pursuit of philosophy in Athens. Scientific investigation in Alexandria included the fields of
physics, biology, geology, medicine, mathematics, astronomy, and philology; and its prestigious library, the Bibliotheca Alexandrina, contained at its
peak as many as 700,000 scrolls, the equivalent of perhaps I 00,000 modem
books. The large number of astronomers and mathematicians who lived in
Alexandria included Aristarchus, Eratosthenes, Euclid, Hipparchus, Callimachus, and Apollonius of Perga as well as the inventor, Hero. On the other
hand Plato's Academy remained active in Athens, and almost as influential
were the newly established schools of Epicurus' so-called Garden and the
Stoa of Zeno where he and his disciples sought a credible synthesis of Platonism and religion. In Aristotle' s Lyceum, Theophrastus and then Strato
sustained a high level of achievement in both science and secular cosmology,
but unlike the theoretical writings of Aristotle, theirs were later almost entirely lost, leaving little documentation of their mature theoretical assumptions.
Over time, economic and political trends became more hostile to secular
philosophy. Populist collective needs prevailed at the expense of the seemingly indifferent secular philosophical speculation at odds with religion. 1
Once Rome attained victory in the Punic Wars, it became the dominant
military presence in the region, and an empire emerged that tolerated various
religions and fertility cults brought to Rome by the many immigrants from
captured territory throughout the Mediterranean region and beyond. A concomitant decline seems to have occurred in secular philosophy except for the
105

106

Chapter 5

contribution of such figures as Lucretius, Posidonius, Cicero, Plutarch, and a
diminishing assortment of their contemporaries preceding the emergence of
Christianity. In effect, the unique ideological achievement of ancient natural
philosophy seems to have undergone a gradual rise and fall that both anticipated and somewhat overlapped with the later and more famous rise and fall
of the Roman Empire.
Not that philosophy had yet displayed signs of severe decline. The materialist perspective of Aristotle ' s two remarkable disciples--Theophrastus followed by Strato--remained at a high level. The many inhabitants of Epicurus'
controversial Gardens continued to link religion with hedonism supposedly
justified by Democritus' theory of atomism, and Pyrrho's version of skepticism more or less encouraged the pursuit of religion. In contrast, Arcesilaus,
the sixth head of Plato' s Academy, abandoned Plato's doctrine of ideal
forms , instead featuring systematic disbelief based on sustained common
sense (eulogon). A century later his successor Carneades went even further
by proposing sustained analysis dependent on the question of probability.
Platonists and Stoic philosophers continued to stress transcendent assumptions, but the Aristotelians, Epicureans and Academic skeptics beginning
with Arcesilaus remained secularists, and both Strato and Cameades in particular came to be recognized as militant atheists. Carneades took disbelief to
an extreme that was arguably more aggressive than that of anyone else either
before or since.
As with Epicurus, almost the entire theoretical productivity that Theophrastus and Strato sustained at a high level throughout their lives was to be
lost to posterity. As a result there is little record of their ideas in their own
words. They may paradoxically be said to have provided the most sophisticated but least influential analysis identified with ancient secularism. Fortunately, Diogenes Laertius compiled extended bibliographies for both of them
that were even more inclusive than Aristotle's extant writings, but with little
textual evidence of their content relevant to science and cosmology.
The seven outstanding figures in secular philosophy who played significant roles during the three-century Hellenistic phase include Theophrastus
and Strato of Aristotle's Lyceum, Epicurus followed much later by Lucretius
among the so-called Epicureans, Arcesilaus and Carneades among the socalled Academic skeptics, and finally Cicero because of his early education
by tutors linked with a variety of philosophical schools, as well as his pivotal
role in history of Rome. His two remarkable dialogues, Academica and Nature of the Gods, together provide an excellent picture of secular philosophy
as a whole up to that time.
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I. THEOPHRASTUS (cA. 371-287BC)
For roughly fifty years after Aristotle ' s death the Lyceum continued to exist
as a major school of philosophy under the leadership of Theophrastus, followed by Strato as his disciple. Both were exceptionally talented, and the
school's theoretical predominance diminished only after the death of Strato.
Born with the name Tyrtamus, Theophrastus was said to have been given his
nickname by Aristotle because of his graceful style. Fourteen years younger
than Aristotle, he first studied at Plato's Academy, then seems to have left
Athens with Aristotle following Plato's death. He later joined Aristotle's
Lyceum at its inception, and when Aristotle fled from Athens to avoid prosecution, he replaced him as director of the Lyceum and retained this role for
the next thirty-six years until he himself died at the age of eighty-five. Altogether, as many as 2,000 students were said to have attended his lectures, and
unlike Aristotle, he also seems to have enjoyed a high level of popularity
among his fellow citizens in Athens throughout his life. When he was tried
for atheism, apparently for opposing animal sacrifice, he was declared innocent of the charges and became even more popular among Athenians.
Theophrastus extended Aristotle ' s research on a basis that Aristotle himself would have fully supported. In particular Theophrastus ' prolonged studies in botany justified his later status as the so-called father of botany, despite
Aristotle ' s earlier findings . He also continued to expand his inquiries into
many areas as suggested by his enormous bibliography of 741 texts, 490 of
them listed by Diogenes Laertius. According to their titles he published at
least fifty texts pertaining to science, thirty-five on human behavior, thirty on
logic, ten on religion, and at least a dozen relevant to philosophy in general,
and he authored specific studies of Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Archelaus,
Diogenes, Empedocles, and two apiece on Democritus and Plato. Unfortunately, all of these philosophical texts were lost except for his brief essay,
Metaphysics. This seems to have been found among Aristotle's lecture notes
when they were discovered and his Metaphysics is quite useful as a summary
in helping to clarify his version of cosmology as compared to Aristotle's
earlier perspective.
A single easily overlooked citation in Sextus Empiricus ' biography of
Parmenides discloses that among his twenty-nine lost scrolls upon physics,
Theophrastus published what amounted to a standard history of ancient theories about the connection between the soul and the body, in other words
between mind and conscious behavior. 2 Relevant to the concepts of Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and probably Theophrastus himself, it
seems a major split continued to exist between theories that featured
transcendent consciousness and those that emphasized mental performance
linked with physical behavior. That Theophrastus authored such a history
suggests the continuation of secular analysis, but also that he felt obliged to
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acknowledge the concept of transcendent soul in the very effort to discourage
its implications. Theophrastus summarized Aristotle's perspective with relative objectivity and displayed his ability to present controversial analysis
without provoking a hostile reaction.
Not more than eighteen pages long, Metaphysics offers a broad summary
in response to Aristotle's theories in De Anima and other late writings. There
is no hard evidence that Theophrastus wrote the text only its strong likelihood, since he alone was uniquely qualified having discussed the relevant
issues. The text's final perspective seems quite compatible with Aristotle's
assumptions, but is based on less stringent analysis. Obviously Theophrastus
wrote it in an effort to clarify Aristotle's complex arguments and present
them in a simpler and more accessible form for the general reader. In addition, he was able to perform such a task while mentioning a variety of
tangential issues far more elusive than Aristotle might have been willing to
concede. Many of Theophrastus' ideas seem retrospective, effectively the
reconsideration of arguments more closely elaborated in earlier works, but
there is also the sense that much remained to be ascertained on a more
inclusive basis.
At the beginning of Theophrastus' text several early portions seem to
promote a monotheistic version of godhead that might have been acceptable
to Plato. For example, he writes:
It is necessary, presumably, to recognize [realities] by some power and some
superiority to other things, as if it were God that we were apprehending; for the
ruling principle of all things, through which all things both are and endure, is
divine. 3

The use of italics suggests the possibility of interpolation, especially with
the additional wording, " ... for the ruling principle of all things ... is
divine." Here his insistence seems plain that a higher power dominates the
universe, and it can be most readily described as God. However, word play in
later passages suggests a pantheistic equation between the god concept and
the universe itself as a substitute for deity.
Elsewhere Theophrastus concedes that Plato had been able to apply ruling
principles to ideas, numbers, and "the things we have names [for]," but
complains of Plato having sought to "treat of the ruling principles only."
How much better, he argues, is the scientific approach he shared with Aristotle that featured the discovery and interpretation of such principles without
implying their imposition by any kind of a higher power. As opposed to
metaphysics, science should feature empirical analysis to determine the validity of ruling principles quite aside from whether they have any link with
godhead. Theophrastus emphasizes the variable freedom of the universe and
actually praises Heraclitus' startling fragment to the effect that the universe
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"is like a rubbish-heap of things thrown anyhow." 4 The standard translation
of Heraclitus' sentence features dust rather than rubbish, but the word "rubbish" bears useful connotations pertaining to a jumbled anarchy that too
often defies simplistic cause-and-effect analysis.
Just a page later, Theophrastus points out the pantheistic dilemma that
occurs if God is both the moved and mover:
And even sense-perception seems in a way to join in proclaiming that the
mover need not always, because the one acts and the other is acted on, be
different from what it moves; the same result follows ifwe apply the question
to reason itself and to God. 5

The emphasis here is decidedly pantheistic. If the universe, like God, is
both moved and the mover, it possesses comparable authority, so the two are
in effect identical at least to this extent. If one is nothing less than the product
of itself, so is the other. But the only God that can be the product of itself
would be the universe, and the only universe that can be a product of itself
would be God.
Early on in the text Theophrastus expresses doubts he shared with Aristotle about the use of binary combinations in explaining the dynamics of existence. However, he concedes on the final page that heavenly bodies "possess
order" that suggest mathematics, and he declares both that the "whole of
reality . . . consists of contraries" including the Manichaean standoff between
good and evil, virtue and vice, heaven and hell, and benevolent and hostile
gods. He also seems to concede the validity of physical binarisms between
heat and cold as suggested by Anaximander, between fire and logos as suggested by Heraclitus, and between atoms and void as suggested by Democritus. Even more basic, Theophrastus suggests, are binarisms between what
"is" and what is "not," between truth and error, and between existence
worthy of analysis and transcendent suppositions. Theophrastus softens his
wording, but the phrase, "transcendent sort of wisdom," seems obvious and
almost prophetic of the later convergence between Platonism and religious
revelation.
In Chapter VII, Theophrastus points out the important linkage between
Aristotle's texts, De Caelo and De Anima, by defining philosophy as a comprehensive explanation of both celestial motion and animal life:
It is clear that the celestial system also in its rotation . . . is a sort of life of the
universe. Surely, then, if the life in animals does not need explanation or is to
be explained only in this way, may it not be the case that in the heavens too,
and in the heavenly bodies, movement does not need explanation or is to be
explained in a special way? 6
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Here Theophrastus seems to imply the Aristotelian cosmology that all
existence partakes of cyclical infinitude in addition to the interaction among
contraries that do not need to be explained by transcendent authority. Sustained existence accordingly predominates both in the sky as demonstrated
by the endless orbits of stars and planets, and on earth by endless procreation
of life from one generation to the next as Aristotle suggested in De Anima.
In Chapter IX, the final chapter of the treatise, Theophrastus discusses the
possibility of evolution earlier suggested by both Anaximander and Aristotle:
In the case of plants and still more of inanimate things that have a nature which
is determinate, ... there seems to be some plausibility in the view that after all
it is fortuitously and by the rotation of the universe that these things acquire
certain forms or differences from one another." 7

Implicit in this somewhat confusing sentence is Darwin's notion of both
genetic variation and the improved chances of survival among variant species. Also implicit is the suggestion that all of nature very likely occurs
without the intervention of one or more gods.
Theophrastus concludes his short essay by suggesting both the modest
role of human life in the universe and the importance of the ethical distinction between good and evil in the universe:
For what is animate is a small part of the universe, and what is inanimate is
infinite; and of animate things themselves there is only a minute part whose
existence is actually better than its non-existence would be. But to say that in
general the good is something rare and found only in few things, .. . is the act
of a most ignorant person .... Rather, reality in fact is and always has been
good. 8

As far as he is concerned, human ethics that depend on religion are inconsequential compared to the benign indifference of the universe as a whole. He
also asserts that even the one or more deities worshipped by believers "cannot guide everything to what is best." 9
Theophrastus makes an abrupt transition at the very end of Metaphysics
to what seemed the theoretical incompatibility between Aristotle and Democritus' respective cosmologies. This transition is admittedly sudden, as the
topic has no obvious relevance to the issues under discussion. However, it is
significant in the history of science, for Theophrastus apparently suggests the
necessity of obtaining a synthesis between Aristotle's cyclical model of the
universe as a whole and Democritus' concept of atomism at a microscopic
level. Theophrastus himself seems to have already proposed the tentative
concept of a "micro-void" as a possible compromise between the two competitive theories of natural philosophy. Thus, he abruptly shifts his topic to
the need for sustained investigation in order to obtain a viable synthesis
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between the two seemingly incompatible perspectives. The enormous task he
proposed was obscured by his bland wording, "But at any rate these are the
questions we must inquire into." 10 Apparently he sought what would have
amounted to an ancient unified field theory and in fact, Strato did attempt
reconcile the two theories for example, by conducting experiments using a
relatively crude version of a vacuum jar he invented. His effort was doomed
to failure because of the inadequacy of his equipment, but, more significantly, his primitive effort initiated the dependence on experimentation in order
to confirm the validity of one or more theories. To this extent, at least,
Theophrastus can be said to have inspired Strato's effort as a major step
toward the remarkable achievement of modem science later reinvented by Sir
Francis Bacon.
II. STRATO OF LAMPSACUS (cA. 335-287 BC)
Strato was born in Lampsacus and was the tutor of Ptolemy II in Alexandria,
where he also played a central role in secular philosophy. He was the mentor
of several of Alexandria's most important scientists as well as the friend and
mentor of Arcesilaus, the dominant Academic skeptic in Athens at the time.
After Theophrastus' death, Strato became the third director of the Lyceum in
Athens and served in that capacity until his own death eighteen years later.
During this period he published upon a large variety of topics including
physics, ethics, cosmology, logic, psychology, and zoology among many
others. Diogenes Laertius lists specific titles of some of his lost papers including "On Chance," "On Definition," "On Justice," "On Happiness," and
"On Modes of Life." Only in recent times has Strato's extant corpus of
fragments and segments been gathered, consisting of 150 fragments and
paraphrastic summaries by as many as fifty ancient and medieval authors. 11
Simplicius salvaged seventeen of these fragments , the early doxographer
Aetius obtained sixteen, Plutarch fourteen, Sextus Empiricus seven, and Cicero four.
It can be assumed that Strato's name was stricken from the record and
that his works were all but eradicated because of his outspoken arguments
supportive of atheism. Throughout his lifetime he seems to have freely acknowledged his atheism, and it seems without threat of prosecution. However, by the late Middle Ages his contributions in both philosophy and natural
science had been almost totally erased from the history of ancient philosophy. The choice among scholars at the time appears to have been to preserve
Aristotle's contribution through a few appropriate deletions and editorial
modifications; to acknowledge Theophrastus' contribution without preserving his papers on cosmology, with the exception of Metaphysics; and finally
to ignore Strato's contribution in its entirety. He seems to have been erased

112

Chapter 5

from the record of both science and philosophy, and this omission persists
today. This is even true, for example, for two recent histories of ancient
secular philosophy, Jennifer Hecht's Doubt: A History, published in 2003,
and Tim Whitmarsh's Battling the Gods: Atheism in the Ancient World,
published in 2015. Neither mentions Strato despite the significant role he
played in the advance of secularism during the Hellenistic period. The unusual convergence at the time between the two schools, Plato's Academy under
the leadership of the skeptic Arcesilaus, and Aristotle's Lyceum under the
leadership of Strato, was itself evidence of the central role Strato played in
the history of philosophy.
As documented in Diogenes Laertius's biography, Strato's last will and
testament discloses his close friendship with Arcesilaus. Both the wording
and provisions of the will indicate strong rapport between the two, suggesting the extent to which Arcesilaus' version of Academic skepticism dominant at the time was in fact compatible with Strato's outright atheism. If true,
the earlier standoff between Plato and Aristotle's antithetical philosophies
seems to have been resolved by Strato and Arcesilaus, the two famous philosophical schools' directors, with Strato's insistence on rigorous scientific
methodology and Arcesilaus' theory of epoche as relentless skeptical inquiry.
Strato's atheism was undoubtedly linked with his effort as a scientist to
discover an inclusive theory of the physical universe that was independent of
supernatural authority. He was quoted as having boasted that he "did not
make use of the gods in explaining the origin of the world," and according to
Cicero, he further insisted, "The sole repository of divine power is nature,
which constrains in itself the causes of birth, growth, and decay, but is
entirely devoid of sensation and of form ." 12 Strato promoted two basic concepts that later became standard assumptions of scientific materialism, the
first, the so-called "Stratonician Presumption" as named by the contemporary
English philosopher, Anthony Flew. Formulated as an axiom, it declared that
any idea or supposition including the god concept must be fully substantiated
in order to be accepted as a probable truth. Implicit was the concept that the
universe is nothing more or less than its own cause and therefore provides its
own explanation:
"Whatever characteristics we think ourselves able to discern in the universe as
a whole are "underivative" [sic] characteristics of the universe itself." 13

The second concept entailed the insistence that all observable phenomena
can be explained as imminent forces of nature, much as Aristotle and Theophrastus had already implied or stated as qualified by the role of probability:

The Lyceum after Aristotle

113

... and he [Strato] says in the end that the universe itself is not animate and
that nature is subsequent to chance, for the spontaneous initiates the motion,
and only then are the various natural processes brought to pass." 14

A strictly physical universe could then be described based on principles
of determinism. Perhaps unexpectedly, the theologian Lactantius, an advisor
of the Emperor Constantine, later took this argument even further on the
assumption either that "first-principles came together at random" or that the
universe "was brought into existence by nature in an unlooked for way":
Nature ... has in itself a power of producing generation, growth and decay,
but it has no consciousness or shape, so that we may understand that all things
have .. . been produced spontaneously, not by any craftsman or originator. 15

Lactantius insisted both altematives-"random" and "unlooked for"-were "idle and impossible." However, as suggested by Plutarch, who quoted
the passage, their connection seems possible. According to Cicero in Academica, Strato insisted on the existence of a unique but explicable godless
universe:
He [Strato] declares that he [himself] does not make use of divine activity for
constructing the world. Instead, his doctrine is "that all existing things of
whatever sort have been produced by natural causes . .. dependent on the
"natural forces of gravitation and motion. 16

He implied that the universe is susceptible to scientific analysis devoid of
religious implications.
Strato also proposed that the underlying structure of matter is "particulate," and that there are only two primary qualities, hot and cold--a notion
first suggested by Anaximander. At a comparable level of abstraction, Strato
went on to explain that all existence "has been caused by natural forces of
gravitation and motion." 17 Thus, Strato was able to reduce Aristotle's explanation of motion to just two impersonal cosmic forces, the attraction of
matter and the numerous transitional displacements produced by this attraction. There was no role for any kind of a god or gods in the physical universe
proposed by Strato, and an entirely different unifying physical force was
needed. Aristotle had already mentioned gravity in both De Caelo and Metaphysics, and Strato tried to identify it more specifically and to measure its
force. 18
Strata' s most important contribution to natural philosophy was his invention of scientific experimentation to confirm the function of physical attraction and measure it as described by Aristotle. Encouraged by Theophrastus,
he apparently sought to obtain a valid synthesis between Aristotle and Democritus' respective macro- and micro-cosmic theories of physics. This
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methodology seems to have been the first of its kind to test a basic theory.
Earlier novelties such as the so-called Baghdad Battery might have been
devised to exhibit the presumed mysteries of both magnetism and static
electricity, but the use of experimentation to measure the impact of a physical
force had never been attempted before. As to be expected, the experiment
was only partially successful. However, as explained by G.E.R. Lloyd, the
importance of Strato's theory of gravity was "not so much in what [he] was
trying to prove [e.g. the fact that acceleration occurs or that falling objects
tend to cause other objects to rise] as in the way he sought to prove it." 19 On
this basis Strato seems to have invented scientific experiments, and, however
primitive his effort, it turned out to be an even more important step than
Aristotle's earlier emphasis on the accumulation of data. Aristotle had already established the importance of collected data relevant to biological sciences, but it was Strato who enlarged the scope of science to include physics
and astronomy and employed the experimental principle of "falsifiability by
observation," as explained by the twentieth century philosopher Karl Popper.
To confirm any particular explanation of the physical universe, for example
the relationship between gravitation and velocity, the experimental scientist
needs to measure evidence on a controlled basis in experimental situations
designed for exactly this purpose. The success of an experiment demonstrated the validity of a particular theory, and its failure could be just as useful in
demonstrating the need to explore possible alternatives.
Strato sought, for example, to measure the effect of gravity by dropping
an object from two different heights-less than an inch and a hundred feetin order to compare the relative effects of their impact. However crude, the
measurement of comparative differences helped to justify his seemingly obvious conclusion that acceleration occurs when anything falls and that it is a
result of gravity, ergo gravity exists to the extent that it can be measured. As
explained by Strato, "The weight of the object does not increase, the object
itself has not become greater, it does not strike a greater space of ground, nor
is it impelled by a greater [external force]; nevertheless, it moves more
quickly, thereby producing a greater impact." 20 Having dispensed with four
alternative hypotheses, Strato demonstrated the likelihood that acceleration
was influenced by "attraction" as anticipated by Aristotle and much later as
explained by Galileo. Strato confirmed this principle in his essay, "On Motion," as quoted by Simplicius. To confirm the principle of acceleration, he
also measured a falling stream of water that breaks into drops toward the
bottom of its fall, supporting the likelihood that water particles as well as
objects gather speed when they fall.
For if one observes water pouring down from a roof and falling from a considerable height, the flow at the top is seen to be continuous, but the water at the

The Lyceum after Aristotle

115

bottom falls to the ground in discontinuous parts. This would never happen
unless the water traversed each successive space more swiftly. 21

Lower portions of the stream accelerate to such an extent that they can be
observed to break loose from higher portions. As can be observed of foun• tains, the water speeds up while falling such that the lower portions of water
separate as drops from higher portions.
One step further, Strato demonstrated weight's essential role by demonstrating the more basic principle that comparative weight increases the greater downward thrust of some things (e.g. iron) as compared to others (e.g.
dirt), resulting in the upward thrust of much lighter substances (notably both
water and fire):
. . . every body possesses heaviness and moves towards the center [of the
world], but because the heavier ones settle at the bottom the less heavy ones
are forcibly squeezed out upwards by them, so that, if someone removed the
earth, water would go to the centre, and if the water, air, and if the air, fire. 22

Strato accordingly revised Aristotle's distinction between opposite forces,
one downward and the other upward, by proposing a simpler distinction
between various downward forces, some of them sufficient to force the compensatory upward thrust of others. Strato 's findings based on this experimentation were substantial. Again, his experimental analysis was later unfortunately lost or destroyed.
Aristotle and various contemporaries had already suggested numerous
valid concepts and suppositions, but none had turned to the use of experimental evidence to confirm their validity. Aristotle himself completely overlooked such an approach, with the possible exception of a brief passage in De
Caelo that mentioned different effects to be observed in a jar, and Plato
actually suggested such a mode of investigation in Timaeus only to warn
against what seemed the misguided effort to determine probability based on
powers that are limited to God. His advice may be quoted in its entirety:
There will be no difficulty in seeing how and by what mixtures the colors
derived from these are made according to the rules of probability. He, however, who should attempt to verify all this by experiment, would forget the
difference of human and divine nature. For God only has the knowledge and
also the power which are able to combine many things into one and again
resolve the one into many. But no man either is or ever will be able to accomplish either the one or the other operation. 23

Plato emphasized the limits of human intelligence compared to divine
intelligence in the ability to dispense and interpret particular truths, quite
aside from the future benefits of experimentation for almost all fields of
scientific inquiry.
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Also important in the advance of natural philosophy was Strato's text,
"On the Void," which seems to have explored in depth the possibility of
resolving what seemed a basic contradiction between Democritus and Aristotle's versions of natural philosophy. Democritus had featured discontinuity
resulting from the universal existence of void to explain the possibility of
motion, and Aristotle had featured the necessity of continuity throughout the
universe whereby all such voids are impossible. In Physics 4.6-9, he seems to
have been confident of his stance except at the very end in 217b-20-28,
where his analysis becomes confused. For Strato, however, the question was
whether some kind of a synthesis could be found on an experimental basis to
resolve this question. Theophrastus had suggested the necessity to address
this question in his last paragraph of Metaphysics; and in "On the Void"
Strato sought an acceptable theoretical synthesis by withdrawing air from a
drum in order to measure a sufficient vacuum for the purposes of analysis.
His equipment, a simple vacuum jar, was far too primitive to clarify the
question, but his ingenuity was unprecedented.
In light of modem physics there is no insurmountable contradiction between the seemingly divergent theoretical perspectives of Democritus and
Aristotle. In one sense all space is occupied by an infinite assortment of
atoms and particles, as proposed by Democritus, but, as proposed by Aristotle, these atoms and particles can also be treated as concentrations of energy
vastly smaller than the distances among them in any medium more concentrated than a perfect vacuum. Indeed, visible things do exist as "bound"
collections of atomic particles that can travel in space, but in doing so they
displace other things less tightly bound as collections of particles. To this
extent a rock necessarily displaces a loose assortment of water particles as it
drops to the bottom of a tank full of water, and in fact similar displacements
occur at a microscopic level for every motion, every manifestation of displacement.
Strato's task was to obtain a synthesis that salvaged both options and
reconciled their seemingly contradictory theories of the physical universe. As
later explained by his protege, Hero, he proposed that the exterior space of
mass consisting of atoms includes micro-voids, effectively "pockets of emptiness" that exist both within atoms and among them as well. With specific
reference to water penetrated by light, Hero went on to quote Strato's suggestion that the void inside atoms can be penetrated without obvious impact. 24
Temporary micro-voids that comprise intermittent empty space could also be
explained within objects or atoms, if not among them. 25 Again, this is evidence ofStrato's effort to obtain a synthesis between Democritus and Aristotle. According to Hero, Strato's conclusion was necessarily simplistic, but
more important, his effort anticipated modem scientific analysis totally beyond both metaphysics and ancient mythology. 26 For who else in the ancient
pursuit of "truth" resorted to experimentation preceding Strato except per-

The Lyceum after Aristotle

117

haps Aristotle? In fact, Aristotle mentions such a possibility almost incidentally at the very end of De Caelo , but there is no evidence he turned to this
level of observation on a systematic basis. 27 Moreover, Strato's relatively
awkward synthesis set a precedent for similar inductive determinations much
later in the history of science. Two such examples are the eighteenth century
discrepancy between Newton and Huygens' respective theories of light (as
particles and/or waves), and, more recently, the early twentieth century discrepancy between quantum mechanics and Einstein's theory of relativity.
Though at a far more sophisticated level of analysis, Einstein's effort in his
later years to reconcile these seemingly incompatible theories into a unified
field theory was comparable to Strato' s effort to integrate Aristotle and Democritus' theories of space.
Strato explored many additional questions on a strictly empirical basis,
including the theories of light, displacement, condensation, rarefaction, and
elasticity. Without mentioning Strato by name, Bacon drew upon his example at the tum of the seventeenth century, and with sufficient success that
experimental science has become standard since then. 28 Strato had other
insights and hypotheses that called for experimental confirmation. These
included the likelihood that hot and cold repel each other, that change is just
as unpredictable as stasis, that time is a measure of both change and rest, that
the human personality changes with age, that every living creature is capable
of thought, and that the seat of thought- thus by implication the soul itselfis located in the middle of the brain. Even today most of these issues remain
worthy of investigation.
Strato' s two successors as directors of the Lyceum, Lyco followed by
Aristo, can be considered to have been relatively inconsequential, and Aristotle's Lyceum fell into obscurity within the next few generations. However, at
the time Strato seems to have borne a substantial influence upon the scientists who gathered in Alexandria at the time. Most notably he served as the
mentor of such major astronomers and scientists in Alexandria as Aristarchus, Hipparchus, and Eratosthenes, and, as already indicated, he had been a
friend and mentor of Arcesilaus in Athens. Through Aristarchus, Strata was
also said to have had at least an indirect influence on Archimedes of Syracuse. The achievement of scientists influenced by Strato was also impressive.
In the field of astronomy, for example, Aristarchus, Eratosthenes and Hipparchus established the earth to be a sphere located in a heliocentric universe,
and among other findings they demonstrated that the sun is larger than the
earth, that the earth rotates on its axis, causing day and night, and that it
slightly tilts on its axis, resulting in the seasons. Hipparchus alone calculated
the accurate length of the year as well as the accurate sizes of the sun and
moon, and he also charted the stars. In tum, Eratosthenes successfully measured the size of the earth and suggested the possible expansion of continents,
the position of mountain chains, the geological submergence of lands (al-
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ready a topic of keen interest to Strato), and the elevation of ancient seabeds. 29
A loyal student of Strato, the mathematician and inventor Hero explored
such phenomena as the flow of water in pipes and the reflection of light rays
in short paths, and he invented a number of ingenious devices, including
siphons, fountains, an air pump, a water organ, a thermoscope, and, most
notably, the first steam engine that almost worked. In turn these scientific
and technological achievements inspired almost three hundred years of medieval Arab scientific inquiry from the ninth to the twelfth century and finally
the scientific inquiry of modern European civilization beginning with Bacon,
Galileo, and their contemporaries in the sixteenth century. Certainly Strato
was not the unique source of all these achievements, but he played a pivotal
role in linking ancient Greek materialism and modern science.
Last but not least, Strato's outspoken atheism probably helped to inspire
Carneades' later atheistic stance that was also influential. During their lifetimes, both were dominant in their respective fields. Strato was the last major
natural philosopher in the ancient tradition extending from Thales to Aristotle's Lyceum and beyond, and more than a century later Carneades in his role
as the director of Plato's Third Academy was the single most persuasive
skeptic opposed to religious belief since Strato. Not surprisingly, historians
supportive of organized religion have disregarded both of them. Everything
they produced has been lost except for fragments that are only beginning to
receive examination based on their theoretical merits.

Chapter Six

The Epicureans

I. EPICURUS (341-270 BC)

At the beginning of the Hellenistic period the most notable accomplishment
in secular philosophy, aside from Aristotle's Lyceum, was the successful
effort of Epicurus to reconcile natural philosophy with hedonistic ethics.
Epicurus was born of Athenian heritage and raised on the Island of Samos,
where he became interested in philosophy at the age of twelve. When he
reached eighteen, he went to Athens to study at Plato's Academy under
Xenocrates, and his arrival occurred at almost the same time as Aristotle fled
the city to avoid prosecution on the charge of atheism. Two years later he
himself was exiled from Athens along with a random selection of emigrants
at the orders of the dictator Anti pater. Once relocated in Colophon, he studied philosophy under Nausiphanes, a former disciple of both Democritus and
the skeptic Pyrrho. By the age of thirty-two he started his own school in
Mytilene on the Isle of Lesbos followed by a second school in Lampsacus.
Finally, in 307 he was able to return to Athens, where he purchased property
described as "the Garden," located within a mile of Plato's Academy. At this
site he both taught and practiced his version of philosophy among friends and
disciples until his death at the age of seventy-two. His motto on the front gate
to his garden was, "Here our highest good is pleasure." He attracted a large
number of disciples and was supposedly a generous patron, but his relationship with philosophers beyond his inner circle was mostly hostile. There is
no evidence of a friendly interaction with the Lyceum, even though he was a
contemporary ofTheophrastus and Strato, who seems to have lived just a few
miles away.
Epicurus' total output as an author was supposedly unmatched in size
throughout ancient history except for the transcription of Cameades' lectures
119
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by Clitomachus. Many contemporaries considered his arguments to be clumsy and unworthy of serious consideration, but he retained a large number of
disciples who lived both within his community and elsewhere. The ancient
library at Herculaneum that was destroyed by Mt. Vesuvius in 79 AD seems
to have included many papyri by and about Epicurus, and there has been an
effort to recover their texts, but as yet without success. Today, his extant
texts include three elongated letters, one of which seems a manifesto, "Letter
to Herodotus." All three are available as supplements in an appendix to
Diogenes Laertius' Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Fortunately, Lucretius
based his remarkable philosophical epic on Epicurus' arguments, and during
the Renaissance modem philosophers such as Ariosto, Gassendi, Hobbes,
and Sir William Temple proposed natural theories inspired by these arguments as well as Lucretius' interpretation.
Epicurus was criticized during his lifetime for not documenting his
sources, and to justify his self-designated role as a prophet he repeatedly
insisted that his ideas were entirely his own, not acquired from anybody
else. 1 Most obvious among the sources he neglected to credit was the atomism of Democritus, whose writings he "filched word for word" according to
Plutarch. 2 In any case he seems to have accepted Democritus' concept of
atomism without having entirely rejected the possibility of godhead. To a
certain extent his emphasis on atomism might have been linked with his
hostility to Aristotle's Lyceum located nearby in Athens. As an ethicist he
also seems to have deviated from the ethical principle of moderation advocated by Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics by emphasizing the maximization of
pleasure short of harmful consequences.
Epicurus also rejected the teachings of his single mentor Nausiphanes, a
Democritean philosopher, calling him among other things, "a jelly-fish, an
illiterate, a fraud, and a trollop." With obvious sarcasm he called Plato the
"golden Plato," and he called Plato's disciples, "the toadies ofDionysius" as
well as having described Socrates as nothing more than a buffoon. Aristotle
he dismissed as "a profligate who after devouring his patrimony took to
soldiering and sold drugs," and he similarly dispensed with Protagoras as a
"pack-carrier," Heraclitus as a "muddler," and Pyrrho as an "ignorant boor." 3
Epicurus was suspected of atheism. However, he seems to have escaped
prosecution by avoiding any discussion that would suggest the possibility. As
a result there is no clear evidence of his feelings comparable to the outspoken
atheism of such earlier figures as Diagoras and Critias as well as the candid
agnosticism of Protagoras and Simoni des. Later in De Natura Deorum, Cicero nevertheless described him as a skeptic hostile to the concept of a benevolent personal God.
To justify his religious convictions, Epicurus reinvented Homeric gods as
a host of deities who supposedly occupied a transcendent garden of their own
in a separate and inaccessible realm perhaps suggestive of his own such
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garden. Such an implied analogy could only have attracted a variety of disciples to reside in his garden. Cicero and Posidonius (one of Cicero's eminent
teachers) later suggested that Epicurus took this approach primarily in order
to avoid the fate of Socrates, Aristotle, and many others. Significantly, the
later expulsion of Epicurean disciples from other sites identified with Epicurean philosophy in Rome, Messene, Lyttus, and Phalana was always based on
hedonistic grounds rather than the charge of atheism.
The primary evidence available today regarding the materialist emphasis
of Epicurus can be found in his summary Epitome that was attached to
Diogenes' text upon Greek philosophers. This remnant of his numerous writings includes a 24-page explanation of his theory of atomism addressed to
Herodotus, an 18-page explanation of astronomy addressed to Pythocles, and
finally a short discussion of ethics and religion addressed to Menoeceus.
Epicurus' provocative advice, limited to two separate paragraphs, seems
unique in its radical departure from the secular perspective in the rest of his
text. The initial wording reads as follows in its translation by Cyril Bailey:
First of all believe that god is a being immortal and blessed, even as the
common idea of a god is engraved on men' s minds, and do not assign to him
anything alien to his immortality or ill-suited to his blessedness: but believe
about him everything that can uphold his blessedness and immortality. For
gods there are, since the knowledge of them is by clear vision. But they are not
such as the many believe them to be .. . For the statements of the many about
the gods are .. . false suppositions, according to which the greatest misfortunes
befall the wicked and the greatest blessings the good by the gifts of the gods.
For men being accustomed always to their own virtues welcome those like
themselves, but regard all that is not of their nature as alien. 4

Three pages later, however, Epicurus concluded his "Letter to Menoeceus" and included a passage that specifically rejects natural philosophy and
seems to recommend the advantage of unexamined belief suggestive of Pyrrhonian skepticism's principle of hmartia:
For, indeed, it were better to follow the myths about the gods than to become a
slave to the destiny of the natural philosophers: for the former suggests a hope
of placating the gods by worship, whereas the latter involves a necessity which
knows no placation. 5

Accept the necessity of received legends, he recommended, since· the
pursuit of scientific accuracy too easily becomes an endless obligation that
only natural philosophers can be expected to endure.
In his final sentence Epicurus also suggested such blessings can be enjoyed while alive based on the expectation of their continuance during an
afterlife. Moreover, he emphasized the value of "legends" telling of what
might have happened once upon a time as opposed to their more likely
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designation as "myths." On the other hand, he mentioned how "natural philosophers" risk their peace of mind by denying the likelihood of life after
death:
It were better, indeed, to accept the legends of the gods than to bow beneath
that yoke of destiny which the natural philosophers have imposed. The one
holds out some faint hope that we may escape ifwe honour the gods, while the
necessity of the naturalists is deaf to all entreaties. 6

However, Epicurus explained, a second and more credible destiny becomes possible, a different version of heaven provided by a "true" God:
For life has no terrors for him who has thoroughly apprehended that there are
no terrors for him in ceasing to live . . .. Death, therefore, the most awful of
evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when
death is come, we are not. 7

If heaven does not exist, death simply consists of non-existence, which is
nothing to be afraid of. As later explained by Sextus Empiricus, this second
alternative-the absence of life after death- consists of total obliteration and
therefore by implication the total absence of negative experience:
Death is nothing to us; for what is dissolved is senseless, and what is senseless
is nothing to us. Inasmuch as we are compounded of soul and body, and death
is a dissolution of soul and body, when we exist death does not exist (for we
are not being dissolved), and when death exists we do not exist, for through the
cessation of the compound of soul and body we too cease to exist. 8

The Roman historian Pliny later described this symmetrical principle in
even simpler terms: "All men are in the same state from their last day onward
as they were before their first day, and neither body nor mind possesses any
sensation after death, any more than it did before birth." 9
In the debate he constructs in, De Natura Deorum, written perhaps 250
years later, Cicero specifically addressed the issue of Epicurus' insincerity
pertaining to religious belief. Delegated by Cicero as the debate's spokesman
of skepticism, the individual identified as Cotta insisted that Epicurus did not
really believe in the gods, and for the most part that he argued otherwise to
avoid ostracism. 1 Cotta also suggested that Epicurus featured the indifference of gods to human destiny in order to encourage their rejection among
his followers . In response to Cotta, Cicero conceded his own doubts about
Epicurus' religious belief by mentioning that he did not seem particularly
vigorous in his defense of their existence. What Cicero also found bothersome about the gods described by Epicurus was their utter indifference to
everything else that seemed to matter. 11 Perhaps two hundred years after
Cicero's debate, Sextus Empiricus likewise mentioned a contradiction. Epi-
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curus seems to have affirmed the existence of a God but without at all
exploring its supposed relationship with the universe. 12 The possibility of
sustained hypocrisy on the part of Epicurus, as both Cicero and Sextus Empiricus suggested, seems justified in light of circumstances at the time. Socrates had already been martyred for his supposed atheism; both Anaxagoras
and Pericles' mistress, Aspasia, had barely escaped the same fate only because of Pericles' impassioned defense in the public forum; and the sculptor
Phidias had been imprisoned for impiety only to die soon afterwards, Theophrastus had been tried and acquitted for impiety, the hedonist philosopher
Theodorus had been banished for impiety, both Diagoras and Aristotle had
fled Athens for their lives on similar charges, and Protagoras had taken flight
only to die at sea. Epicurus could hardly be blamed for his effort to avoid a
comparable fate, nor can it be forgotten that even the venerable Plato, disciple of Socrates, had recommended the execution of all mature atheists in the
final paragraph of his final text in Laws X.
Relevant to cosmology, Epicurus supported Melissus' thesis as explained
by Aristotle that "the sum of things is infinite," and that infinitude characterizes the physical universe in all of its dimensions. He also agreed with
Parmenides that the entire physical universe always existed and always shall.
He rejected creation stories and the notion of a judgment day, his own version of the conservation of matter having been strictly in agreement with
Parmenides' argument that there is no possibility of either initial creation or
any kind of termination:
The sum total of things was always such as it is now, and such it will ever
remain. For there is nothing into which it can change. For outside the sum of
things there is nothing which could enter into it and bring about the change. 13

Here in three sentences Epicurus summarized with forceful clarity the
Eleatic stance of both Parmenides and Melissus as well as Aristotle's basic
assumption in Physics, Metaphysics, and De Caelo . Moreover, Epicurus'
insistence that "nothing" that exists outside "the sum total of things" would
seem to have referred to the existence of heaven beyond the physical universe. By implication there could be no edge to the universe beyond which an
independent realm of God, heaven, or hell might be located. Epicurus accordingly reiterated Melissus' most basic principle already accepted by Aristotle:
Now the sum of things [i.e. the universe] is not discerned to comparison with
anything else: hence, since it has no extremity, it has no limit; and since it has
no limit, it must be unlimited or infinite. 14

This shared assumption seems in full accord with contemporary estimates
by astronomers that our particular galaxy, containing many billions of stars,
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is but one among an infinity of others and that all stars in the sky--and
possibly all stars in other galaxies as well--average one planet apiece. The
remarkable infinitude suggested by Epicurus seems to have been confirmed
by modem astronomy.
Epicurus' principal deviation from Aristotle's version of physics was that
he fully accepted Leucippus and Democritus' theory of the atom as the very
smallest component of the universe without any kind of void within it. 15
Therefore, he argued that further divisions of particles smaller than the atom
are impossible if atoms lack the space (or void) in which these smaller
particles can exist. Epicurus went even further by maintaining that without
exception all material differences result from the interaction among fast and
slow atoms and big and small atoms, but that nothing exists smaller than
atoms, and that the space that separates them is necessarily empty.
In order to explain random motion and the freedom of the will, Epicurus
might have suggested elsewhere, if not in his texts that have survived, that
falling atoms swerve slightly to one side at the bottom of their fall, providing
microscopic impetus with unpredictable results. For if atoms swerve, if ever
so slightly, variation becomes possible that defies predictability at all levels
of existence. Even free will could be explained as an aspect of consciousness
that was ultimately derivative of the swerve of atoms. The modem reader
knows of this hierarchic theory of variation supposedly proposed by Epicurus
only because Lucretius later submitted it to his own analysis identified as a
clinamen. In De Rerum Natura, however, Cicero criticized the concept as an
extravagant supposition, in fact more absurd than anything else suggested by
Democritus. Why would Epicurus have proposed this? It seems he wanted to
transcend the stark inevitability of determinism at the expense of freedom at
every level beginning with the interaction of atoms. According to Cicero,
however, the concept of such a "swerve" was effective in discrediting Epicurus' version of atomism more than if he had simply abandoned his effort in
defense of free will. 16 However, Epicurus himself did not address the topic in
his Epitome, and Cicero insisted that Democritus had never suggested such a
possibility.
Over the centuries, however, the swerve has continued to intrigue many
supporters and detractors of both Epicurus and Lucretius. Jonathan Swift
resurrected the concept to ridicule the atomism of Gassendi as scientific
nonsense, but Karl Marx more favorably explored its implications in his
doctoral dissertation, and the prestigious early twentieth-century quantum
physicist, Niels Bohr, still later suggested its relevance to modem laws of
chance. Whatever its validity, the concept effectively demonstrates Epicurus'
willingness to explore theoretical possibilities beyond Democritus' basic atomist concept.
Like Aristotle, Epicurus can be identified as having been a behaviorist in
his analysis of human consciousness. He described visual perception as the
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interpretation of "outlines" or "films" that emanate from surfaces, producing
an image, or "presentation," which can be interpreted by the brain. All such
sensations are both "true" and "quick as thought" in the sense that they are
instantaneously perceived. Then again, he insisted that feelings and preconceptions can also be valid, and that various assortments of these may contradict each other now and again, justifying the effort to determine their respective truth. He also proposed that both falsehood and error are the inevitable
results of "the intrusion of opinion," and that scientific method is needed to
minimize this threat, for " it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it
attempts to infer the unknown from the known." 17 Here again, as suggested
by Aristotle throughout De Anima, inductive observation confirms its own
truths despite the possibility of contradiction with the observations of others
or even with one' s own observation at other times. When such disparity
arises, it becomes necessary to renew investigation on an even more systematic basis.
·
It was the concept of soul (or psyche) that determined Epicurus' theoretical preference for Aristotle's secularism rather than the god concept advocated by Plato. Without mentioning either Plato or Aristotle by name, Epicurus
supported Aristotle' s assumptions based on what seems to have been an
anatomical explanation, "that the soul is a corporeal thing, composed of fine
articles, dispersed all over the frame. " Because of the fineness of its particles
Epicurus argued that the soul "keeps in touch with the rest of the frame" and
"has the greatest share in causing sensation." 18 This explanation suggested
the need to explore the full complexity of brain physiology, though Epicurus
obviously risked absurdity in explaining the unique status of soul as a portion
of the body "composed of the smoothest and roundest of atoms, far superior
in both respects to those offire." 19
Epicurus also proposed a general analysis of mental behavior as a manifestation of soul that was based on neural interactivity without any suggestion of transcendent spiritual implications:
An empty space cannot itself either act or be acted upon, but simply allows
body to move through it. Hence those who call soul incorporeal speak foolishly. For if it were so, it could neither act nor be acted upon. But, as it is, both
these properties, you see, plainly belong to the soul. 20

We could say today that mental behavior depends on interaction among
cranial "atoms" (i.e. brain cells) as well as the empty space that separates
these cells. As opposed to Plato, who had treated soul as an incorporeal
substance that both subsumes and transcends the physical universe, Epicurus
maintained that consciousness is a product of biology that provides an organized response to external agents, for example perception of danger and the

126

Chapter 6

appetite for food. Like Aristotle, he identified consciousness as primarily a
function of the body rather than transcendent spirit.
Epicurus also explained the whole body as the product of multiple sensations that "give the body its own permanent nature."--or, more precisely, in
the words of Sextus Empiricus, its "stable existence." 21 Epicurus further
explained that all modes of consciousness "have their own characteristic
modes of being perceived and distinguished, but always along with the whole
body in which they inhere and never in separation from it." 22 Behavior as the
outcome of holistic physiology was what mattered rather than spiritual purity.
It might well have been the idea of interactive harmony within the body
that motivated Epicurus's pursuit of harmony in all aspects of life. He actually mentioned Heraclitus' notion of "globular masses of fire," to warn against
disagreeable human relationships, and he added, "[We] must hold that nothing suggestive of conflict or disquiet is compatible with an immortal and
blessed nature." 23 His reference to an "immortal" nature might suggest the
Eleatic notion of permanent motion without beginning or end, but he seems
to have primarily concerned himself with its more immediate manifestation
as felt ambivalence regarding conflict and disquiet. And what exactly was the
better solution for coping with such problems--religion or secular efficiency?
To explain and eliminate difficulties linked with this choice, he argued, "We
must hold that to arrive at accurate knowledge of the cause of things of the
moment is the business of natural science." Science was essential in determining the truth at least to this extent, but it seems not to have justified his
total abandonment of the gods.

II. LUCRETIUS (cA. 99-55 BC)
As secular philosophy's grand epic poet, Lucretius is thought to have been as
talented a poet as Homer and Virgil and in addition, expanded his subjects to
write about science and human destiny rather than received mythical history.
There is little biographical information about his life beyond a brief passage
in St. Jerome's chronicle of the fourth century AD, which mentions that he
had been poisoned in his youth by a love philter and had spent the rest of his
life alternating between insanity and intense creativity while writing his
grand epic, On the Nature of Things (De Rerum Natura). Just before its
publication he committed suicide at the age of forty-four, when he was said
to have been fully satisfied only with the final draft of Book I. Apparently,
Cicero helped him revise De Rerum Natura and may also have played a role
in obtaining its publication, as a letter from Cicero to his brother after Lucretius' death suggests. Cicero also seems to have expressed ambivalent praise,
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"Many brilliant passages of genius, yet much technique. " 24 It seems he admired Lucretius' secular vision even more than his poetic skill.
Lucretius achieved a unique synthesis between Homeric inspiration and
the empirical perspective of Epicurus and natural science in general. His only
predecessor of comparable talent among Latin poets was Quintus Ennius,
and except for Cicero's occasional assistance as a copy editor, no other
contemporaries seem to have influenced him, with the possible exception of
Catullus, a close friend of the decadent aristocrat Memmius, to whom Lucretius dedicated his epic. On the other hand, Lucretius was primarily inspired
by the writings of Epicurus that were then still accessible, and it may be
assumed that these texts included Epicurus' principal work, On Nature (Peri
Physeos), whose title probably influenced Lucretius' choice of his own title.
As a poet Lucretius' singular accomplishment was in having rendered in
unmatched dactylic hexameters his own synthesis of materialist assumptions
that Epicurus and various pre-Socratic philosophers had already declared in
prose. His sentences were appropriately poetic, but their content was analytical with the purpose of promoting his theory. He addressed a broad range of
topics that included sense perception, celestial motion, volcanic eruption,
thunderstorms, atomic structure, gravity waves, and finally an apocalyptic
depiction of the fifth-century Athenian plague earlier described by Thucydides. Many of the topics he discussed-including the controversial theory of
swerving atoms (clinamen)--were probably inspired by On Nature, though he
also seems to have been aware of the major pre-Socratic materialists as well
as scientific findings during the two centuries since Epicurus' death.
If there was a single theme of the entire text, it would seem best expressed
in his dedication to Book IV," . .. and I proceed to set free the mind from the
fast bonds of religious scruples." Unfortunately, this avowal has been too
often ignored in modem translations. The relatively modem Rouse and Smith
version, for example, uses the neutral word superstition, despite Lucretius
himself having used the Latin word religio, whose simplest translation seems
obvious. 25 In contrast, Karl Marx employed vigorous epithets in quoting the
passage, both "the shackles of religion" and "the opium of religion," and
Lucretius might have found his translation entirely acceptable. In his dedication of Book I, for example, having promised to explain the inception of the
universe as a product of the gods, he shifted to its natural manifestation and
soon enough dispensed with the role of gods:
For I will essay to discourse to you of the most high system of heaven and the
gods and will open up the first beginnings of things, out of which nature gives
birth to all things and increase and nourishment, and into which nature likewise dissolves them back after their destruction. These we are accustomed in
explaining their reason to call matter and begetting bodies of things and to
name seeds of things and also to term first bodies, because from them as first
elements a!l things are. 26
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Somehow the topic got reversed, since nature, not the gods, was said to
have served as the agent of change. Lucretius then suggested his own epic
vision oflife and death without resurrection as inspired by Epicurus, who had
remained in Athens after its 430 BC plague in order to promote his secular
vision:
... a man of Greece [i.e. Epicurus] ventured first to lift up his mortal eyes to
her face and first to withstand her to her face. Him neither story of gods nor
thunderbolts nor heaven with threatening roar could quell ... 27

Lucretius thereupon shifted his topic to nature by introducing the concept
of seeds to suggest both an evolutionary and effectively cyclical transition of
biological generation throughout the history of the universe, dependent on
sustained procreation rather than incessant intervention by one or more gods.
Due to literary convention, Lucretius first dedicated Book I to Venus, the
mythical goddess of love, but then he extended his dedication to include his
ostensible friend and patron Memmius, supposedly Venus' favorite disciple.
However, this allusion may have been insulting, especially in light of Book
IV's invocation, in which Lucretius described the pursuit of sexual love as
nothing better than "dumb desire." As an exile in Athens at the time, Memmius seems to have responded by purchasing much of the site of Epicurus'
Garden and according to some accounts, he even had Epicurus' house tom
down to be replaced by his own.
Lucretius finally shifted his dedication to Epicurus, who had lived three
centuries earlier. He declared his full agreement with Epicurus' dependence
on science and stated that his own first principle was the relative permanence
of the physical universe, a position contrary to his later obsession with the
likelihood of eventual catastrophe. Lucretius went on to propose several
credible assumptions linked with his principle of permanence: (1) . .. that
nature sooner or later restores everything to its original components; (2) that
nature does not cause the destruction of anything until there is sufficient
force to make this happen; (3) that things cannot be destroyed on a separate
basis, suggesting the likelihood of more inclusive destruction; (4) that no
single thing comes to an end without somehow causing disruption; and (5)
that nothing visible totally passes away, since nature somehow compensates
for its loss through the creation of something else. 28 Lucretius also offered a
sixth corollary, the somewhat ominous principle that "nature takes effect
though the manifestation of bodies unseen," with the result that "the initial
stage [i.e. creation] cannot be easily observed." 29 The first, fourth and fifth
corollaries suggest the influence of Democritus and the third conveys Lucretius' apocalyptic obsession best typified by the Athenian plague earlier described by Thucydides.
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Lucretius' second basic principle was based on Epicurus' notion of density inspired by Democritus that nothing is packed in a solid mass. In other
words, everything is surrounded by void. 30 He argued, as had both Democritus and Epicurus, that without this void, motion would be impossible. As
before, empty space seemed essential to the movement of matter from one
site to another, from one level of existence to another. In the words of
Lucretius, "Either movement is not possible for all bodies, or void exists
intermingled with everything, so each thing is able to initiate movement." 31
Lucretius' third principle was based upon the essentially binary assumption of Leucippus and Democritus: that the entire universe consists of two
entities--bodies and void in which these bodies can move in any direction. 32
In light of this dualism between atoms and the empty space among them,
Lucretius excluded the involvement of any additional force or element in
nature, presumably including the concepts of transcendent soul and/or supernatural authority. 33 Here, as elsewhere, Lucretius did not mention the role of
God or gods, but the holistic limitations of his interpretation again suggested
the exclusion of supernatural intervention as an aspect of nature. There was
no room for the influence of gods in the universe he described.
Like Democritus and Epicurus, Lucretius identified the atom as the smallest particle of matter with a unity of its own as a "solid singleness." 34 He
further expanded the idea by proposing that combinations of atoms occur as a
result of a " variety of connexions, weights, blows, concurrences, and motions," and for the most part, he suggested, these are activated by fire, the
primary agent of motion suggested much earlier by Heraclitus and Empedocles. However, he expressed his doubt whether fire itself is a basic substance.
He conceded that the universe itself consists of fire , but suggested that in the
final analysis such a possibility had "gone far astray from the truth." 35 What
he overlooked, of course, was the abstract principle of energy symbolized by
fire, providing the useful dichotomy between mass and energy in currency
since the mid-nineteenth century.
While Lucretius expressed his doubts about Heraclitus' supposedly frivolous philosophy, he accepted the possibility of fire as one of the four basic
elements within Empedocles' more inclusive model of a cyclical interaction
among earth, air, water, and fire . He -also suggested the beginning of the
universe as well as its destruction saying that things "go back to heaven and
its fires for a beginning," as might be suggested by the contemporary Big
Bang theory, since "all things may not return utterly to nothing." 36 He took
into account Anaxagoras ' notion of homoemeria whereby minute particles
play an identical role in the overall composition of larger body parts--for
example particles within atoms, atoms within molecules, and as well as the
countless cells that compose any particular organ. 37 He also accepted Anaxagoras' supposition "that all things are hidden immingling in all things." 38
Copper, he thought, includes all other metals and elements in its atomic

130

Chapter 6

structure quite aside from the dominance of its particular substance. "We
may be aware that things do not commingle in other things, but seeds shared
by many things are somehow able to immingling in things. " 39 If the definition of"seeds" [semina] can be stretched to refer to protons and electrons in
the atomic structure of elements, what might otherwise seem absurd becomes
a reasonable supposition.
As already suggested by Aristotle as well as the early pre-Socratic philosophers Anaximander and Anaximenes, Lucretius declared that the entire universe is infinite and exists in incessant motion at every level. 40 He also
accepted the existence of void as space adjacent to mass, which permits
motion as the most basic function of the universe as explained by both
Anaxagoras and Democritus. Of course, he would add the qualification that
particular kinds of motion eventually complete themselves when first beginnings end through final destruction--as when Lucretius argues that all things
terminate whenever matter has somehow been diverted and can no longer be
supplied. 41 It is in the final portion of Book VI that he addresses how this
process can be expected to bear a negative impact on human survival itself.
On one hand, Lucretius argued that everything is held together by a
principle of weight or attraction as explained by the words "yearning for the
middle." 42 Today, this force is identified as gravity but Lucretius suggested
that the principle extends to other processes that involve clustering on a
much larger scale, for example galaxies and undoubtedly the universe as a
whole. However, he specified that there can be no inclusive middle since the
universe is infinite, and he suggested that the impact of thrust opposed to
gravity might ultimately precipitate a cataclysmic outcome beyond anything
that Epicurus was able to suggest in his Epitome.
It is mistaken to limit Lucretius' sources to Epicurus' interpretation of
Democritus and Leucippus. Their influence was certainly important, but
Book I also contains basic concepts linked with other pre-Socratic figures
such as Thales, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Melissus, and Empedocles, who was
supposedly Lucretius' favorite pre-Socratic philosopher. As to be expected,
Lucretius ignored Plato, and he did not mention Aristotle's contribution in
his explanation of cosmology despite his expression toward the end of Book
I ofhis indebtedness to Aristotle's theoretical concept of mass in motion. The
probable explanation for this omission is that he might not have been aware
of Aristotle's texts that seem to have been brought to Rome in unpublished
manuscripts during his final years. Of course Aristotle was remembered as a
principal disciple of Plato, but his texts on cosmology were not yet available.
Thus, it seems likely that Lucretius' knowledge of Aristotle's mature work
was superficial, and that he affirmed the concept of mass in eternal motion
without fully understanding its implications. Lucretius' first book of his epic
accordingly offers a piecemeal cosmology that bridges the gap between the
philosophies of Epicurus and Aristotle, but with a sense of cataclysmic de-
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cline beyond anything they themselves had proposed. Lucretius accepted
their shared versions of cyclical occurrence, but he added the inevitable
likelihood of collective destruction, for example, to body parts upon death,
the collapse of society, etc. If earlier natural philosophers, with the possible
exception of Heraclitus, could be described as cosmic optimists confident of
sustained harmony, Lucretius warned of an unavoidable cataclysmic outcome.
Book II begins with a rambling invocation in which Lucretius paid his
ironic respects to ancient mythology by describing nature as a mother goddess, a fertile deity of birth and growth. He drew upon prehistoric matriarchal
religion to be able to assign to nature itself a generic role that affects all
aspects of life. As for the issue of whether gods have personal identities, he
declared his preference for supernatural motherhood as a principle of intrinsic growth. Insisting that the world is round, he explained that just as seeds
symbolize the vital transition from one generation to the next, the entire earth
symbolizes global sustenance through procreation.
The remainder of Book II deals more extensively with topics already
mentioned in Book I, for example Lucretius' concern about the unseen motions in matter as well as his concept of"up and down" that implies the force
of gravity. 43 He declared his approval of Epicurus' emphasis on both the
difference between smooth and hooked atoms and the slight swerve of atoms
when they complete their fall as the effect of gravity. As earlier indicated, he
suggested the importance of this swerve (clinamen) as an agent of freedom
linked with atomic structure that provides spontaneity and even the principle
of free will. Without this additional factor, he suggested, an otherwise deterministic universe would never have produced anything. 44 The most provocative assertion by Lucretius in Book II, perhaps linked with the swerve, was
his suggestion that there is far too much erratic behavior in the universe for it
to have been devised by supernatural authority, "so great are the faults it
stands endowed with." 45 Lucretius also paid his obligatory respect for Epicurus' notion of gods sequestered in their own garden elsewhere in the universe "far removed and from our affairs." 46 Like Epicurus, he used this
heavenly tableau for ironic purposes, in his case by ridiculing the authority of
these gods as opposed to the inner power of nature that incessantly recreates
itself without the intervention of any force beyond itself.
Lucretius went so far as to predict the existence of life elsewhere in the
universe. He argued that if there is endless space in all directions, as first
maintained by Melissus, it seems unlikely that our spherical earth is unique
unto itself and different from any number of similar bodies in outer space
that are also the product of nature and therefore just as likely to have evolved
from similar origins. 47 Noteworthy in this passage is Lucretius' confidence
that other worlds elsewhere might be similar to our own and that the origin of
life perhaps involved some version of the swerve.
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Book II ends with another reference to mother earth identified as nature,
and Lucretius rejects creationism except as a genetic process of nature that
suggests the concept of evolution:
For it is not true, as I think, that the races of mortal creatures were let down
from high heaven by some golden chain upon the fields, nor were they sprung
from sea or waves beating upon the rocks, but the same earth generated them
which feeds them now from herself. 48

The allusion in this passage was to Homer's suggestion in Book VIII of
The Iliad that a golden chain suspended from heaven symbolized Zeus's
overwhelming authority, a concept that Lucretius found ridiculous. Instead,
he insisted on the inevitability of the growth and decline of both the individual and the species as a whole. In other words, all biological entities feed on
their environment as long as they are able to grow, then decline and die
"since food sooner or later fails advanced age. " 49
Book III begins by linking spirit with mind as a function of the body just
as Aristotle had done in De Anima. Whereas Plato had identified spirit or
soul--or simply mind--as a universal principle dominant across the universe,
Lucretius assigned it to the biological realm as conscious behavior essential
for the purposes of survival. Lucretius more explicitly claimed that thought
plays a comparable role with the function of hands, feet, and eyes, in the
composition of the human being. He also suggested that intelligence and
spirit merge and coexist in the unique realm of the mind, though he located
this function within the chest near the heart rather than the skull.
Lucretius explained death as the departure of both heat and breath (a
"vital wind"), and suggested (in light of Anaximenes) that death occurs when
the heart no longer pumps oxygen as a "vital wind" needed to produce "heat
mixed with air" throughout the body. He also insisted that death results in the
complete cessation of life. Like Epicurus he argued that there is no afterlife-that upon death "heat and wind abandon our frame." 50 Moreover, he
repeatedly asserted in particular that the notion of an afterlife whereby the
mind (i.e. the "soul") can somehow be prolonged is not possible: "When we
shall no longer be, then sure enough nothing at all will be able to happen to
us, who will then no longer be ..." 51 He concluded Book III with the
bothersome paradox that in the end the elongation of life has no impact on
the eternity of death." 52 Whereas the passage of life can be subjected to
temporal measurement, lifelessness persists forever, both before we are born
and after we die.
In Book IV, Lucretius shifted his argument to explore the body's senses
in greater detail, particularly visual perception. He explained the senses are
the primary source of the truth and argued that they cannot be refuted. 53 His
insistence might seem arguable today, but science necessarily depends on the
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collection and analysis of observable data. Any hypothesis, the God concept
included, can only be accepted on a tentative basis until adequate supportive
evidence provides confirmation. Lucretius accordingly proposed an effective
analogy between sloppy science and the design and construction of a house
by incompetent architects and carpenters:
As in a building, if the rule first applied is warped, and the square is untrue and
deviates from its straight lines, and if there is the slightest flaw in any part of
the level, all the construction must be faulty, .. . so too all reason of things
must needs prove to you, distorted and false, which is founded on false
senses. 54

The analogy between "false senses" and bad carpentry has possible applications to religion and any conceptual system that might favor a loose assortment of assumptions on a flawed holistic basis. Whatever system of thought
depends on unverifiable assumptions is just as vulnerable to collapse as the
unstable building produced by hasty architects and their ineffectual carpenters.
In Book V, Lucretius offered a history of the earth from its first origins to
its anticipated final cataclysmic annihilation. Comparable to the process of
growth and decay at every level of existence, he argued, the earth itself is
confronted with the same fate. He challenged the accepted religious assumption among his contemporaries that the earth and sky will exist forever.
Instead, he offered a totally different prediction as suggested in the Bible's
Book of Revelation that the entire world is vulnerable to cataclysmic destruction. He suggested the possibility of earthquakes, and even warned of a heat
wave comparable to global warming as a possible source of destruction. 55
Today his prognostication seems at least possible. Contrary to Christ' s prediction of a judgment day within the lifetime of his disciples, Lucretius
reassured his readers that a final cataclysmic outcome is inevitable but can be
expected in the distant future , since "the world is young and new, and it is not
long since its beginning." 56
Lucretius proposed that meanwhile tumultuous destruction happens on a
limited basis throughout history, as a result of countless circumstances. As
for human destiny, he argued, its future is necessarily limited to the span of
history with which we are familiar. He then shifted his emphasis to such
human issues as wealth, royalty, clothes, labor, language, the use of fire, and
even the arts. In an eighty-line segment he explained the institution of religion as a manifestation of collective behavior and proposed that humanity
invented anthropomorphic worship of polytheistic gods to cope with its ignorance of natural phenomenon. 57 He also identified worship as a product of
fear, especially fear of wholesale destruction, exactly the collective destina-
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tion he predicted. Here a major transition occurred in Lucretius' text, as ifhe
intended to suggest that nothing was left to be said about religion.
Lucretius begins his final segment, Book VI, by renewing Epicurus' insistence on the acceptance of the laws of nature rather than the possibility of
intervention by the gods. Through ignorance and blind reasoning, he insists,
did people "abase their spirits" because of the fear of the gods. In effect, their
ignorance of physical causes compels them to depend on the authority of the
gods for what they cannot otherwise understand. To whatever extent the gods
might exist, he declares, nature's destructive impact should be attributed to
nature itself rather than supernatural interference. Lucretius goes on to furnish an exhaustive analysis of thunder, lightning, wind, fire, waves, tornados,
earthquakes, volcanoes, landslides, floods, and other such natural threats in
order to demonstrate that their occurrence is entirely a product of nature and
has no relationship to the intentions of hypothetical gods or their relevance to
human affairs. He also warns of sulphur, poisons, poisonous plants, the air in
gold mines, and even the habit of hot baths after meals.
Lucretius then shifts his discussion to the magnetic attraction between
iron bodies as a harmless but inexplicable force, suggesting that its unique
powers nevertheless exemplify the necessity for thorough investigation by
"exceedingly roundabout ways" to find an explanation. His wording "roundabout ways" perhaps suggests experimentation as a staple of scientific methodology already explored by Strato, but Lucretius made no reference otherwise to Strato's example. Today what seems amazing is that Lucretius' emphasis on the essential role of magnetism would not be adequately explained
until Gilbert's findings at the tum of the seventeenth century. With unusual
foresight, Lucretius drew upon what seemed the inexplicable example of
magnetism to propose the likelihood of "continual flow and discharge"
among such phenomena as sounds, odors, heat, and the spray of ocean
waves, all of which "disperse in every direction around [such that] there is no
delay, no rest to interrupt the flow." Moreover, the porous aspect of matter
also seems to apply to stone, wood, gold, etc. as compared to iron, suggesting
that the full explanation of these differences might help to explain why iron
is the principal agent of magnetism. 58 Even air differs from the absolute void,
he argues, since it is "forever buffeting things" and flows towards the void as
earlier suggested by Anaximenes. 59 In this instance, he proposes, an invisible
current might be possible--much as occurs for electricity. He returns once
again to the analogy with seeds. No less undetectable in their flow, he proposes, are biological and non-biological seeds [semina] that possess comparable freedom in their passage through space. Lucretius suggests that many
seeds are conducive to one's health--even essential to life--but that others can
be dangerous, and might even cause plague and pestilence that bring destruction to an entire community.
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In bringing his unique epic of natural philosophy to a close, Lucretius
provides a vivid description of such a plague that can be expected "like cloud
or mist, causing commotion wherever it goes and compelling change." 60 He
devotes his final 150 lines to a description of the Plague of Athens from 430
to 426 BC as described by the Greek historian Thucydides, who like Epicurus actually survived the ordeal. It has been estimated that between one-third
and two-thirds of the Athenian population died in this catastrophe at the
beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Lucretius' graphic description of the
plague is both vivid and disturbing, and the question is why he chose this
particular catastrophe to culminate his seemingly disinterested natural history
of the universe. He had earlier concurred with Epicurus's effort to promote
the concept of a benign physical universe without effective godhead. However, he seemed to abandon Epicurus' cosmic optimism when he describes how
an entire population was destroyed by an epidemic that was followed by the
collapse of Athens, the most advanced city in the world at the time. Lucretius
seems to have felt that this particular example effectively predicted the ultimate fate of the entire world sometime in the indefinite future. 61
Lucretius committed suicide soon after completing his text. His depiction
of total catastrophe might have been inspired by his advanced illness and
may have encouraged his choice to resort to self-destruction. In any case his
apocryphal vision of eventual destruction was far more pessimistic than the
indifferent concept of determinism featured in earlier times.

Chapter Seven

Skepticism

Skepticism played a major role in Greek philosophy since its beginning. PreSocratic philosophers doubted Homeric myth as well as having entertained
doubts about the validity of their respective theories. For an entire generation
the Sophists of Athens challenged received assumptions relevant to almost
every issue, and even Platonism can be explained as a byproduct of the
skepticism taught by Socrates as opposed to versions of disbelief featured by
the rest of the Sophists. Within the next century skepticism inevitably split
into competitive schools. On one hand Pyrrhonian skeptics featured orthodox
belief as a choice just as valid as any other, since no "truth" could be proven
to be absolutely valid. In effect they insisted that believers can and ought to
depend on the supposed knowledge they find the most acceptable. In
contrast, Academic skeptics led by Arcesilaus, the director of Plato's Academy almost a century after Plato, emphasized the uncompromising pursuit of
truth based on persistent inquiry. On a systematic basis this approach necessitated the pursuit of the best and most credible explanation as confirmed by
valid evidence. Academic skepticism predominated throughout the Hellenistic period until the time of Cicero, perhaps a generation before Pyrrhonian
skepticism came to the fore again. Both versions of skepticism, the Pyrrhonian and Academic schools, were later displaced by more affirmative ideological pursuits that included stoicism, the worship of populist deities, and
ultimately Christian religious conversion imposed by the Emperor Constantine. Only then was philosophical doubt entirely quashed.
The collective obsession with doubt among an assortment of ancient
Greek thinkers deserves closer examination. In its original definition, the
word skeptic simply referred to one who inquires or investigates, but both
Pyrrhonian and Academic skeptics stressed the willing "suspension of assent" (epoche) while pursuing better and more acceptable answers. Accord137
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ing to Pyrrho and his followers, peace of mind (ataraxia) is finally attained
through the tentative acceptance of received beliefs based on the assumption
that no truth is fully verifiable in the final analysis. Paradoxically, if no truth
can be entirely confirmed--perhaps with this single exception that none can
be confirmed--the qualified tolerance of all supposed truths, including received belief, is entirely justified. Academic skeptics rejected this conformist
logic by imposing more stringent demands in the pursuit of truth, first when
Arcesilaus insisted upon the necessity of rigorous common sense (eulogon),
and almost a century later when Carneades added the more definitive task of
establishing the probability of supposed truths, for example by employing
Aristotle's deductive logic as well as the use of experimentation introduced
by Strata.
Skepticism lost its appeal in later centuries. In his first book, Against the
Academics, St. Augustine sought to refute ancient Greek philosophy precisely because it put too much emphasis on skepticism, and during the Dark and
Middle Ages devout Christians across Europe learned to reject doubt when
applied to religious belief, as it became a paramount transgression that could
lead to the Inquisition. As an intellectual perspective at odds with belief,
skepticism itself came to be considered evil, in fact the worst of all sins
because it encouraged the rejection of spiritual devotion. However, the pursuit of skepticism recovered during the Renaissance through the application
of a kind of Pyrrhonian double negative. So-called fideists led by Pomponazzi, Pascal, and others promoted the assumption that religious doubt can initiate religious conversion based on renewed discovery that God does in fact
rule the universe. More specifically, Descartes used skepticism as a heuristic
strategy for this purpose through the acceptance of one seemingly irrefutable
axiom, "I think, therefore I am," followed by what seemed its inevitable
corollary, "If I exist, so therefore does God." Later fideists such as Pico della
Mirandola also exercised doubt to confirm religious faith rather than engaging in the empirical pursuit of knowledge as did such scientists and philosophers as Copernicus, Bruno, Bacon, and Gassendi, who renewed reliance on
doubt on essentially the same basis as "ancient" Greek philosophers had
done many centuries earlier. 1 Today this version of doubt is almost taken for
granted as one scientific theory supplants another almost without public notice from one decade to the next. A year or two ago the public was told that
maybe a few billion stars occupy our galaxy, this year that it seems more than
a billion galaxies occupy the universe in its entirety, and still later that it
seems likely enormous ice clouds in outer space might have furnished at least
half the world's water supply. 2
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I. PYRRHO (cA. 360-270 BC)
The first major skeptic later than the Sophist movement was Pyrrho (or
Pyrrhon) of Elis, who was perhaps a generation younger than Aristotle. Pyrrho introduced to Greek philosophy his version of skepticism based on his
personal knowledge of the moral teachings of India's Magi and Gymnosophists he encountered as a foot soldier during Alexander the Great's invasion
of Asia. Pyrrho apparently combined his ethical vision acquired in India with
the assumptions of Protagoras, which he had learned from his mentor, Anaxarchus, a follower of Democritus who was also associated with Metrodorus
of Chios. 3 If knowledge is unavoidably indeterminate, Pyrrho argued, we
must cultivate a suspension of judgment (epoche) that lets us emphasize
ataraxia by living in full harmony with the world that surrounds us. Once
epoche is achieved, ataraxia supposedly follows "like its shadow," or, with
more poetic flair, "even as a shadow follows its substance." 4
According to Diogenes Laertius, Pyrrho first acquired a skeptical viewpoint when he became fascinated with the Gymnosophists' suspension of
judgment through quietude (ataraxia), and detachment from worldly matters
(apragmosyne)--principles he later cultivated to guarantee freedom from
anxiety resulting from the effort to arrive at a viable choice between contradictory theoretical assumptions. There is no truth whatsoever that cannot be
refuted by other truths, he claimed, so their equal likelihood lets us abandon
the fruitless pursuit of clear-cut final answers. In light of Gymnosophist
principles, he argued as an abstract principle, "no single thing is in itself any
more this than that." Moreover, he said that nothing truly predominates in the
final analysis except the custom and conventions of society.
Pyrrho listed ten so-called aporia, or perplexities, that hinder accurate
comparisons in a balanced judgment of experience. These can be summarized as follows: (1) the inevitable confusion of pleasure and pain; (2) variant
human idiosyncrasies; (3) sensory differences; (4) the impact of aging; (5)
different customs, variable laws, myths, and dogmatic assumptions; (6)
mixed environmental influences; (7) differences in visual perspective; (8)
variation in quantity; (9) the comparative rarity of events; and (10) paired
comparisons (right and left, up and down, etc.). Obviously these categories
overlap, but whatever their combination, he suggested, they help to identify
numerous distractive effects on one's supposedly objective judgment. The
later Pyrrhonian skeptic Agrippa proposed further aporia that augment Pyrrho 's list: (1) excessive contentiousness based on disagreement; (2) incessant
elaboration; (3) unnecessary contextual references; (4) the rushed acceptance
of hypotheses; and (5) the dependence on related events that supposedly
prove each other.
Pyrrho was the first skeptic to give the term epoche a central role as the
suspension of judgment in philosophical discourse, but it seems he did so for
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the purpose of activating ataraxia, effectively the comfortable abandonment
of further inquiry. In philosophical debate epoche might now and again be
divisive, but its use was preliminary to the final achievement of ataraxia akin
to the Zen Buddhist concept of satori wherein a full "sense of beyond"
supplants analytic thought. 5 Pyrrho suggested that an uncompromising commitment to doubt by means of epoche discloses the fallibility of all supposed
truths, so one is free to assent to any belief one wants since each is just as
valid as another. On this basis religion is fully as credible as any other belief
system. The syllogistic implication at the root of this certitude was simple. If
everything is potentially false, nothing can be proven true, and one's choice
in what to believe finally depends on ataraxia, the felt comfort level in
accepting its validity. One can therefore be relieved of any sense of shame or
hypocrisy in accepting received doctrine. No matter how misguided a religion or belief system might seem, it is no more vulnerable to refutation than
another, so it is entirely acceptable to go along with shared assumptions that
are acceptable to friends, relatives, and fellow citizens.
As explained by Diogenes Laertius, Pyrrho also argued, "there is nothing
really existent, but custom and convention govern human action; for no
single thing is in itself any more this than that." 6 Therefore, what predominates must be the full and uncompromising acceptance of conventional assumptions. If everybody who matters in one's life worships Zeus, let it be
Zeus who supposedly rules--and the same with Osiris, Mithra, Cybele, or any
of the other gods. On this basis it is entirely appropriate to be a Buddhist
among Buddhists, and so on. The truth effectively consists of whatever
shared concept helps to minimize intellectual discomfort. The most important task in life is the cultivation of intellectual repose through compliance
with received opinion without any sense of obligation to justify its assumptions.
Pyrrho did not concern himself with the contradiction that received values
are too often dogmatic as defined by earlier skeptics. Nor does he seem to
have been bothered that one's full commitment to ataraxia makes possible
the nominal observance of any number of ideologies including atheism, if
they are inoffensive to one's neighbors and fellow citizens. Once the use of
skepticism confirms that no proof exists one way or the other about God's
existence or any other such consideration, one is free to pursue any belief
system that seems even remotely credible as long as it is comfortable.
Pyrrho had only one major pupil, Timon, whose version of skepticism
placed an emphasis on the rejection of hypotheses in general. A successful
author who apparently wrote satires, Timon was loyal to Pyrrho's version of
skepticism, if with little to add to Pyrrho' s relatively simple argument. Timon spoke favorably of both Democritus and Protagoras as earlier skeptics, but
he despised Arcesilaus, the arrogant and excessively argumentative young
leader of the competitive school of Academic skeptics, at least partly because
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of Academic skepticism's emphasis on sustained uncompromising analysis.
Unfortunately, Timon seems to have lacked any productive disciples, so
Pyrrhonian skepticism fell into decline soon after his death in 230 B.C. and
remained dormant throughout the rest of the Hellenistic period. Only once,
for example, did Cicero bother to mention Pyrrho by name. Nevertheless,
Pyrrho's version of skepticism regained its popularity during Augustus' reign
as Rome's first emperor. Just as Academic skepticism had completely supplanted Pyrrhonian skepticism in the second century BC, the Pyrrhonian
approach completely reversed this preference, very likely because it was an
ideological stance more compatible with the acquiescence to imperial authority. A young skeptic from Alexandria, Aenesidemus (ca. 90-80 BC), once
again codified Pyrrho's arguments, and Sextus Empiricus took them into
account in his thorough summary of skeptical theory (ca. 200 AD). Diogenes
Laertius also offered a relatively balanced assessment of Pyrrho 's influence,
though he conceded the ethical difficulties implicit in Pyrrho's approach:
"He [Pyrrho] denied that anything was honourable or dishonourable, just or
unjust. ... Universally, there is nothing really existent, but custom and
convention govern human action." 7
Possibly a reflection of the revival of Pyrrhonian skepticism, the poet
Virgil wrote The Aeneid as requested by Augustus in order to provide Rome
with an artificial mythology of its own comparable to Homer's heroic vision
of the origins of Greece. Significantly, Virgil asked on his deathbed that the
text be destroyed, and of course his request was ignored. Like Lucretius, he
wrote consummate poetry, but in obvious contrast with Lucretius he also
seems to have become dissatisfied with its propagandistic implications along
Homeric lines. In effect he had spent too much of his productive career
promoting a misguided imperial destiny as later described by Gibbon and
many others. His task had been effectively Pyrrhonian in complying with
Augustus' request, but by the end of his life he seems to have recognized that
there were better and more useful truths to take into account.

II. ARCESILAUS (cA. 316-241 BC)
The origin of the Academic School of skeptics is usually identified with
Arcesilaus, who was roughly a generation younger than Pyrrho. After Plato
he was the fifth director of what came to be described as the Old Academy,
which had been led in sequence by Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemon, and
Crates during the four decades that followed Plato's death. The influence of
the Academy had steadily declined until Arcesilaus assumed its leadership in
247, and under his direction the school recovered its popularity as the Second
(or Middle) Academy, effectively the successor to Plato's initial Academy
but with an ideological stance that emphasized Socrates' assumption that he
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knew he didn't know. Like Socrates, Arcesilaus transcribed none of his ideas, so there is no record of his attitude toward Plato's transcendental idealism
beyond his effort to renew Socrates' original intentions of the pursuit of truth
through sustained analysis. Whereas Plato's version of skepticism had discouraged natural philosophy, Arcesilaus restored its original emphasis on
empirical inquiry. He rejected Pyrrho's stress on intellectual comfort as well
as the theory of Stoicism recently founded by Zeno of Citium, which also
featured ethics dependent on the acceptance of received truths. As opposed to
unsubstantiated collective belief, he instead advocated sustained inquiry to
ascertain valid truth with the full expectation that such a task could never be
fully achieved.
Arcesilaus' principal achievement seems to have been in having detached
Pyrrho's concept of epoche from his emphasis on the pursuit of ataraxia. The
function of epoche was no longer as an effective agent of ataraxia and
instead became an uncompromising intellectual commitment whose source
of satisfaction was nothing more than the sense of achievement in having
clarified the issue(s) at least to a certain extent. One did not exercise doubt in
order to believe, but in order to have a better idea of the topic. Like Socrates,
Arcesilaus remained aware that he might stumble on valid assumptions now
and again, but always with the realization that he could only be confident of
its validity on a tentative basis.
The difference between Pyrrho and Arcesilaus' respective uses of the
term epoche was of fundamental importance. Whereas Pyrrho featured
epoche as a means to the acceptance of ideas and theories that help to produce the experience of ataraxia, the Academic version of skepticism promoted by Arcesilaus was more or less in accord with Aristotle's natural
philosophy as well as Strato's reliance on experimentation. Taken to its
extreme, Pyrrho's skepticism was an anti-intellectual stance that supported
quietude and the status quo, while Academic skepticism encouraged the pursuit of science without the imminent prospect of final answers. 8
But there were also epistemological issues. If no "truth" is totally verifiable, Arcesilaus suggested, it becomes necessary and appropriate to challenge Stoicism's emphasis on ideas that are supposedly "cataleptic" (or apodictic) in the sense that they seem to bear a clear and distinct resemblance to
reality. Indeed, too many of such truths turn out to be false. Instead, he
argued, knowledge (episteme) and received opinion (doxa) can only be integrated when knowledge is accepted on a tentative basis. In the words of
Cicero, it was Arcesilaus' opinion that "nothing is more disgraceful than for
assent and approval to outstrip knowledge and perception." 9 Since all knowledge is susceptible to error, true wisdom benefits from Socrates' example by
granting one's relative ignorance: "And if all things are non-apprehensible, it
will follow, even according to the Stoics, that the wise man suspends judg-
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ment [epichein ton sophon] , for sustained inquiry is essential to wisdom
based on attainable knowledge. " 10
Arcesilaus emphasized the value of obvious ideas toward this presumably
more substantial objective. Essential to his argument was the provisional
acceptance of common sense (eulogon), however risky and beset with mistakes, as the best and most pragmatic initial step, if without confirming any
kind of final truth. On the other hand, the uncompromising avoidance of
empty suppositions is also likely to justify serious inquiry. Does the concept
of Zeus seated on a throne, for example, befit common sense? If not, its
likelihood can be doubted at least as a temporary supposition.
Arcesilus apparently felt that common sense is in accord with scientific
hypotheses that oblige confirmation as first suggested by Plato ' s surprisingly
advanced use of the word: "I don ' t know yet whether it fulfills the conditions, but I can propose a hypothesis "--in other words a tentative explanation
that can be submitted to further examination. 11 For Arcesilaus' friend Strato,
the task was one in which a theoretical possibility was framed as a hypothesi~
followed by one or more experiments to determine its validity. As Strato
discovered, every experiment sets the stage for others as well, and as often as
not the tentative "truths" they confirm can be accepted or rejected on an
enlarged interactive basis. Such freedom in the speculative stages of scientific inquiry gives little role to ataraxia beyond Archimedes' "eureka" response
that can itself lead to further questions.
Frequently overlooked by classical scholars was Arcesilaus' friendship
with Strato, which is indicated by Strato's generous final will that Diogenes
Laertius quotes in its entirety. A large number of Strato's possessions were
bequeathed to Arcesilaus, so it may be assumed that their personal friendship
was matched by their theoretical rapport. It requires no ingenuity, for example, to link Arcesilaus' concept of epoche with the Stratonician Presumption
that the burden of proof is upon both philosophers and scientists. There is no
written evidence of this possibility, but Strato's dependence on testing scientific hypotheses bore a strong affinity to Arcesilaus ' concept of epoche relevant to philosophical discourse. The suspension of judgment Arcesilaus advocated on an intellectual basis was fully in accord with the use of hypotheses in empirical investigations, and his version of epoche can be understood
as having been intrinsic to Strato ' s scientific perspective. In reverse, Strato's
effort as a scientist confirmed the value of epoche relevant to scientific
inquiry. As for the issue of religious belief, their shared doubts reinforce the
likelihood that Arcesilaus' radical version of skepticism was compatible with
Strato' s outspoken atheism. In effect one of them did not believe in God,
whereas the other believed that God does not exist. In the same fashion they
shared comparable versions of disbelief in the sense that Strato 's belief that
tentative scientific evidence was nothing more than probable truth until prov-
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en otherwise was much the same as Arcesilaus' rigorous suspension of doubt
about all topics, both scientific and non-scientific, until proven otherwise.
Arcesilaus' version of epoche devoid of ataraxia was rejected by Aenisidemus and others during the Emperor Augustus' rule, but the concept again
came into vogue much later during the Renaissance. Montaigne himself
wrote the word epoche on the ceiling above his desk as a reminder of its
relevance every time he ventured to look upwards. Also, Montaigne's locus
classicus, "Apology for Raimond Sebond," featured Arcesilaus' sense of the
term throughout its text. He was more inspired by Arcesilaus' concept of
doubt rather than Pyrrho' thesis. In effect, his persistent inquiry confirmed
his basic discomfort with received assumptions.
Arcesilaus' concept of epoche also anticipated various theories of uncertainty that have been proposed since the late nineteenth century by scientists
and secular philosophers. The first and perhaps most obvious example would
be Charles Sanders Peirce's theory of "abduction" in the sense that "hopeful
suggestions" can be entertained in pursuit of ideas that do not immediately or
fully present themselves. Also in the same vein was John Dewey's thesis of
"warranted assertibility." 12 In the same light Husserl's concept of "bracketing" can be identified as a temporary use of epoche to disconnect presumably
self-evident ideas from fixed assumptions in order to explore their implications in a new and better light. 13 In effect Arcesilaus' version of skepticism
continues to thrive one way or another. Having played a dominant role for
many decades during the mid-Hellenistic period, his perspective was later
recovered by both science and natural philosophy and remains useful even
today.
III. CARNEADES (214-128 BC)
Born at Cyrene in Libya, Cameades traveled to Athens early in life and
briefly pursued Stoic philosophy before turning to skepticism. As the head of
the Third (or New) Academy, he became the dominant skeptic of the second
century BC as well as the fourth director of the Academy in succession after
Arcesilaus. Cameades was even more famous than Arcesilaus as a brilliant
teacher and consummate polemicist able and willing to debate the merits of
any issue. Probably inspired by Strato's example, his outspoken atheistic
viewpoint featured the necessary role of probability (pithanon) in drawing
such a conclusion, a stance that influenced three generations of disciples that
included Clitomachus, Philo of Larissa, and finally even Cicero. On his
single visit to Rome, Cameades achieved notoriety as a skeptic by giving a
public lecture in which he maintained with persuasiveness that those who
inflict injustice suffer more than their victims. On the very next day, however, he gave a second lecture in which he argued exactly the opposite position
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with equal conviction. His purpose was to demonstrate that credible truths
can too often be asserted to support contradictory arguments, and more important, he sought to demonstrate the ultimate uncertainty of all such arguments. He continued to emphasize this principle throughout his career, but it
was counterproductive at the time, at least in this instance. Shocked by his
audacity, Cato the Elder ordered his permanent expulsion from Rome to
prevent him from contaminating the morals of its youth. Apparently Carneades never returned.
Like both Socrates and Arcesilaus, Carneades did not transcribe his ideas.
Instead, he depended on a scribe--Clitomachus, a disciple from Carthage--to
record his dialogues so that he could declare his arguments with relative
freedom. It was later estimated that Clitomachus used more than 400 scrolls
to contain Carneades' lectures, and according to Diogenes Laertius, without
exception he was more productive than all ancient authors. As perhaps to be
expected, Clitomachus succeeded Carneades upon his death as the director
and principal theoretician of the Third Academy. Unfortunately, however,
none of Clitomachus' transcriptions survived, so there is little evidence to
document Carneades' pivotal role in the history of skeptical philosophy beyond the historic assessment of Diogenes Laertius, Cicero, and Sextus Empmcus.
Cicero's perspective is particularly useful in the analysis of Carneades,
since two of Clitomachus' disciples, Philo and Antiochus, later the directors
of the so-called Fourth and Fifth Academies, served as Cicero's teachers at
different stages of his youth. Also, Cicero seems to have been familiar with
Clitomachus' transcriptions when he wrote De Natura Deorum andAcademica. However, it seems the only portions deleted from Cicero's two remarkable books were those pertaining to Carneades' views. Very likely these
passages were eliminated by later scribes in order to preserve Cicero's texts
from total destruction. For the most part, today's readers reassemble Carneades' assumptions as well as possible from the fourth portion of Academica, in which Cicero seems to have used the persona of Cotta to declare
Carneades' ideas without specifically identifying him as their original
source.
More useful, however, in reconstructing Carneades' perspective is the
summary description by Sextus Empiricus, a Greek philosophical historian
who lived two centuries after Cicero. ln Against the Logicians, Sextus explained with thoroughness Carneades' pursuit of credible truth based on
"tested presentations," or accurate "perceived objects" in light of one's ability to grasp their manifestation. Of course any number of suppositions can be
recognized as possible truths, but these should be fully conceded if and to
what extent they fall short of the whole truth. 14
At the core of Cameades' skeptical position was an implied epistemology
that there is no fully reliable "criterion" (or principle of confirmation) to
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determine any supposed truth, since each and every mental "presentation"
manifests both what it perceives and its own intrinsic limitations as an act of
mental perception. Truths do exist, Carneades conceded, but unavoidable
mental limitations diminish accuracy except when judged as a matter of
probability. The validity of any particular idea turns out to be nothing more
than its probable truth (pithanon), for we lack the means to achieve any kind
of finality in our thinking. Carneades agreed with Protagoras' original assumption that each and every presumed truth can and should be debated on
both sides (in utramque partem) in order to determine its relative likelihood.
Supportive evidence was essential, but the effective rejection of contrary
evidence was also needed toward the tentative acceptance as a credible answer. Carneades was also willing to accept Arceilaus' loose concept of reasonableness (eulogon) at a preliminary level of inquiry, but he advocated the
need for further substantiation at more advanced levels based on painstaking
investigation, especially regarding such controversial topics as the existence
of one or more gods.
Some modern scholars have sought to minimize the importance of Carneades' theory of probability by treating it as nothing more than a matter of
credibility (or pithanon) as already explained by Plato and Aristotle, both of
whom at least mentioned the need for confirmation based on relevant information. Plato suggested the need for probability in his dialogues Theatetus
and Timaeus , in which he seems to have anticipated Carneades' perspective
by remarking, "We may venture to assert that what has been said by us is
probable, and will be rendered more probable by investigation." 15 Aristotle
also anticipated Carneades' effort by granting probability full status on a
scientific basis, but he sought to limit science to a relatively simple determination of "that which is always or ... that which is for the most part." In
Prior Analytics, he went so far as to define probability as a "reputable proposition" based on acceptable (or "reputable") knowledge of some event by
observers: "What men know to happen or not to happen, to be or not to be,
for the most part thus and thus, is a probability." 16 Otherwise Aristotle limited his analysis to "hard" evidence and seems to have restricted the question
of probability to what might have seemed relatively soft issues such as he
addressed in Rhetoric and Poetics. Both Plato and Aristotle granted probability a role in their analysis, but with a relatively limited function-almost as
an afterthought. In contrast, Carneades emphasized its central importance
deserving of methodological confirmation at every stage of analysis. Doubt
was no longer an afterthought but in fact a primary feature integral to serious
inquiry. Cameades agreed with Arcesilaus in accepting the importance of
common sense pertaining to most information, but he also insisted truths be
ascertained at three levels of determination: (1) probable in the broadest
sense of the word; (2) "irreversible" in the sense that they cannot be disprov-
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en by contrary evidence; and (3) confinnation "from all sides," by implication including both logical analysis and scientific verification. 17
The primary advantage of Cameades' threefold hierarchy was that it necessitated the full confinnation of ideas that might otherwise seem dubious
or even wrong. For just as seemingly wrong ideas often may tum out to be
valid, numerous "right" ideas are just as likely to be wrong.
This possibility had been implicit in Arcesilaus' notion of common sense
(eulogon), but Cameades even further liberated speculative inquiry from
orthodox assumptions by upgrading what seemed nothing more than argumentative rigor to systematic application. No longer was the sage (or "wise
man") fettered by received truisms. Cameades addressed this necessity with
unusual vigor, most notably pertaining to religious belief, which he felt
lacked sufficient confinnation to justify it. In retrospect it was this issue that
established his notoriety in the record of ancient conceptual history available
to modem readers. Such figures as Democritus and Aristotle had tested limits, but Cameades actually declared his atheism.
Effectively buried in three of his four published volumes, Sextus Empiricus both summarizes and illustrates Cameades' defense of atheism through
his use of logic to stretch the concepts underlying religious belief to total
absurdity. In Outlines of Pyrrhonism, he devotes four pages to a brief explanation of Cameades' version of atheism, which is dependent on the assumption that "the existence of God is not pre-evident." He expresses his agreement with Arcesilaus on what might seem a tentative basis, "we cannot
apprehend whether God exists," but the implication is clear that such a possibility is not likely. 18 He maintains, for example, that a truly omniscient and
omnipotent God able to anticipate the future inclusive of human behavior
should have no difficulty in preventing evil and/or misfortune. If such a
presumably sympathetic deity cannot perfonn this simple task, Cameades
insists, he necessarily lacks (a) omnipotence, (b) omniscience, or (c) both,
thus justifying doubts about his benevolence as well as his supreme authority. As summarized by Sextus Empiricus:
But ifhe [God] had forethought for all, there would have been nothing bad and
no badness in the world; yet all things, they say, are full of badness; hence it
shall not be said that God forethinks all things .... And if, again, he has the
power but not the will to have forethought for all, he will be held to be
malignant; while ifhe has neither the will nor the power, he is both malignant
and weak-an impious thing to say about God .. .. Therefore God has no
forethought for the things in the universe .... So for these reasons we cannot
apprehend whether God exists. 19

In other words, God can be either omniscient or omnipotent, but can't play
both roles at the same time if bad things happen, but if bad things do happen,
as seems to be true, God necessarily violates his own rules. Moreover, "If he
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[God] has the will but not the power, he is less strong than the cause which
renders him unable to forethink." Those who persist in affirming God's
positive influence despite this simple logic become themselves guilty of
impiety one way or another. Sextus Empiricus does not bother to identify the
author of this obvious paradox; its obvious antithetical emphasis suggests the
likelihood of Cameades' authorship, especially in light of his several longer
definitions of God elsewhere in Sextus Empiricus' text.
In his long segment, "Do Gods Exist," in the third volume, Against the
Physicists, Sextus Empiricus offers several more elaborate syllogistic arguments to the same effect and once again the unidentified author could only
have been Cameades, who seems to have frequently exercised his skill in
formulating elongated syllogistic deductions called sorites: the demonstration of X, therefore Y, therefore Z, etc. Relevant to the identification of
God(s), his argument began with the absurdity of X followed by the worse
absurdity of Y, the bizarre absurdity of Z, etc. The first of these elongated
atheistic deductions recorded in its entirety by Sextus Empiricus is quoted as
follows:
Again, if the Divine exists, it is either a body or incorporeal. But it will not be
incorporeal for the reasons we have already stated [since the incorporeal is
inanimate and insensitive and incapable of any action]. And if it is a body, it is
either a compound of the simple elements or a simple and elemental body. And
if it is a compound, it is perishable; for everything which is constructed by the
union of things must necessarily dissolve and perish. And if it is a simple
body, it is either fire or air or water or earth. But whichever of these it is, it is
without soul or reason, which is absurd. lf, then, God is neither a compound
nor a simple body, and besides these there is no other alternative, one must
declare that God is nothing. 20

As an enlargement of sorites that can be quoted in this context (roughly
half his longest example), Cameades is again quoted by Sextus Empiricus
with a seemingly endless variety of extravagant comparisons to the effect
that the usual traits attributed to God possess sufficient human resemblance
not to be immortal, but that the elimination of such traits reduces God's
identity to virtual non-existence. The second half of another of Cameades'
elongated logical definitions of God can also be quoted here to confirm his
unusual logical capabilities:
But if God has not art, he will not have the art of living; and if so, neither will
he have virtue. But if God has not virtue, he is non-existent-And again: God
being rational, ifhe does not possess virtue, he certainly possesses its opposite,
vice: but he does not possess its opposite, vice: therefore God possesses art,
and there is something non-evident to God. From which it follows that he is
perishable, as we argued before. But he is not perishable; therefore he does not
exist. 21
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In summary, a perfect God can neither be speechless nor gifted with
speech, artistic nor lacking in art, virtuous but not virtuous, etc. and therefore
such a being is impossible. As explained by Cameades at the simplest level,
"If, then, God is neither a compound nor a simple body, and besides these
there is no other alternative, one must declare that God is nothing." Moreover, Cameades argues almost as an afterthought, there are too many gods to
choose from. If Zeus is a god, so is Poseidon, but also countless minor deities
can be added such as a sun God, a god for each month, for dawn, for the
evening, and even worthless Phobos, "the god who shares in beauty least of
all." Perhaps the better and more credible choice is no god at all.
In retrospect Cameades' theoretical dependence on the concept of probability seems to have had more influence on modem scientific methodology
than the issue of atheism. Even in its earliest stage, well before its modem
statistical application, its application seems to have been implicit Strato's
empirical investigation as well as Arcesilaus' generalized principle of inductive thoroughness. Moreover, their shared perspective very likely afforded in
combination what might be described as an overlooked but essential missing
link between Aristotelian science and the inception of modem science as
explained by Francis Bacon in his famous Preface to Novum Organum. Today they remain the most notorious atheists in ancient history-too aggressive in their commitment to disbelief to be identified by name or simply
mentioned to be otherwise ignored. As perhaps to be expected, the memory
of all three- Strato and Cameades as well as Arcesilaus-has continued to
remain "untouched" well beyond the lifetime of Bacon. Yet they played a
najor role in the invention of inductive research.

Chapter Eight

Cicero (106-43 B.C.)

Cicero played a major role in the history of Rome. His speeches were remarkable, and as many as 800 of his letters have survived to document
Roman civilization at the time. His so-called "Ciceronian" prose style became a unique standard of excellence, and he knew as much as any of his
contemporaries about ancient philosophy. Moreover, he played a dominant
role in the Roman Senate and he opposed Caesar's effort to become the
emperor of Rome. The two knew each other well- Caesar as a successful
general with ambitions of imperial authority and Cicero as an outstanding
orator, statesman, and scholar, arguably the most eminent Roman citizen at
the time. The two differed, however, on whether Rome would become an
empire led by Caesar or remain a republic under rule of the Senate led by
Cicero. Whether justified or not, Cicero was suspected of having supported
Caesar' s assassination to thwart the conversion of the republic into an empire. Aware of probable retaliation by Caesar's former lieutenant, Mark Antony and his allies, Cicero withdrew from politics to write on a wide variety
of fields , including Greek philosophy. As anticipated, he was murdered within two years, decapitated, and his skull and hands were sent as trophies to
Mark Antony to be mutilated before a supportive crowd.
Fortunately, most of Cicero's writings escaped censorship because of his
pivotal role in Roman history but also because of their excellence. As a
result, his unique knowledge of ancient philosophy was preserved and helped
to document its important but declining role at the time. Resulting from the
effort to recover his writings by Petrarch, many centuries later his texts also
helped to usher in the Renaissance. Others identified as philosophes, joined
in the task, and soon their effort widened to include the recovery of texts by
other classical authors, many of whom were all but forgotten. Whereas Cicero can be said to have failed in his attempt to preserve the Roman Republic,
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his writings seem to have become the single most important catalyst for the
inception of the Renaissance fifteen centuries later.
Cicero was well qualified to explain Greek philosophy to his contemporaries in Rome. He had been taught Cameades' Academic skepticism as
interpreted by Clitomachus. As disciples of Clitomachus, his tutors Philo and
Antiochus were the leaders of the Fourth and Fifth Academies that pursued a
synthesis with Platonism and Stoicism probably to soften Cameades' radical
assumptions. In his mid-teens Cicero had also been a disciple of both the
Stoic philosopher Diodorus and the Epicurean philosopher Phaedrus. Moreover, he was a close friend and former student of Posidonius, the eminent
scientist who was then leader of the Stoic movement. And of course his
editorial assistance to Lucretius in the composition of De Rerum Natura must
have reinforced his familiarity with Epicurean philosophy. His remark in one
of his letters regarding Lucretius' text, "many brilliant passages of genius,"
suggests his likely approval of the text's atheistic assumptions.'
Two of Cicero's final books, Academica and De Natura Deorum, were
especially important in treating the issues of skepticism and natural philosophy as opposed to the existence of gods. Academica provided a sophisticated
historical analysis of Academic skepticism. In turn, De Natura Deorum provided a hypothetical debate about religion and the existence of gods from the
perspectives of the principal philosophical schools of the time as represented
by a Stoic, an Epicurean, and an Academic skeptic. Cicero's treatment of
philosophical issues was less persuasive than Plato's earlier debates, but he
gave all the participants better opportunity to defend their assumptions.

I. ACADEMICA
Academica provides the single ancient text that explains in depth the principal issues of late Hellenistic skepticism. In the format of a debate, its text
surveys a broad variety of theories and assumptions except for those of
Cameades, whose theoretical views were later deleted from Cicero's manuscripts. Of the two elongated segments that survived, the second half of the
first segment remains intact, as does the initial quarter of the second segment.
The large gap between them is easily overlooked by modern readers, but this
is at the cost of Cicero's full explanation of Cameades' version of atheism.
The modem reader's knowledge of Cameade's arguments is thus limited
almost exclusively to the much later summary by Sextus Empiricus.
Part I of Academica begins with a comparison between Plato and Aristotle by Varro, a friend and prestigious scholar whom Cicero conceded might
be at least as informed as himself. In the context of the dialogue, Varro
summarizes the ideas of Antiochus, Cicero's second tutor in Academic skepticism, but soon shifts to consider issues beyond the received assumptions of
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Academic skepticism. He explains, for example, that Socrates' ms1stence
that he knew he didn't know had inspired both Plato's sustained quest for
transcendent truths and Aristotle's alternative quest for scientific truths
through the systematic investigation of the physical universe based on empirical evidence. According to Varro, all philosophers at the time who came
afterwards took Socrates' simple paradox into account one way or another,
including both Arcesilaus and Carneades in their emphasis on common sense
and probability. On the other hand, Varro concedes Aristotle's "copiousness
of intellect" as well as his supposed invention of what amounted to a fifth
element beyond earth, air, water, and fire-- a material "entirely formless and
devoid of all quality." 2 He undoubtedly refers to the general concept of
matter as already suggested by Anaximander and others preceding Aristotle.
Varro further explains that the response of both Arcesilaus and Carneades to
Socrates' paradox was simply to consider all supposed "truths" on a tentative
basis by emphasizing the principle of epoche as suspended judgment. If no
truth could be fully known, Varro asserts, let that be the final truth concerning all issues, by implication including the possible existence of gods, not
that he specifically mentions such a possibility.
Upon the completion of Varro's elongated explanation, Cicero suggests
the role of Carneades, and here, as earlier mentioned, the text suddenly
terminates with the tantalizing words "incredible facility," very likely intended to describe Carneades' oratorical skills. Discussion resumes with Lucullus (a skeptic in Philo's school of Academic skepticism), explaining the
issue of probability and the benefits of arguing on both sides of any question
on all matters, including religious belief. 3 Lucullus goes on to summarize the
historic importance of Carneades without referring to his ideas, and he rejects
unnamed critics of Carneades ' radical negativism as "thinkers who sanctioned nothing as proved." 4 Still later, however, he concedes that Carneades
himself now and again softened his relentless stance hostile to religious
belief as an invalid hypothesis.
Lucullus also criticizes Philo for his continuing arch-skeptical stance in
having shared the conviction of Cameades that in the final analysis nothing
can be known." 5 Lucullus himself asserts the effectiveness ofreason itself as
an appropriate alternative to arch-skepticism since it depends on the pursuit
of research as a "process of reasoning that leads from things perceived to
something not previously perceived. ' 6 It is difficult to disagree with this
argument. However, unexamined assent has been almost universally enforced in all societies and among all religions. As a result skepticism's negative methodology in addition to Carneades' atheistic certitude is discouraged
and even prohibited in too many societies, and perhaps at too great a cost.
What ancient skeptics provided for the first time was sufficient negation to
make possible the valid pursuit ofreligious doubt despite continuing enforcement of shared beliefs among the population at large.
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Lucullus draws his argument to a close with a brief discussion of Arcesilaus' concept of epoche on the assumption that whatever cannot be fully
perceived cannot be granted full assent. On this basis Lucullus concludes that
wisdom consists of withholding assent from anything either false or unknown. What is crucial, he argues, is to be guided by reason rather than
received opinion. Then again, as insisted by Antiochus, also a former tutor of
Cicero, Lucullus concedes that excessive skepticism can too easily become
oppressive by preventing not only thought but all physical activity. 7 Even
Cameades was said to have broken this stricture by now and again conceding, "that the wise man will occasionally hold an opinion, that is, commit an
error." 8 In effect, he had sometimes compromised his systematic effort to
reject all presumed truths that turned out not to be true.
Cicero devotes most of the second half of Academica to an extended
explanation of his own theory of skepticism and his response to alternative
sources. He qualifies his acceptance of Cameades' theory of probability, for
example by declaring that his own interest in skepticism has not been combative. On the other hand, he asserts that he continues to be "fired up with zeal
for the discovery of the truth," as Augustine much later conceded in his
critique of Cicero in both Against the Academics and his Confessions. Cicero
insists that it is entirely honorable to hold valid assumptions," and he holds
the complementary opinion that it is even disgraceful to accept falsehoods as
the truth. The chief virtue of the truly wise man, he suggests, is his ability to
avoid being misguided and susceptible to deception." Cicero accordingly
suggests the advantage of agnosticism by declaring that the "mere habit of
assenting" is necessarily at risk, and to such an extent that it is preferable that
"all assent be withheld." Cicero continues that nothing can be entirely perceived, and that it is precisely this limitation on which "all the controversy
tums." 9 He rejects Pyrrho's concept that all truth is ultimately indeterminate,
and instead proposes that truth does exist but can only be known indirectly
and therefore on a tentative basis. He also cites Cameades distinction that
many falsehoods might seem probable, but nothing truly false can be perceived and known. As a result, he suggests, the philosopher's task is to
withhold assent as obliged by the principle of epoche, but also to be guided
by the aspect of probability in finally granting qualified assent. 10 By implication he suggests that the god concept is more dependent on this necessity
than any other concept.
As emphasized by both Arcesilaus and Cameades, Cicero concedes that
doubt plays an important role in serious analysis rather than outright denial,
and that sufficient doubt ultimately justifies what might be described as
tentative denial. Cicero also explores in depth the necessity of withholding
assent simply in order to weigh the merits of alternative theories as Strato
recommended. Like others before him, he emphasizes the importance of
arguing on both sides to arrive at the nearest approximation to the truth. 11
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Moreover, since the absolute truth is all but impossible to discern, he accepts
the necessity that philosophers should refine the comparison of alternative
"truths" based on what seems their likelihood. "The wise man," he argues in
full accord with Cameades, will take into account whatever he encounters
that seems probable if nothing presents itself contrary to that probability. 12
On this basis Cicero acknowledges the universal relevance of probability
pertaining to every aspect of human experience as opposed to the act of
assent dependent on "mere opinion and hasty thinking." 13
Cicero summarizes almost all of the cosmic assumptions by early Greek
philosophers through Plato and Aristotle to determine their relative validity
as explanations of the universe. Of particular interest are those he lists as
having proposed an eternal history of the universe devoid of initial creation.
He specifically includes Anaximander and Xenophanes as well as Melissus
and Aristotle. In particular he tells of Melissus' description of an infinite and
unchangeable universe and of Aristotle's similar concept of a world that
never had a beginning and would never "perish in dissolution." 14 Cicero also
praises Strata's atheism in having dispensed with the notion of divine origin,
instead confining his investigation to all existence that can be traced to natural causes. However, he is reluctant to accept Strata's radical hypothesis that
existence in its entirety has been exclusively a product of the natural forces
of gravitation and motion--an assumption anticipated by Aristotle's binarism
of matter and motion that was obviously acceptable to Strata. There can be
no doubt, however, that Cicero remains interested in Strata's theory, and to
the extent that he concedes his inability to make a choice among credible
alternatives. 15 Today Strata seems to have been far closer to the truth than
Cicero had been willing to accept.
Academica ends on an ambivalent note. Cicero pays his obligatory respects to Rome's pagan gods and goddesses, but he also makes it plain that
he remains an agnostic, if unwilling to make the final inductive leap by
abandoning the concept of an afterlife and the benevolent authority of god(s).
In retrospect, his choice seems to have been of unusual historic importance.
He inspired St. Augustine's choice to cultivate unexamined faith as explained in the last paragraph of his first book, Against the Academics, and
much later, he inspired Petrarch's efforts to recover Cicero's writings, which
proved essential to the beginning of the Renaissance. Copernicus' heliocentric theory can also be traced to Academica. According to his Introduction to
On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, Copernicus first encountered
the concept of heliocentric motion in a copy of Academica that told of the
ancient astronomer Hicetas's astronomical proposal to this effect. 16 Copernicus' later mathematical calculations were by general consensus the first major scientific breakthrough linked with the Renaissance. In effect, amazingly,
the two principal figures responsible for this grand collective achievementPetrarch and Copernicus-were inspired by Cicero, but so too was St. Au-
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gustine's conversion to Christianity as a defiant response to Cicero's defense
of skepticism-effectively his own choice based on the comparison of probabilities.
II. ON THE NATURE OF THE GODS
As the second of Cicero's two volumes relevant to the issue of disbelief, The
Nature of the Gods [De Natura Deorum] is supposedly limited in particular
to the validity of the god concept. At the very beginning, Cicero indicates
that he has already published Academica to examine the broad consideration
of "withholding assent," and that his specific purpose in this text is to explore
the possible existence of one or more gods as explained by contemporary
philosophers. 17 To suggest the potential difficulty in undertaking this task, he
asserts that there is such a wide range of beliefs about their existence that it is
difficult to arrive at a coherent final judgment. In order to cope with this task,
he explains that his organization of De Natura Deorum involves a tripartite
comparison of attitudes toward religious belief among the three most popular
philosophies in currency at the time-Epicureanism as explained by Velleius, Stoicism as explained by Balbus, and Academic skepticism as explained by Cotta, based on the teachings of Cameades interpreted by both
Philo and Antiochus. For Epicureanism, Cicero combines the perspective of
Zeno of Sidon with his friend Phaedrus, the author of On Gods (Peri theon).
For Stoicism he combines the perspectives of his personal friends Diodotus
and Posidonius. And finally, for skepticism he resorts to Cotta to elucidate
Philo and Antiochus' explanations ofCameades. 18
Cicero divides theories that support the god concept into two categories-those with deities totally indifferent to human experience and those with
intrusive gods who have created mankind as a species to be "controlled and
kept in motion." 19 As explained by Cicero, this difference has important
implications for the practice of religious belief, since the abandonment of this
practice may be at too great a cost, for individual integrity ultimately depends
on one's ability and confidence in making what seems a valid choice. This
principle, he suggests, applies to both the individual and society as a whole.
For this reason he praises the useful contribution of philosophers such as
Plato and Zeno, who believed "the whole world is ruled and governed by
divine intelligence and reason," as opposed to Cameades, who "controverted" this orthodox perspective at great length. 20 He and his followers
might promote their seemingly valid theories with vigor and conviction, but
others less hostile to the god concept to make valid arguments that also
deserved consideration.
Two of the three participants, Velleius and Balbus, respond by suggesting
their support of religious belief to a certain extent, but also their willingness
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to argue their opinions in the spirit of skepticism. The third, Cotta, concedes
his recent temptation to consider the possible existence of gods, but insists
that this is something that has never been proven. Cicero then mentions the
outright disbelief of Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene as well as
such figures as Strato and Cameades, if without identifying them by name.
However, he also mentions "other philosophers .. . of eminence and note
have proposed that a more sophisticated religion can be adopted based on the
supposition that the world is ruled by "divine intelligence and reason." Thus.,
he proposes that it seems entirely possible that gods do "watch over the life
of men," as perhaps suggested by the religious assumptions of Anaxagoras,
Plato, Zeno, Chrysippus, and later Stoics. Cicero concludes by proposing that
active dialogue- effectively a sequence of elongated statements--seems an
appropriate means to explore and compare these possibilities. Cicero suggests that there is finally just one answer-either affirmative or negativepertaining to God's existence, and that Cameades' willingness to declare his
atheism had been based on evidence available at the time but that a new and
more advanced perspective might have changed his mind. Cicero seems to be
sympathetic with Antiochus' s effort to soften skepticism but unable to ignore
the earlier and more stringent skepticism of Cameades. The new and more
advanced perspective he mentions probably referred to a recent effort of
Stoic philosophers to obtain a synthesis between some of Aristotle's assumptions and an updated version of Platonism. Once debate resumes, however,
Cameades is all but ignored, and it seems he has been quoted primarily to
initiate the exchange.
The sequence of books in De Natura Deorum that follows is key to
understanding it. Book I consists of two halves with a ten-page introduction
plus Velleius' initial summary of Epicurean theory (sections 18 to 56), answered by Cotta's prolonged critique in light of skeptical assumptions (sections 57 to 124). In Book II, Balbus once again suggests the possibility of a
viable synthesis of Stoicism and Aristotelian scientific findings, and Book III
brings the exchange to a close with Cotta's skeptical arguments that reject
the concept of religion based on ethical issues, if nothing else. It should be
mentioned that Cicero grants Cotta as much space in Book I to attack Velleius as he has given Velleius' argument plus the introduction. Altogether
Cotta and Balbus are allotted equal participation overall, each of them roughly four times as much as Velleius receives. Moreover, Veilleius' presentation
is mostly limited to the relatively uncomplicated task of summarizing the
religious implications of ancient Greek philosophers up to and including
Plato. As a result, the Epicurean perspective receives far less attention than
the others, suggesting that Cicero's principal effort is to contrast Cameades'
version of Academic skepticism as explained by Cotta with Balbus' synthesis
of Aristotelian science with Stoicism and Platonism. In fact such a combina-
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tion suggests the earlier effort by Antiochus, a director of the so-called fifth
academy as well as one of Cicero's instructors in skepticism.
The exchange begins in Book I with Velleius ' historic summary of Greek
philosophy in which he attributes religious views to pre-Socratic philosophers that are slightly different from earlier descriptions by Aristotle and
others. For example, Velleius indicates that Thales had proposed that god
consists of mind that has molded everything from water, and that Anaximenes had described the air as god in incessant motion. He also indicates that
Anaxagoras first proposed that an infinite mind had designed and perfected
the order of the universe, that Pythagoras first suggested that the entire universe consists of a soul of which our souls are but fragments, and that Parmenides identified God as a circle of glowing lights across the sky. Veillius also
criticizes Empedocles for his religious naivete, Protagoras for his lack of
clarity, Plato for his concept of God's divine incorporeal existence, and Aristotle for various Platonic inconsistencies in his early but now lost essay,
"Philosophy," whose arguments were entirely abandoned in his later writings. On the other hand, Velleius praises Democritus in having disentangled
his theory from a "maze of errors" by proposing a "repudiation of deity so
absolute as to leave no conception of a divine being remaining!" 21 He also
mentions the contributions of such secondary figures as Antisthenes, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Heraclides of Pontus, Zeno, Aristo, Cleanthes, Persaeus,
and Chrysippus.
With less justification, he dismisses Strato, Epicurus' contemporary, as a
philosopher unworthy of serious consideration. He expresses his willingness
to accept Strato's atheism but not his indifference to human experience: "In
his [Strato' s] view the sole repository of divine power is nature, which contains in itself the causes of birth, growth, and decay, but is entirely devoid of
sensation and of form ." 22 He also warns against "the insane mythology of
Egypt" as well as the countless popular beliefs at the time that were typified
by inconsistencies resulting from ignorance. 23 On the other hand, he reiterates his full support for Epicurus' assumption that the gods exist because
nature itself has imprinted their concept on the minds of all mankind. In other
words, if mankind's religious belief is necessarily almost universal, it must
be conceded that the gods do in fact probably exist.
Next to speak is Cotta, and in the second half of Book I he rejects Velleius' assumptions, many of which seem to deviate from Epicurean doctrine
as explained by both Epicurus and Lucretius. As an Academic skeptic Cotta
confesses that he still believes in the gods despite his skepticism, but he
rejects the argument that the world's entire population throughout history has
believed in gods, since many ancient societies did not hold such beliefs, nor
did the assortment of ancient Greek atheists and skeptics whose identities
were common knowledge. Democritus himself, Cotta insists, had "no fixed
attitude toward the existence of the gods." 24 He also challenges the theory of
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atomism as an eternal multiplicity of tiny particles suspended in a void that
repeatedly swerve and collide with each other. 25 How, he asks, can such a
realm be linked with the authority of godhead? In his opinion these and
comparable suppositions suggest a lack of education on the part of Epicurus,
whose philosophy did not display any trace whatsoever of influence by Plato's Academy, Aristotle's Lyceum, or even ordinary schools 26 Aside from
having heard a few lectures by Nausiphanes, a follower of Democritus, Cotta
argues, Epicurus' knowledge of philosophy was sparse, and his chronic disrespect of other philosophers was inexcusable. 27
Moreover, Cotta explains, the gods suggested by Epicurus were "shadow
deities," nothing more than the "counterfeit of substance. " 28 He also expresses his astonishment that the theory of atomism is considered an adequate
explanation of human existence in the form of gods. 29 Then again, he asks
why do gods possess hands and feet if they don't really need them? He
declares that it is absurd to believe in an optimistic God entirely occupied for
all eternity in reflecting "What a good time I am having! How happy I am!" 30
In the final analysis, Cotta declares, the whole purpose of religion is to
guarantee loyal citizens: " ... the entire notion of the immortal gods is a
fiction invented by wise men in the interest of the state." He explains that this
pragmatic intention, however beneficial it might seem at times, is finally
destructive of religion as a supposedly transcendent experience. Cotta thereupon reminds Velleius, that as Posidonius has suggested in his earlier book
with the same title, De Natura Deorum, that Epicurus did not really believe
in the gods, and that he praised the immortal gods only to avoid public
hostility. In his opinion, Epicurus was fully aware that the God concept is an
impossibility, so he abolished them, though professedly retaining them. 31
Third in sequence, Balbus is granted all of Book II for expounding a
unique synthesis between Skepticism and Stoicism, and by implication, between Platonic metaphysics and scientific inquiry as promoted by Aristotle.
Balbus indicates that he will only have time to discuss two basic issues, the
proof of gods ' existence or lack thereof, and the explanation of their nature.
He begins by quoting Chrysippus, the most prolific of the early Stoic philosophers, to the effect that the dominant and final authority in the universe
beyond human capability necessarily depends on the existence of one or
more gods. He summarizes this more or less Platonic assumption in an eloquent passage that features the need for transcendent reason, whatever it
consists of, that can be identified as superior ability usually identified with
one or more gods. 32 If human intelligence, the most advanced achievement
of the universe, is incapable of having created the universe and then having
ruled it, a bigger and more dominant authority must fulfill this need. Whatever god consists of, he is to be identified with this enlarged authority. On the
other hand, Balbus suggests, the difficulty with stoicism is that it can be used
to justify the worship of any number of natural forces presumably superior to
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human reason. With this reasoning the sun, fire, liquidity, can all be worshipped. Moreover, as earlier suggested by the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus,
polytheism and pantheism also become possible.
Balbus next proposes a pantheistic argument that anticipates Spinoza's
thesis that the entire universe may be considered a god. He also praises
design as the source of regular and rhythmical motion in the universe, and
then praises chance as well, though it seems antithetical to design. Finally he
declares the importance of Aristotle's emphasis on the "motion of all living
bodies" as the result of nature, force, or will, and declares that the physical
world is "necessarily the most excellent of all things ... itself a living being
and a god. 33 Finally Balbus advocates the possibility of obtaining a synthesis
between Plato and Aristotle by treating science as justification for Platonic
beauty, ultimately suggesting Pythagoras' early concept of spherical perfection. 34 After an extended discussion of cosmic phenomena such as the sun,
moon, and sky as astronomical bodies of absolute regularity, Balbus shifts to
the perspective of Zeno, the founder of Stoicism who was willing to accept
Heraclitus' insistence on the special role of fire. This too, Balbus insists, is
indicative of God's foresight in planning the universe in every detail. Godhood can therefore be explained to manifest three principles ... first, structures toward better survival as recommended by Zeno; second genuine completeness as demonstrated by Aristotelian science, and third, and most of all,
consummate beauty as suggested by Plato. 35 Balbus goes on to describe more
than a dozen classical gods and goddesses as credible deities, and then differentiates religion from superstition based on appropriate levels of worship. He
also offers a proof of God's existence that anticipates St. Anselm's ontological argument by conceding nature's status as a separate realm somewhat
independent of the gods. Ifwe fully accept divine intelligence, he concludes,
we must also concede the necessity of divine providence. Moreover, if god
knows all, he is presumably generous as well. Balbus also asserts that the
gods are comparable to humanity in their possession of reason, that both have
the same concept of truth, and that both have the same standard in enjoining
what is right and wrong. The logic seems plain that if mankind possesses
intelligence, faith, virtue and concord, these virtues could only have descended from the powers above. 36
Balbus attributes to supernatural power the grand design of the universe
as an enormous cosmic cycle that somehow combines Aristotelian cosmology with the pre-Socratic paradigm advocated by Empedocles with earth turning into water, water into air, air into aether, and finally with the process
somehow reversed. To this extent Balbus is willing to concede that nature
governs the world. 37 However, he also concedes the contradictory possibility
that if nature exceeds art, and if art is entirely governed by reason, nature
itself cannot be considered to lack reason." 38 Balbus goes on to praise the
principle of gravity-the distribution of weight as defined by Aristotle--as
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the ultimate source of beauty. As already suggested by Strato and Archimedes, he goes on to maintain that weight is more credible as a unifying
principle than the haphazard collision of atomic particles, though he seems to
have been unable to recognize that the two might somehow coexist. He also
concurs with Aristotle in describing the earth as a sphere produced by weight
and bedecked with water and a plenitude of vegetation. 39 For a full page he
enthusiastically praises the spherical explanation of the earth. In conclusion,
he anticipates the common religious defense against post-Copernican secularism: "No one thinking of the earth in its entirety can doubt the divine
reason." 40 Such a glorious world could not happen all by itself. Obviously, it
needs a transcendent helping hand.
Without mentioning Lucretius' De Rerum Natura, which had been published just a few years earlier, Balbus concedes the possibility that the earth
might eventually come to an end in an enormous fiery cataclysm that destroys all life, setting the stage for new worlds also under the cyclical guidance of gods. 41 Without suggesting the involvement of one or more gods,
Balbus proposes the ultimate cataclysmic destiny of the universe when it
completes its cycle of existence comparable to the cycle of life. Lucretius '
cataclysmic vision is suggested, if without any reference to Lucretius himself.
Balbus concludes his argument with the thesis "that the world was created
specifically for the benefit of gods and men," in other words " ... that
everything beneficial to humanity was created specifically for this purpose."42 On the other hand, he avoids mentioning the alternative possibility
that the god concept itself just might have been promoted by mankind on the
same basis, "specifically for its own purpose," since "no great man ever
existed who did not enjoy some portion of divine inspiration." Here he assigns all acts of intelligence to this inclusive perspective as opposed to becoming entangled in incessant religious debate encouraged by the Academy
of Arcesilaus and Carneades. Sustained pursuit of such speculation, he suggests, can only bear harmful consequences: "For the habit of arguing in
support of atheism, whether it be done from conviction or in pretense, is a
wicked and an impious practice. " 43 With this abrupt and seemingly decisive
rejection of atheism, Balbus brings his exposition to a close, fully aware that
Cotta, who is waiting to respond, typifies exactly what he rejects.
The fourth and last portion of On the Nature of the Gods, Cotta's defense
of Academic skepticism, is relatively brief and seems to have been based on
skeptical assumptions almost identical to those of Carneades. Cotta begins
with the assurance that he too wants to believe in the gods and has done so
since his childhood, but that he cannot accept Balbus' arguments as adequate
proof of their existence. He confesses that he opposes all four of Balbus '
assumptions--first regarding the existence of the gods, second their nature,

162

Chapter8

third the governance of the world, and finally, their supposed concern about
mankind's welfare.44
Apropos of the first point, Cotta raises again the issue of universal belief
in immortal gods suggested by both Balbus and Velleius to demonstrate the
validity ofreligion. Quite the opposite, his response is that religious belief by
almost the entire population including both "foolish" and "mad" believers
justifies the discomfort of serious philosophers. 45 Cotta goes on to insist that
the question is not who or how many believe in the existence of gods. Quite
the contrary, he asserts, the more basic question in and of itself is whether the
gods do in fact exist. 46 Moreover, he suggests that cosmic regularity at every
level does not confirm god's existence. Quite the opposite, it confirms that
the universe runs on its own, further suggesting that genuine miracles-if
such occur--might be a far better indicator of God's existence than physical
uniformity.
Nor, Cotta argues, is it possible to accept the ontological thesis attributed
to Chrysippus, the most influential of early Stoic philosophers, that if what
can be observed in the universe could not have been created by man, some
being must exist of a higher order than man, and this being can therefore be
identified as god. 47 In response Cotta inverts Chrysippus' argument to prove
the contrary, that the world cannot be identified with one or more gods, yet
nothing is superior to the world," more beautiful, or more conducive to our
health. 48 By implication, the world itself becomes a manifestation of God as
suggested by the most basic assumption of pantheism. Cotta also expresses
his agreement with Chrysippus' explanation of supposedly transcendent human faculties as gifts of nature. According to Cotta, nature's ability to impart
these gifts is entirely the outcome of material force rather than divine reason. 49 Relevant to the question of an afterlife, he explains that aging necessarily occurs for all living species and unavoidably culminates in death. Cotta
also links the capacity for sensation with the inevitability of death once there
is no longer any need for sensation." 50 And finally, Cotta explains the comparison between life and fire based on the fact that both culminate in ashes,
and each expires when its process exhausts itself. Cotta emphasizes this
similitude and concludes that the two are similar at least in this respect. 51
Cotta switches his argument by suggesting that all the gods necessarily
lack the most important anthropomorphic traits that worshippers attribute to
them, such as prudence, ethical choice, and the capacity for reason, if in fact
they themselves lack experience with evil and have no need to choose between things good and evil. His logic is disarmingly simple and based on the
assumption that gods probably do not possess human traits if they have no
need for them. 52 Cotta then lists a wide assortment of such traits absent in
the standard concept of God, including all the vices as well as the virtues of
temperance, courage, and rational judgment. Moreover, he asserts that without these traits, "God then is neither rational nor possessed of any of the
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virtues." Based on this deficiency he accordingly maintains, "But such a God
is inconceivable." 53 Cotta concludes by arguing that Stoic philosophers who
argue otherwise share the "stupidity of the vulgar and the ignorant" in their
effort to identify god(s) as "deified human beings." Thereupon he provides
an elongated catalog of as many as sixty-eight ancient gods and goddesses
who have been worshipped at one time or another. He ends by arguing that
the further invention of such deities can only be a waste of time and should
be abandoned. The unspoken deduction is that the acceptance of atheism is
the only credible alternative.
Next Cotta questions the ethical aspect ofreligion that links divine providence with virtue and reason. Whereas these capabilities might seem to
merge in the depiction of god(s), he argues, such a convergence tends to be
violated in human society. Far too often, he suggests, there is a misuse of
reason despite ethical considerations, especially through the misuse of intelligence to perform hostile and even criminal acts. Too often, moreover, greed
typified by an excessive accumulation of wealth often depends on superior
mental facility, as do other such transgressions for comparable reasons. He
accordingly asks, "Is there a single act of lust, of avarice, or of crime, which
is not entered on deliberately or which is not carried out with active exercise
of thought, that is, by aid of the reason?" 54 Cotta's answer to his own question is devastating:
For if the gods gave man reason, they gave him malice, for malice is the crafty
and covert planning of harm; and likewise also the gods gave him trickery and
crime and all the other wickednesses, none of which can be either planned or
executed without reasoning. 55

In contrast, Cotta provides an extended list of virtuous men in ancient
times who have instead been "visited by misfortune" as compared to "the
wicked who have prospered exceedingly." In his opinion, such ethical disparities suggest that the benevolent intervention of the gods in human affairs has
been modest at best, further suggesting the obvious paradox that there is no
such thing as the divine governance of the world if that governance makes no
distinction between the good and the wicked. For emphasis Cotta quotes the
philosopher Diogenes, a contemporary of Aristotle and the inventor of the
relatively modest Cynical school of philosophy, that "the prosperity and
good fortune of the wicked . . . disprove the might and power of the gods
entirely." Cotta fully concurs: "If human rulers knowingly overlook a fault
they are greatly to blame; but as for god, he cannot even offer the excuse of
ignorance." 56
Cotta finally reminds everybody of Carneades' cynical deduction, "Accordingly either providence does not know its own powers, or it does not
regard human affairs, or it lacks power of judgment to discern what is the

164

Chapter8

best. It does not care for individuals." Cotta ends his argument on a less
strident note: "This more or less is what I have to say about the nature of the
gods; it is not my design to disprove it, but to bring you to understand how
obscure it is and how difficult to explain." 57
Upon the conclusion of debate, Cicero and Velleius compare notes on
their respective attitudes in response to the various arguments. Velleius declares his preference for Cotta's atheistic assumptions, and Cicero answers
perhaps surprisingly that he feels Balbus' Stoic arguments were more credible in the final analysis. 58 Today, in contrast, it seems to convey the weakest
perspective, and Aristotle ' s often hardly recognizable assumptions somehow
prevailed over those of Cameades. The retrospective assessments assigned to
both participants also seems misguided. As an Epicurean, V eilleius is predictably attracted by an atheistic stance, aside from his aversion to Strato's
example that was to be expected in light of the sustained animosity between
Epicureans and the Lyceum. On the other hand, Cicero's agreement with
Balbus is perhaps a result of the impact of Aristotle ' s fresh influence at the
time, having come into currency in Rome not more than a few decades
earlier. Cicero certainly appreciates Aristotle ' s views explained by Balbus,
but there is little evidence that be himself has explored Aristotle's analysis in
any depth beyond the assumptions expressed by Balbus. Then again, perhaps
Cicero's choice results from his earlier experience as a student of the late
Academic skeptics, Philo and Antiochus, both of whom sought a synthesis
beyond Cameades' reductive commitment to atheism. In any case, Cicero
seems more tempted by Balbus ' effort as a Stoic philosopher to revisit the
possible validity of religion than might otherwise be expected.
At the beginning of his remarkable text, Cicero seems to have presented
its arguments as a final history of skepticism and natural philosophy in a
tradition that extended from Plato's transcendent truths to their wholesale
rejection by Cameades and others. His tone is initially apologetic. "They
wonder at my coming forward so unexpectedly as the champion of a derelict
system and one that bas long been given up." 59 It suggests both the crisis in
Rome and the declining relevance of Greek philosophy at the time, just a few
centuries before Christianity offered an entirely new version of orthodoxy,
one that eliminated from consideration the possible validity of both skepticism and natural philosophy. Today, of course, Cicero's summary assessment of the collective interplay among Greek philosophers after perhaps six
centuries of documented secular assumptions seems more valid than ever.
Cicero himself was remarkably insightful in having described this history as
a "negative dialectic" that would continue to be valid whatever its future
prospects in Rome :
Take for example the philosophical method referred to, that of a purely negative dialectic which refrains from pronouncing any positive judgment. This,
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after being originated by Socrates, revived by Arcesilas, and reinforced by
Cameades, has flourished right down to our own period; though I understand
that in Greece itself it is now almost bereft of adherents. But this I ascribe not
to the fault of the Academy but to the dullness of mankind. 60

This remarkable achievement of Greek civilization had already fallen into
decline, and whether Cicero realized it or not deterioration would soon
spread to all aspects of existence in Rome itself, and to such an extent that his
generation can be described as having provided the culmination of ancient
civilization beyond anything that would follow over the next fifteen centuries. There is insufficient evidence based on textual scholarship as to which
of Cicero's final texts was brought to its completion immediately preceded
his assassination, but his last words in De Natura Deorum, strictly translated
as "more nearly a semblance of the truth" [veritatis similitudinem], suggest
his final definitive pronouncement.

Epilogue

The decline of secular philosophy can be linked with the ascent of the Roman
Empire, but it was also partly a result of its own evolution. Natural philosophy had already fallen into decline well before the reign of Augustus, and in
fact Cicero's two dialogues seem to have been a culmination of secular
inquiry, as compared to the continuing growth of stoicism advocated by
Seneca, Plotinus, and Marcus Aurelius, which gave new life to Platonism as
well as anticipating the later acceptance of Christianity. There was also renewed interest in Pyrrhonian skepticism as revised by the Alexandrian skeptic, Aenisidemus, who effectively expanded Pyrrho's defense of benign ignorance to include the value of unexamined political allegiance. This, too,
was a by-product of the overall transition of Rome from a republic to Augustus' imperial reign, exactly when political quietism tolerant of authority was
welcome. Not surprisingly, for example, Augustus exiled Ovid from Rome
because of his obvious disrespect for the gods, then commissioned Virgil's
epic, The Aeneid, to mythologize the role of Roman gods on an anachronistic
Homeric basis. While ancient Greek civilization had advanced from Homer
to Aristotle, Rome's later transition seems to have regressed from Lucretius'
epic secular pessimism to Virgil's renewed depictions of Homeric bravery.
Augustus ruled effectively for two decades, and Tiberius, his successor
was largely successful. However, less competent emperors followed whose
impact was harmful, most notably Caligula and Nero. In the second century
AD, there was substantial improvement in governance during the so-called
Antonine Age led by Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus, and Marcus Aurelius--all
of whom ruled effectively for two decades apiece. In particular, Marcus
Aurelius played an effective double role as a stoic philosopher and benevolent ruler of Rome. However, his son Commodus succeeded him and was as
ruinous as Caligula and Nero. More deterioration followed under the next
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twenty-nine emperors before Diocletian failed in his futile attempt to restore
Rome's earlier authority by suppressing Christianity. Gibbon described this
process of deterioration in his history, The Decline and Fall of the Roman
Empire, and in his recent book The Swerve, Stephen Greenblatt captures the
inevitable downward transformation of Roman "civilization" as a wholeAs the empire crumbled, as cities decayed, trade declined, and the increasingly
anxious populace scanned the horizon for barbarous armies, the whole Roman
system of elementary and higher education fell apart. What began as downsizing went on to wholesale abandonment. Schools closed, libraries and academies shut their doors, professional grammarians and teachers of rhetoric found
themselves out of work. There were more important things to worry about than
the fate of books. 1

Along with Rome's cultural decline and perhaps contributing to it, there
was an influx of workers from across the empire who brought an assortment
of sacrificial religions with them. The goddess Cybele had been granted
respectability as early as 206 BC because of her supposed role in Rome 's
victory over Carthage. Later arrivals included Artis, Dionysus, Astarte, Demeter, Serapis, and Zoroaster. Several of the religions featured trinities already suggested by the Egyptian sacred family of Osiris, Isis and Horusand the worship of many of these gods seems to have imitated rituals performed in the worship of Osiris, whose death and resurrection had been
celebrated in Egypt as early as the twenty-fourth century BC.
Many Roman aristocrats were offended and repelled by what seemed the
vulgarity of populist religion. In his essay, "Superstition," Plutarch criticized
his less fortunate neighbors for their prostrations, their inability to reason on
their own, their mixture of dread and worship in the idea of God, and their
acceptance of the concept of human sacrifice. 2 These attitudes extended to
early Christianity and were often linked with social class. Celsus was rigorous in his dismissal of Christianity as nothing more than "a fable that primarily appealed to the lower classes." 3 On the other hand, some Roman aristocrats considered religion to be useful in keeping an otherwise unruly multitude respectful of authority. They thought impoverished troublemakers were
more likely to obey the law if they believed in a god who punished disobedience. The Roman historian Livy agreed, suggesting that there was historic
precedence for this necessity based on the legend of the king of Rome, Numa
Pompilius, who "put the fear of the gods upon the people as the most effective thing for an ignorant and rough multitude." Earlier, the Sicilian historian
Diodorus wrote that this goal was best achieved by promising rewards and
punishment in an afterlife: "Myths which are told of the affairs in Hades,
though pure invention at bottom, contribute to make men pious and upright. "4 The fear of God provided an incentive for people who were unable to
obey the law as an ethical necessity.
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Although Christianity arrived in Rome later than most of the Near Eastern
religions, it was better packaged as a belief system than any of them. It
possessed a text of its own, as opposed to an almost complete lack of written
verification among competitive religions. It also enlisted an effective priesthood, included women as well as men (especially as compared to Mithraism), and, perhaps most important, taught a doctrine that featured the worship of one God instead of an assortment of countless demigods and goddesses. Finally, Christians were prohibited from attending ceremonies for competitive deities, for example the lively pagan festivals held in Rome . This
combination of factors ultimately prevailed. When the Emperor Constantine
converted to Christianity in 312 AD, he was successful in imposing Christian
conversion across Europe, and with an impact that lasted for the next twelve
centuries.
There was a substantial difference between the more exclusive conceptual
demands of Greek philosophy and the greater accessibility of Biblical scriptures, which were intended for a broad audience. Christ had addressed his
message to the population of the Levant, an impoverished region located
between the two most remarkable economic and cultural epicenters of ancient history preceding Rome--Athens as a wealthy port city where philosophy was brought to fruition at an unprecedented level, and Alexandria as an
even wealthier port city where science and philology also flourished. In the
lands between these two cities, Christianity addressed the needs of an essentially illiterate rural community oppressed by Roman occupation. Here, the
complexity of Greek cosmology and Alexandrian science must have been
irrelevant and difficult to grasp. Although he was successful as a missionary,
is not surprising that Paul converted few , if any of Athens' populace to
Christianity when he traveled there for that purpose. 5
In his first book, Contra-Academica, St. Augustine addressed theoretical
assumptions of Greek philosophy in order to refute them. With skill he
turned Academic skepticism against itself to justify the rejection of all Greek
philosophy for its erroneous assumptions. He argued, most notably, that
whether he realized it not, Cicero proved that all ancient philosophy was
indeterminate and therefore wrong. Moreover, he added, Cicero ' s skepticism
itself could likewise be rejected with the argument, "If nothing can be proven, even this [the argument that nothing can be proved] cannot be proven." 6
But of course Augustine himself neglected to go a step further by extending
this line of argument to reject his own "proof' that supported religious doctrine. For if what can 't be proven can't be proven wrong, it can't even be
proven that what can ' t be proven can't be proven wrong, ergo the question
remains open.
Over time, Christian emperors came to strongly support Christian doctrine, often by suppressing alternatives. Most notably, Theodosius seems to
have been responsible for the accidental destruction of the Library of Alexan-
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dria around 380. As mentioned in this book's Introduction, the destruction of
numerous other libraries occurred over the next few hundred years. The
Christian emperor Justinian closed down the schools of Athens and outlawed
Greek philosophy there to prevent Aristotle's assumptions from being linked
with Christian doctrine. On the other hand, Christian philosophers advanced
what amounted to a mandatory version of orthodox metaphysics that conferred special status to scriptures, presumed miracles, and the spiritual needs
of the populace. This striking theoretical reversal was entirely at odds with
the original intent of ancient Greek philosophy, while the basic assumptions
of Plato's dialogues later provided Christian eschatology with its metaphysical justification throughout the Dark and Middle Ages. In contrast, Aristotle's works remained far less accessible and only became available to scholars after St. Thomas Aquinas had successfully gained their acceptance.
Meanwhile, most of the philosophy of ancient secular philosophers such as
Democritus, Theophrastus, Strata, Epicurus, and Carneades had all but disappeared.
The enforcement of Christianity became bloodthirsty. The Crusades supposedly fulfilled the expansionist Christian mission to capture Jerusalem,
Constantinople, and the region, and the Inquisition tortured and killed millions of suspected heretics and witches. In 1209, for example, the entire
population of Beziers, a fortified town, was slaughtered on the assumption
declared by Pope Innocent III that God would sort out those victims worthy
of heaven from those who deserved otherwise. 7 There is little to no evidence
today of secular philosophy in any guise during the Middle Ages. It had been
effectively erased.
Fortunately, Arab civilization culminating in the twelfth century AD tolerated and even encouraged the investigation of Aristotle's version of materialism, taught by Avicenna and Averroes. These two philosophers in particular provided a theoretical stepping stone that provided a link between ancient
secularism to its later recovery during the European Renaissance, when Italian humanists could reexamine the few Greek and Latin texts that had survived the Dark and Middle Ages.
True to its name, the Renaissance that began with Petrarch' s effort to
restore Cicero was a "rebirth" in which the newly acquired knowledge from
ancient Greece led to a spread of inquiry and of secularism across Europe.
The principal astronomers of the Renaissance--Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo--were heavily beholden to ancient astronomy. In his Introduction to On
the Revolutions of Heavenly Spheres, for example, Copernicus stated that his
concept ofa heliocentric universe had been inspired by a passage in Cicero ' s
Academica about similar findings by the ancient astronomer Hicetas. Similarly, both Bacon and Gilbert employed experimentation comparable to the
efforts of Strata, Montaigne sought to recapture the intellectual freedom of
Academic skepticism by pasting Arcesileus' favorite word, epoche, on the
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ceiling above his desk, and Bruno obviously enlarged upon the materialist
assumptions of Aristotle, Democritus, and their contemporaries. Moreover,
Gassendi elaborated his own version of Democritus' atomism, and Descartes
renewed the pursuit of mathematical philosophy as first suggested by Pythagoras.
The year 1600 was noteworthy in particular. Bruno was burned at the
stake for impiety at about the same time as Gilbert's breakthrough announcement of his discovery of electricity and Shakespeare's production of Hamlet,
in which cosmic doubt is suggested by his most famous line, "To be or not to
be," a phrase first articulated word-for-word by Aristotle in both Prior Analytics [70a4] and Metaphysics [ 1006b 19]. This seemingly empty abstraction-the question of existence in and of itself--had been under consideration
among the natural philosophers of ancient Greece, and Shakespeare re-presented this choice in its dramatic version for an English audience. Although
Bacon avoided mentioning anyone by name, he paid tribute in his introduction to Novum Organum to ancient scientists for having inspired his scientific
methodology-"modem" science as opposed to medieval alchemy.
The English philosopher Hobbes was repeatedly accused of heresy and
had the audacity to describe atheism as "the sin of imprudence." Four
decades later Spinoza confessed, "I do not know how to teach philosophy
without becoming a disturber of established religion." 8 Newton suggested an
explanation of gravity, a modem equivalent of Aristotle's theory of weight in
the final pages of De Caelo. In turn, Hurne featured a modem version of
Academic skepticism based on Locke's psychology, which itself had been
anticipated by Aristotle, and major figures in France including Voltaire,
Rousseau, Diderot, Helvetius, and Condorcet identified themselves as deists
(i.e. believers in an entirely impersonal God) as opposed to the outright
atheism promoted by Meslier and d'Holbach. Later philosophers such as
Mill, Spencer, James, Dewey, Santayana, Heidegger, Sartre, Ayer and Carnap were discrete in avoiding the discussion of religion, as opposed to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Marx, Russell, Freud, and Sartre, all of whom were
willing to admit their atheism. Meanwhile science flourished beyond the
most extravagant expectations of ancient philosophers, with inductive findings relevant to astronomy, evolution, genetics, particle physics, molecular
biology, and numerous other fields of inquiry, all on a strictly secular basis.
Outspoken atheists who authored books and articles specifically to declare their disbelief include Meslier, Bradlaugh, Ingersoll, Mencken, Richard
Dawkins, and Christopher Hitchens. Also worth mentioning, are the two
nineteenth century historians of science, Buchner and Haeckel, as well as the
American historian of science, Andrew White, and two remarkably productive secular historians of the early twentieth century, J.M. Robertson, and
Joseph McCabe. And of course hundreds of other individuals have been
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quoted as freethinkers, for example, in James Haught's excellent anthology,
2000 Years ofDisbelief
Not that freethinkers comprise a large percentage of the population as a
whole. According to the latest Pew poll in 2015, only 7 percent of the population of the United States were willing to identify themselves as atheists as
opposed to the 23 percent who identify themselves as being unaffiliated in
their religious choice, and the 73 percent willing to identify themselves as
Christians. 9 Atheists seem a small minority though their number is perhaps
comparable to the prevalent ratio in Athens during the Age of Pericles. The
percentage of atheists seems to be more substantial in Europe, for example in
France 23 percent, in Holland 20 percent, in Sweden 19 percent, and in
England 18 percent. 10 In contrast, these statistics are reversed among scientists. Over the past century as published in Nature, religious belief among
modem scientists has declined from 27. 7 percent in 1914 to 15 percent in
1933, and to 7 percent in 1998. 11 Einstein has often been identified as an
outstanding exception because of his oft-repeated public support of religion
throughout his life. However, he finally confessed in a personal letter a year
before he died, "The word 'god' is for me nothing more than the expression
and product of human weaknesses, the Bible a collection of honorable, but
still primitive legends which are nevertheless pretty childish." 12 Who could
have said it better?
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